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UNCLAS NAIROBI 002215 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC KDEM KE PGOV PREL PTER
SUBJECT: MUNGIKI: KENYA'S LARGEST CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION 
 
REF: 06 NAIROBI 5282 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The Mungiki, a large criminal organization 
operating within the Kikuyu community, has a network of 
supporters within the government bureaucracy and political 
leadership.  It's use of extreme violence to amplify its 
influence through terror and its parallel government weakens 
the authority of the Kenyan state.  The Government's 
professed desire to eradicate the Mungiki is hampered by the 
organization's political and official connections.  Combating 
Mungkiki requires more than merely mass arrests of alleged 
members.  Targeting Mungiki leadership is likely to produce 
better results, but requires confronting its supporters 
within the ranks of Kenya's governing class.  End Summary. 
 
From Tent of the Living God to Organized Crime 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2. (SBU)  The Mungiki criminal organization has its origins 
in an offshoot of a small religious sect among the Kikuyu 
community.  Around 1989 a group of younger members split off 
from the Tent of the Living God, a religious sect operating 
in Kikuyu-dominated regions of Central and Rift Valley 
provinces that calls for a rejection of Christianity and 
Western culture in favor of a return to traditional Kikuyu 
beliefs and culture.  The group broke from Tent of the Living 
God when the Tent's charismatic leader appeared to be 
moderating his views in order to win acceptance by Kikuyu 
elites.  The group adopted the name "Mungiki," meaning "the 
masses."  Ndura Waruinge (see reftel), then about 18 years 
old, emerged as the Mungiki leader.  Waruinge is the grandson 
of a notable Mau Mau leader during the revolt against the 
British colonial administration in the 1950s.  Under 
Waruinge's leadership, the group took on Mau Mau trappings 
(such as oathing rituals, the dreadlock hairstyle, etc.) and 
an increasingly political orientation. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Like the Mau Mau before them, the Mungiki preach 
Kikuyu nationalism, not Kenyan nationalism.  They identify 
rhetorically with the "poor and oppressed" against the elites 
and the Kenyan state.  They often proclaimed in their early 
years that the task of the Mungiki was to complete the work 
of the Mau Mau by "cleansing" Kikuyu culture of Western 
influence and freeing the state from the grip of corrupt 
elites serving foreign masters. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Mungiki grew rapidly during the 1990s, a time of 
severe political turbulence and violence surrounding the 
movement to restore multiparty democracy to Kenya.  The Moi 
regime instigated ethnic violence against Kikuyu communities 
in Rift Valley Province through private ethnic 
militias-for-hire in 1992 and then again in 1997. 
Radicalized and dispossessed Kikuyu youth who had seen their 
communities burned to the ground during these attacks flocked 
to Mungiki for protection and vengeance.  Many of these new 
members, recently having lost their rural homes, relocated to 
Nairobi slums, especially the Kikuyu-dominated slum of 
Mathare, which became a Mungiki stronghold. 
 
¶5. (SBU) While many Mungiki followers in rural areas retained 
a religious and cultural orientation, throughout the 90's, in 
Nairobi, Nakuru and the principal towns of Central Province 
(the Kikuyu heartland), the Mungiki increasingly emphasized 
radical subversive political rhetoric and adopted a military 
style organization.  The Mungiki became less a militant 
religious sect and more an urban political militia and 
criminal gang.  Initiates answer to captains who take orders 
from local coordinators who in turn serve under national 
coordinators.  Members only know the identity of those in 
their cell and the captain supervising their cell.  Immediate 
compliance with orders from above is required from all 
members.  Once having taken the initiation oath, members 
cannot leave the organization.  Betrayal of Mungiki is 
punishable by death. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Urban Mungiki in the mid-1990s became involved in 
vigilante activity to "protect" Kikuyu slum dwellers.  This 
led to the development of protection rackets first in the 
slums and housing estates and then on public transport 
routes.  The Mungiki fought successfully for protection turf 
against smaller traditional extortion gangs, ostensibly in 
the name of reducing rents and fares for the common man. 
They also came into increasing conflict with the police. 
 
