VZCZCXYZ0023
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #1350/01 1481640
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 281640Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0323
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 001350 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN SCHIFFER, DRL FOR MAGGIO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2017 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PHUM NU
SUBJECT: MISKITOS READY TO MOBILIZE BUT LACK RESOURCES 
 
REF: MANAGUA 1078 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli for reason 1.4B 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Diverse anti-Sandinista Miskito groups in 
Nicaragua's North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN) are 
slowly unifying into a single movement.  Significant 
challenges remain, but the group is convinced of the need to 
win the municipal elections in four key RAAN municipalities 
in 2008 as a first step to wrest control of the indigenous 
YATAMA organization from the hands of President Ortega's 
important Atlantic Coast ally, Brooklyn Rivera (reftel). 
Miskito leaders warned that their communities are highly 
susceptible to manipulation due to poor education and severe 
economic hardship.  They stressed the need for community 
level civic education, democracy and leadership training, and 
technical skills development to limit the impact of such 
manipulation in the 2008 elections.  Leaders have vowed to 
break from the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance party (ALN) in the 
2008 elections if party leadership cannot resolve its 
differences with the Liberal Constitutionalist Party (PLC) 
and unify.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On May 18, Poloff met with 14 leaders of various 
pro-democracy Miskito groups opposing President Daniel Ortega 
to discuss the progress of unification efforts among the 
anti-Sandinista factions of the RAAN's Miskito population. 
Represented in the meeting were YATAMA No-Sandinista, two 
Miskito NGOs, the Council of Elders, an anti-Sandinista 
splinter group of the women's association AMICA, the Miskito 
political party PAMUC, and three religious organizations. 
 
Anti-Ortega Opposition Groups Unified...Almost 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3.  (C) Over the past several months, pro-democracy Miskito 
community leaders opposing Ortega have started working 
together to keep the Sandinista National Liberation Front 
(FSLN) from gaining complete control over the Atlantic Coast 
region.  Whereas economic hardship has traditionally divided 
the community -- as each group seeks short-term solutions to 
their specific problems -- the larger threat of Sandinista 
domination of the coast, to the exclusion of non-Sandinistas, 
is forcing the various community factions to work together. 
As a result, meeting participants indicated that some 90 
percent of the opposition groups have united and signed a 
memorandum of understanding. 
 
¶4.  (C) However, significant challenges remain.  While the 
various groups -- women, youth, elders, NGOs, business 
associations, political parties, religious communities, etc. 
-- have agreed in principal to work together, there is no 
formal structure to this new indigenous pro-democratic 
"movement" and no consensus on whether such a structure is 
required before initiating outreach and education efforts in 
the broader Miskito communities.  Further, the movement has 
not yet defined its strategy, core set of objectives, or the 
roles and responsibilities of the constituent groups within 
the strategy framework.  Doing so is essential to identify 
and prioritize activities, articulate projects, and 
understand how individual projects and activities support the 
movement's objectives.  (NOTE:  To date, post has received 
proposals from various opposition groups asking for 
assistance specifically related to their narrow interest 
areas without demonstrating how their projects would support 
and advance the unified movement.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶5.  (C) Although representatives recognized the need for some 
form of "umbrella" structure linking the various groups 
within the movement, they had given little thought to 
"branding" the movement.  They had not discussed how to 
ensure that the beneficiaries of potential projects 
implemented within the Miskito communities would associate a 
specific project to the movement and its underlying 
democratic objectives.  Poloff explained that project-level 
visibility for the movement -- demonstrating that the 
movement is responsible for the project and its subsequent 
benefits, even if executed through a particular NGO or 
organization -- is absolutely crucial to winning converts. 
 
Step 1 2008 Elections, Step 2 Control of YATAMA 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (C) Despite the relative nascence of the group's 
planning, there is consensus that all efforts must focus on 
winning the 2008 municipal elections in the RAAN's principal 
municipalities of Waspam, Prinzapolka, Rio Coco, and Puerto 
Cabezas.  Doing so would severely undermine the power base of 
Brooklyn Rivera, president of the indigenous YATAMA 
organization and President Ortega's key ally, enforcer, and 
policy implementer in the RAAN.  Although the majority of the 
Miskito people oppose Rivera, he has simply ignored previous 
general assemblies' calls for his resignation as YATAMA 
president because they lack the power to remove him. 
However, opposition victories in these municipalities, 
according to meeting attendees, would remove Rivera's formal 
power base, virtually guaranteeing that he would be forced to 
accept the election results of any subsequent general 
assembly held to elect new YATAMA leadership.  Meeting 
participants clearly indicated that, more than the municipal 
victories themselves, removing Rivera and regaining control 
of YATAMA is their primary objective since they see it as the 
best way to thwart Ortega's efforts in the RAAN. 
 
Underlying Goal - Local Capacity Building 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7.  (C) The participants universally agreed that the key to 
victory in the 2008 elections -- and thus in their bid to 
change YATAMA leadership -- is providing civic education, 
democracy training, leadership training, technical skills 
development, and micro-credit at the community level. 
Miskito leaders warned that Miskito communities are highly 
susceptible to manipulation due to generally low education 
levels and severe economic hardship.  They added that the 
FSLN will exploit this weakness in the lead-up to the 2008 
elections -- as it did in 2006 by misleading Miskitos about 
their rights under Nicaraguan laws and by doling out token 
assistance with promises of more in return for votes. 
Teaching the Miskitos about their basic rights, identifying 
and training leaders to think critically and ask tough 
questions, and providing micro-economic prospects will help 
ensure that communities are stronger and more independent. 
(NOTE:  Post has received separate proposals from two Miskito 
NGOs -- FURCA for civic education and Aikuki Wal for 
leadership development and cooperative formation.  Although 
the proposals were developed independently, we are 
encouraging the two organizations to synchronize community 
selection and coordinate development of training materials. 
Both have agreed to do so.  We forwarded the FURCA proposal 
to DRL two months ago for funding consideration and the 
Aikuki Wal proposal is in the final stage of translation. 
END NOTE.) 
 
Alliance with ALN in 2008 not Guaranteed 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8.  (C) Members from the YATAMA No-Sandinista movement and 
the indigenous PAMUC party underscored that their support for 
ALN candidates in 2008 is far from assured if the ALN cannot 
resolve its differences with the PLC at the national level. 
Recalling how the Liberal schism hurt the anti-Sandinista 
forces in the RAAN in the November 2006 elections, Miskito 
leaders have vowed to go their own way, if necessary, and the 
president of PAMUC declared that his party is ready to carry 
the standard for the Miskito population in 2008. 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
¶9.  (C) Anti-Sandinista Miskito community leaders have hit 
the nail on the head.  They understand perfectly that victory 
in the 2008 municipal elections is their only way to remove 
President Ortega's key Atlantic Coast ally, Brooklyn Rivera. 
They also understand with painful clarity that they will 
never achieve their goal without outside assistance.  These 
pro-democracy leaders in the Miskito community are extremely 
poor, lacking the funds to visit even communities close to 
the RAAN's capital of Puerto Cabezas.  Without assistance, 
visiting distant communities -- let alone providing intensive 
training -- will be impossible.  The leaders were emphatic 
that now, more than ever before, is the time to act.  Rivera 
has been weakened, the FSLN has yet to deliver on promised 
assistance, and the people of the RAAN are looking for help. 
They repeatedly warned that if the FSLN -- or its YATAMA 
allies -- win the 2008 elections, Ortega will be able to 
consolidate his position in the RAAN and it will be too late. 
 
TRIVELLI