VZCZCXRO4420
PP RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHCI #0144/01 1231243
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 031243Z MAY 07
FM AMCONSUL KOLKATA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1528
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFIUU/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 0266
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0108
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA 1884

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KOLKATA 000144 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PTER SOCI PHUM ECON IN NP
SUBJECT: INDIA'S MAOIST MENACE GROWS 
 
REF: A) KOLKATA 000109, B) KOLKATA 000074, C) CHENNAI 000083, D)MUMBAI 001286, 
E) MUMBAI 001253, F) NEW DELHI 001297, G) 05 NEW DELHI 001274 
 
KOLKATA 00000144  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  Recent large scale attacks by Maoist 
insurgents in Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and other states 
reflect growing Maoist strength and organization in India. 
Mostly operating under the banner of the Communist Party of 
India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist), India's Maoists now maintain a 
significant presence in approximately 25% of the districts in 
nine states extending from the Nepal border in the North to the 
state of Karnataka in the South.  The common link between 
Maoists in the different states remains an ideology of violent 
struggle against corrupt local governments unable (or unwilling) 
to address fundamental social needs.  The distinction between 
Maoists as a political movement versus a criminal extortion 
rackets is blurred, but they remain a serious security threat. 
The GOI has called high-level meetings in response to the recent 
surge in Maoist attacks on law enforcement officials and 
politicians, but still lacks a clear strategy. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary Continued.  While coordination between Nepali 
and Indian Maoists has been limited, significant links exist. 
Senior Nepali Maoist leaders such as Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist) (CPNM) Politburo Members Chandra Prakesh Gajurel and 
Mohan Baidya and over 200 other CPNM cadres have been arrested 
in India.  The two organizations have issued joint press 
releases expressing mutual solidarity and according to 
Kolkata-based Nepali diplomats and law enforcement officials in 
Bihar, have shared weapons, some training and support.  In 
addition, recent attacks along the Indo-Nepal border suggest 
increasing spillover from Nepal into India. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Summary Continued.  Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has 
characterized the Maoist insurgency as India's greatest internal 
security threat.  The lack of GOI awareness and response should 
not be taken as the measure of the threat.  Rather, it reflects 
the GOI's inability to recognize and address the underlying 
social issues that fuel the insurgency.  India remains a country 
with almost 600 million people living on less than USD 2 a day 
and successive Indian governments have failed to take their 
concerns into account or devise genuine poverty reduction 
programs.  Unlike Islamic terrorists, outside forces cannot be 
conveniently blamed for the existence of the Maoist terror.  End 
Summary. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
-------- 
Background:  The Naxalite/Maoist Movement in India 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
-------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) In May 1967, Charu Mazumdar, launched an armed 
struggle on behalf of landless peasants near the town of 
Naxalbari in West Bengal's Darjeeling district, the town's name 
gave rise to the term "Naxalite."  The Naxalbari uprising 
revived a tradition of revolutionary activities going back to 
the struggle for independence from British Rule.  Naxalites at 
the time argued that this revolutionary tradition - for which 
Bengal was especially known - had been corrupted by the 
revisionist Communist Party of India (CPI) and its offshoot the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM).  Mazumdar went on to 
engineer a split in the CPM by forming the CPI 
(Marxist-Leninist) (CPI-ML) in 1969 (Note:  The CPI-ML renounced 
violent revolution in 1971 and was recognized by the Election 
Commission of India as a legal political party in 1974.  CPI-ML 
has been active recently in the protests against acquisition of 
rural land for industrial development.  However, CPI-ML still 
retains ties to Naxalite cadres.  In some ways the relationship 
between the CPI-ML and the Naxalites parallels that between the 
Irish Republican Army and the Sinn Fein political party in 
Northern Ireland.  End Note.) 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The Naxalite movement was crushed in the early 1970s 
by the then Congress government of Siddharth Shankar Ray in West 
Bengal and Charu Mazumdar died in police custody in Calcutta in 
¶1972.  Over 10,000 Naxalites were killed, and thousands more 
jailed.  The CPI (ML) underwent further splits, and several 
small groups broke off from the CPI(ML).  Today the Naxalites' 
common goal is peasant revolution, abolition of class 
hierarchies, and the expansion of "liberated zones."  Naxalites 
typically operate in tribal forest areas, both to advance the 
cause of marginalized tribes and to take advantage of the 
inhospitable terrain to evade law enforcement, but they 
 
