VZCZCXRO4122
RR RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHMS #0473/01 1341031
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141031Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8221
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000473 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/PI FOR SFRANCESKI AND RKAPLAN, 
DRL FOR AANZALDUA 
USTR FOR JBUNTIN AND AROSENBERG 
DOL FOR JSHEA, BSHEPARD AND JRUDE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ELAB ETRD KMPI MU
SUBJECT: STRIKE AT PORT OF SALALAH 
 
REF: A. 05 MUSCAT 1874 
     ¶B. 06 MUSCAT 1565 
 
 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Workers at Port of Salalah, Oman's primary 
transshipment port, went on strike May 11.  The Ministry of 
Manpower (MOM) declared the strike illegal under recently 
issued regulations covering work stoppages, and the private 
company that manages the port suspended many of the strike 
leaders by the evening of the second day.  Contacts claim 
that while the strike ended May 13 with most employees 
returning to work, the status of the suspended leaders still 
is under negotiation and the port continues to run well below 
capacity.  End summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
Details of the Strike 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2. (SBU) On Friday morning, May 11, 70 to 90 Omani truck 
drivers and crane operators in Port of Salalah's container 
terminal went on strike, demanding higher wages, changes to 
the shift schedule, danger and pollution allowances, and a 
review of the company's mandatory overtime policy.  The 
strikers accounted for the majority of workers who offload 
and move containerized cargo for transshipment during the 
port's day shift, and their number swelled to more than 150 
by mid-morning as other port employees decided to stay off 
the job to support the strike. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  According to contacts at the port, tensions between 
the port's predominantly foreign management and its Omani 
employees have been high since the last strike at the port in 
December 2005, when workers who walked off the job in support 
of a fired colleague raised many of the same issues (ref A). 
Workers decided to go on strike again, contacts said, to 
protest what they perceive as the company's unwillingness to 
fulfill commitments it made to increase wages and study 
overtime policies as part of the resolution of the 2005 
strike. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Omani government and management of Salalah Port 
Services, the private company that operates the port, moved 
quickly to end the strike.  By the evening of May 11, the 
Ministry of Manpower (MOM) declared the strike illegal 
because, Ministry contacts said, the workers had not provided 
management with three weeks notice before striking as 
required in Ministerial Decision (MD) 294 on strikes and 
collective bargaining.  Saleh Alamri, Director General of 
Labor Care at the MOM, who immediately traveled to Salalah as 
the government's lead negotiator, told poloff that the MOM 
and port officials asked the workers to return to their jobs 
until negotiators could achieve a settlement.  The workers 
refused, Alamri continued, insisting that the company first 
guarantee that it would meet their demands.  The port then 
suspended as many as 70 of the drivers and crane operators 
who instigated the strike.  Contacts among workers in Salalah 
expressed some surprise that the Royal Army of Oman (RAO) - 
instead of simply the Royal Oman Police (ROP) - deployed in 
front of where the striking workers had gathered, stationing 
two vehicles with mounted machine guns along the road to the 
port.  The ROP also established a checkpoint behind the army, 
and manned the port's main gate. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The strike was effectively over by May 13.  Most of 
the workers who supported the drivers and crane operators had 
returned to their jobs by this date, and contacts reported 
that the RAO had left its positions in front of the port. 
Contacts also stated that the Governor of Dhofar - the head 
of the governorate in which Salalah is located - was 
preparing to negotiate the status of the suspended workers. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Government and port officials claimed, however, that 
the strike and the subsequent suspensions have had a 
continuing negative economic effect on the port.  Ali Shamas, 
the Health, Safety, Security and Environment Manager for 
Salalah Port Services, said that the port has been operating 
at only 60% capacity since the afternoon of May 11, adding 
that the company is unsure when it will be able to restore 
full operations.  Alamri told poloff that the strike may have 
cost the Port as much as 500,000 Omani Riyals (OR) (USD 1.3 
million) so far, and that several shipping lines redirected 
traffic to Port Jebel Ali in Dubai, Salalah's primary 
regional competitor, upon hearing of the strike.  He added 
that the government is very concerned that future strikes 
like this one may end up discouraging foreign investment, 
giving the impression that Oman's labor market is unstable. 
 
MUSCAT 00000473  002 OF 002 
 
 
He implied that the government intends to strictly enforce 
the regulations of MD 294 so that workers, employers and 
potential investors recognize that labor relations are guided 
by law. 
 
- - - - 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
¶7. (SBU) This is the first major strike under Oman's reformed 
labor laws, which were issued throughout the fall of 2006 in 
conformance with obligations of the U.S.-Oman Free Trade 
Agreement (ref B).  While the strike indicates the potential 
power that workers can exercise through collective action, 
its outcome shows the need to raise awareness of employees' 
legal rights and responsibilities if labor is to use this 
power effectively.  The claim that long-simmering worker 
resentment may have precipitated the strike suggests that the 
government may need to focus resources on developing 
effective mechanisms for tripartite 
(business-labor-government) communication.  Helping 
management and workers deal with problems as they arise, and 
before strikes occur, likely will be one of the best ways to 
ensure the long-term success of Oman's labor reforms.  End 
comment. 
GRAPPO