¶7. (SBU) By the late 1990s, as the Mungiki grew in numbers 
and wealth, they attracted the attention of political and 
business leaders in the Kikuyu community.  The Mungiki hired 
out their services to Kikuyu politicians (both ruling and 
opposition parties) and business leaders (mostly landlords) 
as enforcers and intimidators.  Many members, especially 
those directly involved in "fund raising," took on a less 
conspicuous look, shaving their dreadlocks in an attempt to 
maintain a lower public profile.  By 2000 the Mungiki had 
recruited or infiltrated significant numbers of members and 
sympathizers within the ranks of the police and state 
bureaucracy. 
 
¶8. (SBU) In March 2002 a force of about 250 Mungiki attacked 
the Kariobangi North housing estate in Nairobi, killing 20 
residents and maiming over 30.  Their particular targets were 
members of the rival "Taliban" gang, which is made up of 
members of the Luo ethnic group, but common residents of the 
estate were also attacked.  Following this incident, which 
the press reported was preceded by numerous warnings to the 
police, all unacted on, the Moi government banned 18 
"vigilante groups," including the Mungiki.  Both Taliban and 
Mungiki leaders were arrested.  The Taliban leader was 
subsequently charged.  The Mungiki leader, Waruinge, was 
released without charge.  Waruinge called on Mungiki 
followers to support Moi's KANU and its Kikuyu presidential 
candidate, Uhuru Kenyatta, even though many Mungiki were the 
victims of Moi-directed communal violence only five years 
earlier. 
 
Mungiki Ideology, Aims and Practices 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶9. (SBU) Mungiki ideology is often contradictory, 
opportunistic and incoherent, but it contains a powerful 
appeal to Kikuyu youth in the slums who feel alienated from 
the Kenyan state and mainstream Kenyan society.  Mungiki 
theology calls for a return to the worship of Ngai, the 
Kikuyu god resident on Kirinyaga (Mount Kenya).  It 
vociferously rejects Christianity as an alien import 
responsible for holding the Kikuyu in "mental slavery" to 
"the West."  And yet, Mungiki rhetoric is full of images and 
verse citations from the Old Testament meant to justify 
Mungiki actions and beliefs. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The Mungiki political agenda is confused, but 
essentially calls for ethnic federalism in which all 
Kikuyu-inhabited areas will be united under the authority of 
the elders, the pre-colonial Kikuyu political system.  This 
"Kikuyu state" may or may not be affiliated with similar 
ethnic states for Kenya's other communities.  The political 
agenda is short on specifics and long on scathing critiques 
of the Kenyan state and the traditional elite it is held to 
serve at the expense of the common man in general and Kikuyu 
youth in particular. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Mungiki arose in the context of the Moi 
administration's explicitly anti-Kikuyu policies.  The fact 
that Kenya is now led by a Kikuyu-dominated government has 
taken some of the wind out of the sails of Mungiki's 
resentment-laden political rhetoric.  That rhetoric has less 
relevancy today as Mungiki de-emphasizes religious, cultural 
and political purposes and now acts purely as a criminal 
organization existing only for the financial benefit of its 
leadership and members.  Religious and political themes are 
used as a means of binding members to Mungiki identity, but 
do not appear to represent a sincere religious, cultural or 
political program. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Multiple press reports refer to the Mungiki 12 
Commandments.  These commandments are illustrative of the 
Mungiki ethos, its military-style organization and modus 
operandi.  Several recent incidents of Mungiki violence 
reflect this code: 
 
-- You shall not smoke cigarettes, take frothed beer, wines 
and spirits but instead take traditional brew. That liquor 
remains prohibited to all unmarried but snuff is allowed to 
all, male and female members. 
 
-- It is an abomination to be an uncircumcised Kikuyu male or 
female. (NOTE:  Mungiki are infamous for forcible female 
genital mutilation.  END NOTE.) 
 
-- Never rape or defile or make love to a woman who is not 
your wife. 
 
-- Never let any member be persecuted, humiliated or be taken 
hostage by any force, no matter how powerful that enemy is. 
Always fight back and if overwhelmed, retreat and seek 
reinforcement. 
 
-- Any life of our member taken by an aggressor, or any of 
our property destroyed by that aggressor shall be avenged. 
Revenge at all times will be tenfold. In this, we are all 
bound by the sacred blood of our veins through an oath. 
 
-- Enemies are traitors, deserters and any force that 
confronts us. Traitors are members who betray us, deserters 
being those who abandon our cause. Their punishment shall be 
death by beheading and their heads shall be dumped where they 
can be found as a testimony but their torsos should never be 
found.  (NOTE:  Several recent suspected Mungiki murders have 
observed this protocol.  END NOTE.) 
 