KOLKATA 00000144  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
eventually hope to expand their activities throughout the 
countryside.  In the revolution's final phase, Naxalites hope to 
take over the cities before bringing down the government in New 
Delhi. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The dominant Naxalite groups before September 2004 
were the People's War (PW) and the Maoist Community Center 
(MCC).  The PW, formed in Andhra Pradesh in 1975, was originally 
known as the People's War Group but shortened its name to 
People's War earlier that year after merging with the CPI -ML 
(Party Unity) faction.  The MCC was founded in the early 1970s 
in Jharkhand by Naxalites escaping from West Bengal.  Much of 
the conflict between these two groups derived from turf battles 
rather than ideological differences.  They merged on September 
21, 2004 to form what is presently known as the Communist Party 
of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist).  As such, "Naxalites" and 
"Maoists" are both now general terms applied to ultra Left-wing 
political groups that carry out armed attacks against symbols of 
state authority to attain political objectives and the terms are 
used interchangeably.  Maoists/ Naxalites trace their ideology 
to Mao Zedong's theory of peasant insurrection, subscribing to 
the notion that "power flows from the barrel of a gun," and seek 
to establish "liberated zones of deprived and alienated sections 
of the population." 
 
-------------------------- 
"The Red Corridor" 
-------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) According to April 2006 GOI estimates, at present, 160 
out of 602 districts in Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, 
Bihar, Orissa, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh and 
Madhya Pradesh are affected by Maoists.  These districts contain 
about 450 police which reported incidents of violence between 
2004 and 2006.  There are another 50-odd districts where Maoist 
groups have extended their influence/activity, but statistics of 
attacks have not been submitted in these areas.  These districts 
fall in the above nine states as well as Karnataka, Kerala and 
Tamil Nadu.  In all, Maoist activities have been reported from 
1,200 police stations in India.  Nearly 6,000 people have been 
killed in Maoist violence in India during the past twenty years. 
According to the Indian government, more than 3,000 of these 
deaths occurred between 2002 and March 2006. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The Dantewara district in southern Chhattisgarh has 
become India's hub for Maoist violence.  Escalating combat 
between government, insurgent, and tribal counter-insurgent 
forces has killed 542 persons since the beginning of 2006, which 
is in excess of casualties in Jammu and Kashmir.  The state 
government has a two-pronged offensive underway to combat the 
Maoists.  First, the state is attempting to transform its police 
force into a paramilitary unit.  All state police officers are 
being put through a six week program at Chhattisgarh's Jungle 
Warfare Training College in Bastar District.  Second, the state 
has provided support and encouragement to a grassroots 
counter-insurgency known locally as Salwa Judum.  This movement 
pits the Maoists against the very people they purport to protect 
and puts the so-called Maoist revolutionaries in a difficult 
situation, and one to which they have responded very violently. 
The Maoists are now killing local tribal people and villagers 
who they suspect might be aligned with Salwa Judum.  As a 
result, southern Chhattisgarh is home to at least twenty-seven 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps, as tribal people flee 
or are forcibly removed from their forest villages by both 
Maoist and counter-insurgent forces.  Based upon interviews of 
GOC officials IDP numbers are estimated to be in excess of 
60,000. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) In Eastern India, Jharkhand, Bihar, Orissa and West 
Bengal are the most affected states. The CPI (Maoist) runs 
virtual parallel governments in many parts of Jharkhand, and 
holds "Jan Adaalats" (Peoples' Courts) in Orissa, Bihar and 
Jharkhand to settle both civil and criminal disputes in remote 
villages.  These "courts" impose penalties ranging from simple 
monetary fines to mutilation and death.  Local district 
government authorities, security persons and lately some CPM 
leaders in southern districts of West Bengal are the primary 
targets of CPI (Maoist) assassinations. (Comment: In West 
Bengal, the CPM and more traditional Naxalites like the CPM-ML 
are seen by Maoists as corrupted by the establishment and as 
ideological competitors for the sympathies of the masses.  End 
Comment).  In some districts, Maoists have replaced the local 
 
