VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #1273/01 1362106
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 162106Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0231
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1099

S E C R E T MANAGUA 001273 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA/AND AND NEA/IRAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2017 
TAGS: PREL MARR PHUM MASS ECON PTER VE IR NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUA'S IRAN-VENEZUELA RELATIONS 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 61378 
     ¶B. MANAGUA 725 
     ¶C. MANAGUA 726 
     ¶D. MANAGUA 1184 
     ¶E. MANAGUA 791 
     ¶F. MANAGUA 06 2611 
     ¶G. MANAGUA 859 
     ¶H. MANAGUA 797 
     ¶I. MANAGUA 1135 
     ¶J. MANAGUA 179 
     ¶K. MANAGUA 826 
     ¶L. MANAGUA 810 
 
Classified By: Amb. Paul Trivelli, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 ¶1. (S) Summary: Given President Daniel Ortega's close 
relationship with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, the 
restoration of diplomatic ties with Iran, and the visit of 
President Ahmedinejad to Nicaragua, the Embassy has not 
formally engaged the Nicaraguans on the Venezuelan-Iranian 
alliance (Ref. A) at this time, as it would do more to 
antagonize, or energize, FSLN radicals than promote the 
cooperative relationship with Nicaragua that we have publicly 
pursued.  However, the Ambassador and Emboffs have, on 
repeated occasions, voiced U.S. concerns about Nicaragua's 
succumbing to the influence of Venezuela and Iran, and 
privately warned that should Nicaragua be exploited to 
endanger our security, there would be consequences for 
U.S.-Nicaraguan relations.  Further, we have taken care to 
reiterate that the EU and UN share our stance vis-a-vis 
Iran's nuclear ambitions. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Since assuming office in January, President Ortega has 
received his counterpart Chavez in country on at least two 
occasions, and has visited Venezuela at least three times. 
The two countries have established political, diplomatic, and 
economic links, and signed a series of framework agreements 
in general areas of cooperation (Ref. B, C). According to a 
recent public opinion poll, however, a majority of the public 
opposes the increasing influence of Chavez in their affairs 
and worry that such a relationship could harm Nicaragua's 
international relations, particularly with the U.S. (Ref. D). 
 We believe that Ortega is already under pressure from Chavez 
to openly defy the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) on 
Iran, but is more likely to avoid dealing with the matter 
than take any direct action that might alienate the USG or 
international donors. 
 
¶3. (SBU) During President Ahmedinejad's visit to Nicaragua 
days after Ortega's inauguration, the two leaders signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) stating that their 
countries will reopen embassies in their respective capitals, 
extend mutual support in international fora, explore areas 
for potential cooperation and create a Joint Commission to 
supervise future bilateral cooperation.  Nicaragua also 
promised to introduce Iran, for possible participation, to 
projects financed by international institutions and bilateral 
sources (Ref. E).  To date, the National Assembly has yet to 
approve the agreement. The Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN), 
Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS), and many Liberal 
Constitutional Party (PLC) National Assembly deputies oppose 
the agreement, in large part because of the clause that 
stipulates mutual support in international fora.  One of the 
main objections is the fear that by siding with Iran, 
Nicaragua will alienate the United States. 
 
¶4. (C)  Since Ortega's election, the Ambassador has relayed 
to Nicaraguan interlocutors USG concerns about Nicaragua 
falling too quickly into the orbit of Hugo Chavez and 
engaging with pariah states such as Iran, foreign policy 
decisions which question the Ortega government's commitment 
to democracy (Ref. F).  We have warned that should Venezuela 
or Iran exploit Nicaragua to endanger our security, there 
would be consequences for U.S.-Nicaraguan bilateral relations 
and development assistance. 
 
¶5. (C) On a number of occasions, the Ambassador has raised 
the USG's designation of Iran's Defense Industries 
Organization (DIO) under E.O. 13382 with Foreign Minister 
Samuel Santos, and reiterated our position with regard to 
UNSCR 1747, urging the GON to ensure it does not support the 
activities of any of the Iranian companies, entities, or 
individuals listed in the UNSCR 1747's annex. We have voiced 
concern that some of President Ortega's public statements 
could be interpreted as support for Iran's defiance of the 
United Nations (Ref. G, H, and I). Europeans who have a stake 
in maintaining stability in the country have backed us on 
this front in conversations with some of Ortega's moderate 
intermediaries.  In separate conversations with Santos, 
PolCouns has also reminded the GON that the EU shares our 
position vis-a-vis Iran's nuclear ambitions (Ref. J and K). 
 
¶6. (S) Although we suspect that some FSLN radicals are 
looking for an excuse to push Ortega to strengthen the 
Venezuelan-Iranian alliance, Ortega appears to be shrewdly 
playing his cards to strike a balance between remaining on 
cordial terms with the "gringos" with his need to impress 
revolutionary soul mates Chavez and Ahmedinejad.  In our 
approach to the Nicaraguans, we have taken care to project 
USG support for Nicaragua's democracy and economic 
development, respect for sovereignty, and willingness to 
pursue a cooperative relationship.  Members of the democratic 
opposition and civil society have praised our approach as the 
best means to prevent President Ortega from using the pretext 
of a "hostile U.S. government" as justification to fall 
exclusively within Venezuela's orbit of influence (ref. L) 
 
TRIVELLI