-- Sect's secrets shall not be discussed with non-members. 
Any member who contravenes this shall be punished severely. 
 
 
-- All times observe peace, spreading our doctrine to our 
brothers and sisters, recruiting many to our cause and 
binding them through administration of the oath. 
 
-- Always endeavor to raise resources to fund any of our 
calling and all our regional coordinators must at all times 
be on the lookout and utilize those avenues that will 
generate resources. 
 
-- There shall be a set target for all regional coordinators, 
besides the resources that will be kept for sharing out by 
the unemployed members. 
 
-- All our efforts shall be the recovery of our lost lands, 
the land of our forefathers where there was no hunger since 
water, milk, honey and meat were in abundance. 
 
-- The sect's trademarks shall at all times be a club and a 
sword to clobber and slay its identified enemies. 
 
-- All members shall at all times be at the ready, to be 
called at short notice to timely execute directives as shall 
be communicated to members through their respective regional 
leaders. 
 
-- The hierarchy of the cause's command shall at all times be 
respected and the decision and resolutions of the national 
council shall be final and non negotiable, to be executed 
without question. 
 
The Mungiki Today: Kenya's Largest Criminal Organization 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) The Mungiki today are a large criminal organization 
with a network of supporters within the government 
bureaucracy and political leadership.  It uses extreme 
violence to amplify its influence through terror.  Some of 
the academic literature on the Mungiki paint its members as 
harmless rastafarians with a thirst for social justice.  If 
this was ever the case, it certainly is not now.  They are 
vicious, sadistic killers.  Kenyan newspapers up until 
recently routinely referred to the Mungiki as a "banned 
sect," emphasizing its roots as an unorthodox religious 
group.  These same newspapers, quite appropriately, now refer 
to Mungiki as a criminal gang.  The Mungiki operate in 
significant portions of Central province, some parts of Rift 
Valley province (Nakuru area, for example) and much of 
Nairobi, especially along transportation routes.  (NOTE: 
Official Government of Kenya figures show the public 
transportation sector clearing over USD 1.5 million a day 
nationwide.  END NOTE) 
 
¶14. (SBU) The Mungiki rule territory as vigilantes (keeping 
out rival gangs), cultural police (enforcing prim Mungiki 
dress codes on women, for example), extortionists (collecting 
monthly fees from residents and business owners) and a 
parallel judiciary (arbitrating family disputes and 
renter/landlord conflicts).  The Mungiki raise funds through 
extortion, kidnapping, hiring out their gangs to politicians 
and business people, and charging for the use of public 
services (public latrines, for example) or illegal utility 
hook-ups (water and electricity).  When under threat from 
either the police or the common citizenry, the Mungiki react 
savagely, with beheadings and public display of mutilated 
corpses.  They employ terror as a means of intimidating 
opposition. 
 
¶15. (SBU) The number of Mungiki members is very difficult to 
determine.  Some press and academic speculations put the 
number at 1.5 million, but this seems to be a gross 
exaggeration.  The Mungiki are a purely Kikuyu affair.  The 
Kikuyu number about eight million out of a Kenyan population 
of 32 million.  The total number of currently active Mungiki, 
including rural members not routinely involved in urban 
criminal activities, is likely under 100,000.  Most observers 
believe that membership is static, hence the emphasis on 
intensifying activities.  Members of Parliament from 
Mungiki-dominated areas are largely silent about the 
organization, due to intimidation, complicity or support. 
Minister of Defense Karume, who represents a Central Province 
constituency infamous as a Mungiki stronghold, recently 
called for the government to negotiate with Mungiki (drawing 
sharp criticism from the press).  The general population is 
intimidated into silence and non-cooperation with the police. 
 On occasion, however, Mungiki victims strike back.  Public 
transport drivers and local residents in a small town outside 
Nairobi recently burned the homes of a number of Mungiki 
members in the area.  The resultant battles left a policeman 
dead. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Ndura Waruinge, the supposed Mungiki founder, 
claimed conversion to Islam in 2000, stating that henceforth 
any move by the government against Mungiki would generate the 
fierce opposition of the worldwide Muslim community. 
Waruinge claimed in 2004 to have left Mungiki and to have 
converted to Christianity and become a pastor.  Little 
credence is given to either "conversion."  It is widely 
believed that Waruninge covertly directs the movement while 
his assumed status allows him to publicly move in political 
circles.  He has formed a political party (Youth Empowerment 
Association) and announced plans to run for a seat in 
parliament.  The alleged overt leader of the Mungiki is Maina 
Njenga.  His large estate in rural Central province is said 
to include facilities for administering the Mungiki oaths and 
conducting Mungiki "baptisms."  Although the police claim to 
be in the midst of a crackdown on the Mungiki, Njenga 
continues to come and go as he pleases. 
 