KOLKATA 00000144  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
administration and police and government officials do not enter. 
 The Maoists define these areas as "liberated zones."  These 
Maoist-dominated areas are usually geographically remote and 
mired in poverty.  Many have suffered from traditional neglect 
by the government and have been ruled by quasi feudal landed 
elites, who have traditionally exploited the general population. 
 The presence of Maoists makes it difficult for government 
authorities to establish or re-establish a presence. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Media reports quoting GOI intelligence sources say 
that the Maoists are well funded ($350 million a year).  Their 
sources of funding include:  extortion, kidnapping for ransom, 
collection of "taxes" from NGO's and other conducting 
development programs or those transporting agricultural/minor 
forest produce and minerals through their territory.  Bank 
robberies and looting of stores are also common tactics.  The 
GOI puts the total estimated number of hardcore underground 
Maoist members in the affected states at 9,300 - a significant 
increase from 2004 (2,165 recruited) and 2003 (831 recruited). 
However, media estimates put the figure significantly higher at 
around 30,000.  Top leaders include CPI (Maoist) General 
Secretary Ganapathi, Pramod Mishra, Uma Shankar, Nathuni Mistry 
 
SIPDIS 
and Kishen.  Nathuni Mistry has been in a Jharkhand jail since 
¶2003. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
---------------------------------- 
"No More Hit and Run . . . Hit Them Precisely and With Impunity" 
-- CPI (Maoist) 9th Congress 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) In January-February 2007, the Maoists held a "9th 
Unity Congress" (the first since 1970 during the old Naxalbari 
period) somewhere in the forest area along the Orissa-Jharkhand 
border.  An official statement, signed by CPI (Maoists) General 
Secretary Ganapathi and released on February 19 announced the 
 
SIPDIS 
intention to conduct a more aggressive campaign by conducting 
people's war throughout the country, changing the name of the 
Maoist Peoples Liberation Guerrilla Army to the People's 
Liberation Army (PLA), deepening its mass base, and waging a 
militant mass movement against the "neo-liberal policies of 
globalization, liberalization and privatization pursued by 
ruling classes on the dictates of imperialists."  Journalist 
contacts reported that Ganapathi, while addressing the hardcore 
Maoist leaders from across the country, said, "No more hit and 
run. Now, the time has come to spread into the towns, identify 
specific targets and attack them with precision."   (See 9th 
Congress Press release at 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india /maoist/docume 
nts/papers/19feb07.htm) 
 
¶12.  (U) The Indian Home Ministry Report for 2006-2007 confirmed 
the more aggressive tactics, noting that Maoists have resorted 
to "tactical counter offensive campaigns."   Following the 
Maoist's 9th Congress, there has a been a demonstrable increase 
in violence in the states of Bihar and Jharkhand.  In April, 
approximately 100 Maoists blew up schools being used as barracks 
for the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), and an undisclosed 
number of Maoists killed two Railway Protection Force (RPF) 
soldiers on the Howrah-Mokama train.  Near the Nepali border on 
March 31, approximately 200 Maoists, possibly with support from 
Nepal, attacked a police station, bank and government office in 
the town of Riga (Reftel A). 
 
¶13.  (SBU) On March 4, CPI (Maoist) militants in Jharkhand shot 
and killed Member of Parliament Sunil Mahto from Jamshedpur 
(Reftel B).  Mahto was a member of the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 
(JMM) party, a state party with a large base among the poor and 
tribal sectors.   The CPI-Maoists have also threatened the 
Deputy Chief Minister of Jharkhand, Sudhir Mahto, and two 
members of the Jharkhand Legislative Assembly/  According to 
media reports, the Maoist letter to Sudhir Mahto said: "Stop 
spreading wrong information about us, otherwise you will face 
the music . . .  we feel it is right to challenge your 
statements and warn you against letting loose a barrage of lies 
cooked up on the diktats of corporate houses, native and 
foreign, and the landed gentry in order to cover the failures of 
your government."  The Maoists also warned the Deputy Chief 
Minister to stop supporting village defense committees, or "face 
the ire" of the Maoists.  (Note:  South Asia Intelligence Review 
(SAIR) offers additional details on recent Maoist activities in 
 
