Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07NICOSIA456, PRISON BRAWL REVEALS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, DISCOMFORT WITH

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07NICOSIA456.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07NICOSIA456 2007-05-29 14:12 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Nicosia
VZCZCXRO8831
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHNC #0456/01 1491412
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 291412Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7853
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000456 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL CY TU
SUBJECT: PRISON BRAWL REVEALS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, DISCOMFORT WITH 
NEWCOMERS 
 
Ref: Nicosia 434 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Turf battles over drug dealing morphed into open 
rioting May 8 at a prison in north Nicosia.  Unable to suppress the 
fighting, penitentiary leadership summoned for assistance "TRNC" 
riot police, who ended the conflict quickly.  Soon afterwards, 
however, media alleged that police and prison guards had employed 
brutal tactics to quell the disturbance.  Additionally, journalists 
revealed that the north's only prison was grossly overcrowded, 
housing three times as many inmates as it could humanely contain. 
Most were mainland Turks, many illegal, spawning further 
navel-gazing that Turkish Cypriots were "losing their island" to the 
mostly poor, often illiterate, and prone to violence newcomers from 
Anatolia.  While the jailhouse riot and subsequent media firestorm 
over prison demographics raised awareness over the 
still-uncontrolled flow of migrants from the mainland, we doubt the 
"TRNC" will implement tougher restrictions anytime soon.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------------- 
RIOTING UNCOVERS VIOLENCE, FILTH 
-------------------------------- 
 
2.  (U) As in many penitentiaries, drugs flow freely at the "TRNC 
Central Prison" in north Nicosia, the north's sole correctional 
facility.  A dispute among rival dealers sparked violence May 8, 
with fights breaking out between 30-odd inmates.  Prison staff, 
quickly determining they lacked the means to respond effectively, 
called in "TRNC" riot police to put down the fighting and restore 
order, which they quickly did.  A subsequent search of prison 
grounds uncovered a considerable number of inmate-produced weapons 
and a variety of illegal substances. 
 
3.  (U) Factual media reporting of the incident quickly turned into 
scathing criticism of the brutal methods employed, however.  Police 
allegedly had targeted not only rioters, but the general prison 
population, subjecting scores to truncheon blows.  The Turkish 
Cypriot Doctors Association (TCDA) obtained permission from the 
"Ministry of Interior" to enter the prison and examine inmates.  Of 
a random sample of 60 prisoners, 50 had heavy bruising on their 
legs, consistent with blows from truncheons. 
 
4.  (U) TCDA also criticized prison living standards, focusing on 
overcrowding.  "Official" figures state that over 450 inmates fill 
the 180-capacity prison; some journalists close to the "government" 
put the true number at 750.  Thirty inmates or more were sharing a 
single commode, TCDA claimed, and showers were similarly scarce. 
Security experts, too, were appalled by conditions within the "TRNC" 
facility.  Not only were the guards and wardens hard-pressed to 
control the overwhelming number of prisoners in such a small prison, 
but there were no closed circuit TV cameras or any other high-tech 
security/surveillance technologies employed there. 
 
5.  (U) Other pundits highlighted equally grave problems with the 
north's incarceration regime.  Convicted criminals shared space with 
detainees awaiting trial and unable to afford bail, for example, a 
practice outlawed in many countries.  Violent criminals and 
non-violent offenders were housed jointly.  And in at least one area 
of the prison, men, women, and legal minors served time in close 
confines. 
 
------------------------------ 
AUTHORITIES QUICK TO PASS BUCK 
------------------------------ 
 
6.  (SBU) Media criticism sent "TRNC" leadership immediately into 
spin control over the handling of the riot.  The "MoI" cited 
overcrowding for prison authorities' inability to contain the 
violence, seemingly ignorant they had any role in generating said 
conditions.  Also to blame for the excessively violent reprisal, the 
"Minister" continued, was the "government's" inability to manage the 
police, who, under Article 10 of the Turkish Cypriot "Constitution," 
temporarily fall under the command of Turkish security forces. 
 
7.  (SBU) It was prison demographics, however, that would soon 
dominate discourse in the T/C community.  "Government" authorities 
argued that Turkish Cypriots constituted only 30 percent of the 
prisoner population, the remainder being foreigners, predominantly 
Turks.  Most of the latter were not the "settlers" so widely 
denigrated in the south, but Anatolian "tourists" -- temporary 
migrants seeking work, really -- who continued to arrive in great 
numbers. 
 
-------------------------- 
Natural to Blame the Other 
-------------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) Even before the May 8 riot, many in the Turkish 
Cypriot-administered area were attributing the increasing crime rate 
to foreigners, mostly Turks.  A day rarely went by, for example, 
without media reports of Turkish "tourists" being arrested at 
Kyrenia or Famagusta ports for carrying narcotics.  Incidents of 
 
NICOSIA 00000456  002 OF 002 
 
 
rape, theft, and murder have increased as well, editorialists 
alleged.  Turkish Cypriot dailies now devote several pages daily to 
criminal news, and they rarely lack for input. 
 
9.  (SBU) The north Nicosia prison had been spacious enough for the 
local prisoner population and mostly calm for decades, T/C media and 
opinion leaders argued.  Further, the Turkish Cypriots currently 
housed there would fill less than half the facility.  Rather than 
building a new prison to accommodate the burgeoning inmate 
populations, the "government" has reacted by announcing its 
intention to speed implementation of the Felon Expatriation 
Agreement recently signed with Turkey.  Only then would overcrowding 
be truly overcome and prison conditions improved, a spokesman 
asserted. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Turkish Cypriots, Settlers, and Migrants 
---------------------------------------- 
 
10.  (SBU) According to the recent "TRNC census," individuals born 
in Turkey represent nearly half of the T/C-administered area's de 
facto population (Reftel).  Social conflict between this segment and 
native-born Turkish Cypriots would seem natural, and does in fact 
occur.  But the public row over the prison riot highlights a 
different demographic fissure in northern Cyprus.  T/Cs directed 
their wrath not towards mainland Turks as a whole, but to the 
uneducated and poor Turkish "tourists" whose numbers, despite 
tougher "TRNC migration legislation" passed last year, continue to 
grow.  While these Anatolians might be filling jobs that neither 
T/Cs nor long-term Turkish residents will accept, they also have 
brought rising criminality, drug use, violence against women, and 
other social ills, the prevailing theory here goes. 
 
11.  (SBU) Many Turkish Cypriots are demanding the "government" take 
drastic measures to staunch the flow of Turkish nationals to the 
island.  "Those here must go, and no more must be allowed to enter," 
shouted "Kibrisli" newspaper recently, ironically plagiarizing 
language most Greek Cypriots use when referring to all ethnic Turks 
who have arrived in Cyprus post-1974.  With jam-packed ferries from 
the mainland continuing to arrive daily, however, Kibrisli's 
campaign looks daunting. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
12.  (SBU) Despite the public's clamor for implementation of a more 
restrictive migratory system, we don't expect major changes soon, 
prison rioting or not.   Revisions undoubtedly would prove 
politically divisive, with T/C nationalists, who historically have 
benefited from mainlanders' votes, opposing the measures stridently. 
 And while the "governing" CTP plausibly might benefit from a 
crackdown, winning electoral support for its "get tough on illegal 
immigration" stand, we doubt it would risk a fight with the right 
wing -- and Ankara -- on this potentially incendiary issue. 
 
SCHLICHER