Comment: Threat to the State? 
----------------------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) Are the Mungiki a unique phenomenon in Kenya?  Yes 
and no.  There are plenty of other vigilante/extortion 
outfits, murderous gangs, political militias, and 
thugs-for-hire.  What makes Mungiki different is the scope, 
comprehensiveness and cohesiveness of the organization.  No 
other criminal organization is as large.  No other criminal 
organization is involved in so many diferent criminal 
enterprises.  No other criminal organization is as well 
connected in politics and the bureaucracy.  No other criminal 
organization has Mungiki's religious/cultural/political 
mystique with which to bind its members. 
 
¶18. (SBU) The parallel government set up by Mungiki in parts 
of rural Kenya, certain Nairobi housing estates and slums, 
and in the transport sector is made possible by weak and 
ineffective governance.  The operation of the "Mungiki state" 
then further weakens governance in those areas.  The apparent 
collusion of politicians and officials with Mungiki hampers 
moves by the partially infiltrated police to confront the 
organization.  The Mungiki are not a revolutionary, 
subversive organization, despite their early rhetoric. 
Mungiki does not pose a direct challenge to the state because 
it does not need to do so.  Rather, Mungiki acts as an 
insidious force that counters efforts to improve governance 
and security in Kenya.  Mungiki weakens the state as it 
bullies and extorts the "poor and oppressed masses" it 
purports to serve, while defying the state to do anything 
about it.  It is a sad commentary about Kenyans' lack of 
faith in state institutions that so few consider recourse to 
the official administration when they suffer Mungiki crimes. 
If the Kenyan state ever became a credible threat to the 
Mungiki's existence, then the organization might indeed pose 
a direct security threat to the country's leaders.  The 
Mungiki does not hesitate to attack and kill police officers 
who they have been unable to co-opt or coerce into 
ineffectiveness. 
 
Comment: What Can Be Done? 
-------------------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) The membership of such a large group cannot be 
simply rounded up, arrested, tried and incarcerated.  The 
government's current crackdown is resulting in many arrests 
of young men in Central Province who have no apparent 
affiliation to Mungiki.  Mungiki members who are caught up in 
these dragnets are routinely bailed out by their fellows, who 
then pose a threat to the arresting officers.  Several police 
officers have been murdered in confrontations with Mungiki 
over the last few weeks. 
 
¶20. (SBU) A more effective approach would be to go after the 
leadership.  However, the political and official connections 
of the Mungiki leadership make this difficult.  Kenya's two 
largest daily newspapers, The Standard and The Nation, have 
both printed editorials accusing the administration of 
lacking the political will to confront Mungiki.  Multiple 
reports indicate increasing disaffection among Kikuyu voters 
with the government's lackluster performance in reining in 
Mungiki oppression.  That vote is an absolute necessity for 
this government's re-election plans in December.  That set of 
circumstances increases the odds for meaningful government 
action to curb the Mungiki. 
 
¶21. (SBU) If the missing political will to confront the 
Mungiki leadership is ever found, then the Kenyan authorities 
may want to consider an approach successfully employed by 
United States law enforcement officials against our own large 
criminal organizations.  Kenya's criminal statutes are often 
lax and difficult to prosecute.  Internal Security Minister 
Michuki has publicly complained about this.  Its tax laws, 
howver, are draconian.  Mungiki leaders would be hard pressed 
to explain the source of their income (as would a number of 
Kenyan politicians and officials).  Confiscation of property 
and imprisonment for tax evasion of Mungiki leaders would put 
a serious dent in Mungiki operations to the relief of Kenya's 
battered citizenry in Nairobi, Central Province and 
elsewhere. 
 
RANNEBERGER