KOLKATA 00000144  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
Bihar and Jharkhand at 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/5 _5.htm#assessment2 
 End Note.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
The GOI Response - Bureaucracy and Inertia 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) In June 2005, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs 
organized a meeting of the Chief Secretaries and Directors 
General of Police of 13 States in Hyderabad and decided to 
create a joint task force of State police departments to counter 
Maoist activities in the six most-affected states: Andhra 
Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Orissa and Maharashtra. 
  The GOI budgeted 510 million dollars for the task force, but 
so far only roughly 220 million dollars has been utilized. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Karnataka has targeted suspected Naxalite leaders 
while taking steps (albeit limited ones) directed at the root 
causes of the Naxalite problem.  In 2005, a top leader belonging 
to the Karnataka State Committee of the People's War Group (PWG) 
was killed by police and another was apprehended.  In districts 
with forest reserves where Naxalites operate, district 
commissioners have initiated special development programs 
enabling tribal communities to harvest forest products (e.g. 
wood, honey, and beeswax) in an effort to provide livelihoods. 
Police sources say that Naxalites continue to operate along 
Karnataka's borders with Andhra Pradesh and Kerala. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) The government of Andhra Pradesh, however, has had 
considerable success in quelling the insurgency with an 
aggressive campaign against the Naxalites, which it commenced in 
2005 after the Naxalites withdrew from peace negotiations 
(Reftel C).  A senior police official said that the Naxalites 
are no longer able to move about in large groups but must do so 
in groups of two to three persons.  He added that while the 
Naxalites are still a threat, their ability to conduct 
large-scale attacks in Andhra Pradesh has been diminished.  The 
police official reports good cooperation with the authorities in 
the neighboring state of Chhattisgarh but said that Naxalite 
movement on the Andhra Pradesh-Orissa border remains a major 
concern. (Note: Due to the effectiveness of the "Greyhound" 
paramilitary units in Andhra Pradesh the Maoists followed the 
path of least resistance to Chhattisgarh, where the vast 
majority of India's attacks now take place.  From Jan 2006 
through April 19, 2007, according to the South Asia Terrorism 
Portal, Chhattisgarh has had 480 Naxalite related deaths.  End 
note). 
 
¶17.  (SBU) A High-Level Coordination Center, headed by the Union 
Home Secretary with Chief Secretaries and police chiefs of 
Maoist affected states as members, meets regularly and reviews 
and coordinates steps taken by the states to counter Maoist 
activities.  The GOI in September 2006 created an Empowered 
Group of Ministers under the leadership of the Home Minister and 
selected Chief Ministers of Maoist-affected states to "closely 
monitor the spread of Naxalism and evolve effective strategies 
to deal with the problem."  In addition, an Inter-ministerial 
Group headed by the Additional Home Secretary was created to 
monitor the progress on land reforms, tribal peoples' 
resettlement and rehabilitation, and review progress on 
development and infrastructure creation in tribal areas.  A 
Standing Committee of Chief Ministers has also been created to 
maximize and improve the outputs of the various state action 
plans for anti-Maoist/Naxalite operations.  A Naxal Management 
Division, headed by an Additional Home Secretary, is responsible 
for monitoring state action plans as well. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Comment: The generally poor response to the 
Maoist/Naxalite menace is a result of weak Center-State and 
State-State relations in India.  Operational effectiveness is 
lowered by the continuing inability of state law enforcement 
bodies to coordinate effectively with each other, and also by 
apparent disagreement over the best approach to take.  Some 
states appear willing to talks with the Maoists, while others 
take a tougher stance.  The GOI has publicly stated a 
"zero-tolerance" approach towards Maoist groups, but this policy 
is still not being implemented uniformly across the states. End 
Comment. 
 
