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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM840, Darfur: Briefing for AU PSC Delegation

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM840 2007-05-29 15:55 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO8968
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0840 1491555
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 291555Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7380
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000840 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN SU
 
SUBJECT: Darfur: Briefing for AU PSC Delegation 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: On May 22, Western representatives briefed a 
fact-finding mission of the African Union Peace and Security Council 
(AU PSC) on the situation in Darfur.  They highlighted the 
importance of an effective peace-keeping force and cease-fire 
mechanism, a specific UN/AU strategy for the political process, and 
non-military logistical support for the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) 
signatories.  Though demonstrating little in-depth knowledge of the 
Darfur crisis, the delegation suggested that leaders at the upcoming 
G-8 summit provide a commitment to the African Union Mission to 
Sudan (AMIS) until the deployment of the UN Heavy Support Package 
and the UN/AU hybrid peace-keeping operation.  End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Representatives of the U.S., the U.K., the Netherlands, 
France, Sweden, the European Union, and Canada briefed a 
fact-finding mission of the AU PSC on May 22 on the situation in 
Darfur.  The six-member delegation, which the PSC had tasked to 
report objective recommendations for ending the conflict, asked for 
a realistic assessment from the ground. 
 
3. (SBU) Western representatives highlighted the importance of an 
effective peace-keeping force in Darfur, coupled with a strengthened 
cease-fire mechanism.  The UK DCM said that deployment of the UN/AU 
hybrid force as soon as possible was essential.  CDA Powers 
described the USG "redlines" for such a force, including a Chapter 
VII mandate and UN command and control.  The French Ambassador 
explained that the ceasefire mechanism consisting of the Cease-fire 
Commission and the Joint Commission did not function and urged the 
AU to take action to increase their efficiency. 
 
4. (SBU) As the members of the delegation demonstrated little 
advance knowledge of the complexities of the Darfur conflict, 
Western representatives briefed them on the outlines of the 
situation.  The Dutch representative described the interplay of the 
conflict between regional governments, the conflict between the 
Sudanese government and Darfur rebel movements, and the conflict 
between tribes.  The Swedish Charge noted that Chad, Eritrea, Libya, 
and Egypt would play a central role in resolving the crisis.  She 
also urged the delegation to consider ways to pressure the Darfur 
rebel movements to participate "in good faith" in the peace process 
while recognizing that "sooner or later the war in Darfur becomes a 
business."  She pointed to regional governments' support for many 
rebel movements and said that the PSC should exercise its power to 
stem this support. 
 
5. (SBU) Poloff underscored the importance of a specific UN/AU 
strategy for the political process, which was seconded by the EU 
representative.  The UK representative emphasized the need for 
political negotiations to involve all elements of Darfurian society 
and said that the Arab tribes were "particularly key."  He also 
noted that the key lesson of DPA was the need to "get the message 
out quickly" on the substance of a political agreement. 
 
6. (SBU) Many of the Western representatives suggested that methods 
for non-military logistical support for the DPA signatories would 
provide a peace dividend and encourage the participation of 
non-signatories in the political process.  The Swedish Charge 
explained the importance of planning for alternative livelihoods for 
the movements, noting that an effective cease-fire mechanism would 
leave many of the combatants "unemployed."  Poloff said that the 
declining support for the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM)/Minawi 
demonstrated the ramifications of delay in providing non-military 
logistical support to the movements and suggested that the AU begin 
planning for the establishment of the Logistical Coordination 
Commission stipulated in the DPA. 
 
7. (SBU) The Nigerian chairman of the delegation responded that it 
was difficult to look at methods for supporting the DPA signatories 
given the "paucity of resources" facing the AMIS, which left many of 
the soldiers unpaid.  He suggested that the international community 
use the occasion of the upcoming G-8 summit to provide a commitment 
of support for AMIS until the deployment of the Heavy Support 
Package and the hybrid operation. 
 
POWERS