----------------------- 
Links With Nepal 
 
KOLKATA 00000144  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
----------------------- 
 
¶19.  (SBU) The success of the Maoist movement in Nepal serves to 
inspire and possibly embolden Indian Maoists (Reftel G).  While 
coordination between Nepali and Indian Maoists is limited, links 
between the two organizations clearly exist.  Over the last few 
years, several key Nepali Maoists have been arrested while in 
India to include CPNM Politburo Member Chandra Prakash Gajurel, 
Standing Committee Member Mohan Baidya, Central Committee Member 
and General Secretary of the All Nepal Peasant Organization 
Chitra Bahadur Shrestha and over 200 other CPNM members.  In 
August 2006, the two Maoist groups issued a joint press release 
stating, "The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the 
Communist Party of India (Maoist) jointly re-assert their firm 
commitment to proletarian internationalism, mutual fraternal 
relations."  In discussions with Kolkata ConGen, a Kolkata-based 
Nepali diplomat said that he was aware of instances of Indian 
Maoists operating in Nepal, with their Nepali counterparts.  A 
senior Bihar police official corroborated those comments, adding 
that movement by both groups across the porous border was common 
and that several Nepali Maoists were detained in Bihar jails.  A 
more disturbing sign of possible Nepali Maoist activity in India 
was the previously noted March 31 attack on the Bihar border 
town of Riga.  A group of approximately 200 Maoists, reportedly 
operating out of Nepal, assaulted a bank, police station and 
local government office, killing a security person and injuring 
six people. (Reftel A). 
 
------------- 
Comment 
------------- 
 
¶20.  (SBU) The inability of the GOI to come to grips with Maoism 
and its persistence and spread is a reflection of the exclusion 
of a large percentage of the Indian population from development 
and governance.  While much has been written regarding this 
phenomenon, experts have identified some basic causes.  Due to 
Indian cultural biases, upper caste Hindus continue to relegate 
low caste, tribal and religious minority groups to perpetual 
inferiority and oppose efforts to introduce a more egalitarian 
social structure.  In addition, the Indian ruling elite has a 
strong urban focus and has deliberately sidestepped the rural 
poor to favor the urban middle class.  Endemic corruption also 
plays a role, as government officials managing programs aimed at 
addressing rural poverty often embezzle the funds, leaving only 
paper programs on the ground.  A recent Nicholas Kristof cover 
story in the New York Times described his tour through rural 
India, where he found that villagers were not provided health 
care, education or basic health services, although the 
government funds programs in all these areas. 
 
¶21.  (SBU) Speaking to a gathering of Chief Ministers in April 
2006, Prime Minister Singh emphasized that the Maoists 
constituted the most serious threat to India's internal 
security.  The GOI and states' failure to respond to the Maoist 
insurgency should not be perceived to diminish the seriousness 
of the threat.  Rather, the lack of a coherent 
counter-insurgency effort against the Maoists and the general 
lack of awareness about the insurgency further contribute to the 
danger in providing more time for the Maoists to extend their 
influence, which they have been doing in states such as 
Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh.   For some of the reasons 
enumerated above, Indian officials appear reluctant and 
incapable of confronting the Maoists and the fundamental issues 
that feed the insurgency:  poverty, corruption and weak 
development.  Outside the pockets benefiting from India's 
embrace of globalization remains a vast hinterland untouched by 
economic growth, with approximately 600 million people living on 
USD 2 a day or less.  Unlike Islamic terror attacks, which 
receive wide coverage by the media and public officials, Maoist 
attacks elicit a muted reaction.  The GOI can easily blame 
Islamic threats on Pakistan or other outside influences.  The 
Maoist problem offers no such easy answers.  To truly combat 
Maoism, the GOI would have make a critical assessment of the 
deplorable social conditions experienced by over two thirds of 
India's population, and that is an area where the Indian 
government does not want to go. 
 
¶22.  (U) This cable was coordinated with Amconsulate Mumbai, 
Amconsulate Chennai, and Embassy New Delhi. 
JARDINE