VZCZCXRO3849
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0800/01 1431136
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231136Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7289
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000800 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, AND TSHORTLEY 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID EAGR PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI SU
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN SUDAN - FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000800  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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(U) From February 26 to March 10, a joint USAID and Government of 
Southern Sudan (GOSS) team traveled to two states in Southern Sudan, 
Central Equatoria and Northern Bahr el Ghazal, to assess the food 
security sector and make recommendations for USAID's transition from 
relief assistance to development assistance.  The team's findings 
will be used to develop a food security strategy that will help 
USAID/Sudan manage the transition to long-term assistance as 
short-term humanitarian resources are reduced.  It is anticipated 
that humanitarian resources will be reduced in phases, as is already 
happening in Southern Sudan, which is in the third year of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).  The USAID team identified 
markets and roads, the role of government, expanded commerce, skills 
and training, water, returnees, reliance on non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), appropriate farming technology, nutrition, 
seeds, and agriculture and pest control as priority issues.  End 
Summary. 
 
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BACKGROUND 
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¶1. (U) During the civil war, USAID's humanitarian programs in 
Southern Sudan supported essential services in the vast rural areas 
where most internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees 
originated.  USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 
(USAID/OFDA) and USAID's Office of Food for Peace (USAID/FFP) 
provided considerable assistance in the food security sector, 
including food aid, agriculture activities, livestock programs, and 
rural livelihood development projects.  The CPA has created a more 
favorable environment for development assistance, especially by 
establishing the new government structures in Southern Sudan and 
improving security.  New long-term resource flows have begun from 
GOSS, other international mechanisms such as the Multi-Donor Trust 
Funds, and the private sector.  Humanitarian assistance at wartime 
levels is no longer needed.  Achieving food security is now 
realistic in Southern Sudan, southern Blue Nile State, the Nuba 
Mountains, and Abyei. (Comment: One of the important results of the 
CPA has been the sharing of oil revenues. The inflow of money to the 
GOSS and the Southern Sudan state governments is running at more 
than USD 1 billion per year, providing an opportunity for government 
services to be established.  In addition, some of the oil companies 
have undertaken community development projects that have had a 
positive impact on food security.  End Comment.) 
 
¶2. (U) The team held discussions with GOSS and state governments, 
reviewed existing USAID humanitarian food security programs, as well 
as other donor-funded activities.  USAID is developing a food 
security strategy that will eventually cover the entire country of 
Sudan, including Darfur, the Three Areas, eastern Sudan, and 
Southern Sudan. 
 
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) The USAID team identified the following needs during the food 
security assessment. 
 
--MARKETS AND ROADS:  Most rural households grow crops for 
consumption, not for markets.  A major constraint to greater 
agricultural production and rural income is lack of access to 
markets.  FeedUi3Z9l--ROLE OF GOVERNMENT:  The GOSS and state governments have 
not yet 
established the foundation for development.  County government 
departments are critical for successful rural income programs. 
Currently, county governments lack the capacity to implement 
policies, monitor activities, and coordinate NGOs, which are 
currently the main service providers.  At the time of the team's 
visit, county officials had no salaries, transportation, equipment, 
and in some cases no offices.  Benefits from donor investments in 
rural income cannot be sustained and maximized without full 
government participation. 
 
--EXPANDED COMMERCE:  Many new post-conflict dynamics influence 
prospects for commerce and economic growth.  New road construction 
is connecting previously disconnected locations and markets, 
 
KHARTOUM 00000800  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
shortening travel time and distance, and changing trade patterns and 
price relationships.  The range and quantity of trade has expanded 
with Uganda, Kenya, and northern Sudan.  For example, Central 
Equatoria State has booming markets in Juba and Yei, but almost all 
fruits, vegetables, and food sold in these markets are from Uganda. 
For now, Southern Sudan remains a net importer of food. 
 
--SKILLS AND TRAINING:  Most skills and services in Southern Sudan 
are being supplied by non-Sudanese.  People need skills and training 
to increase their income through agricultural production or 
employment.  Excellent work in agricultural training and extension 
is being done by NGOs through decentralized farmer training centers. 
 Vocational training is needed to meet the rapidly growing demand 
for new services, such as auto mechanics and electricians.  Shifting 
from free to sustainable cost recovery for training and extension 
will reveal the true demand for these NGO services. 
 
--WATER:  Although not a focus of the assessment, the team saw that 
inadequate and distant water supplies for both people and cattle are 
a major constraint to rural stability, resettlement, and productive 
activities.  Water is crucial to food security, nutrition, hygiene, 
and health.  Long hours collecting water keeps women from other 
productive activities and increases infant malnutrition.  Scarcity 
of water has often led to conflict and slows IDP and refugee 
returns. 
 
--RETURNEES:  Approximately 750,000 refugees and IDPs returned to 
Southern Sudan in 2005 and 2006, following the signing of the CPA. 
The Government of National Unity (GNU), GOSS, and UN agencies have 
agreed to assist as many as 300,000 people to return in 2007. 
Another 300,000 people are expected to return spontaneously before 
the end of the year, with perhaps 100,000 arriving before the rainy 
season starts in May or June.  Northern Bahr el Ghazal State is 
planning to assist 300,000 IDPs to return this year, a figure now 
thought unlikely.  While returnees are eligible for three months of 
food rations from the UN World Food Program (WFP), most rely on 
temporary support from their kin.  Southern Sudan is poorly prepared 
to meet the additional water, education, and health care needs of 
returnees.  From a food security perspective, returnees and host 
communities are considered among the most vulnerable groups. 
 
--RELIANCE ON NGOS:  Southern Sudan will continue to need the 
support of NGOs, donors, and other international agencies for some 
time before the state and local governments can assume complete 
financial and management responsibility for service delivery.  The 
challenge now is to build the capacity and budgetary independence of 
state and local governments so they can eventually take the lead in 
these service sectors. 
 
--APPROPRIATE FARMING TECHNOLOGY:  Most farmers now plant and 
cultivate by hand with hoes, limiting cultivation to less than 1.5 
acres.  Using ox plows, agricultural production can be increased by 
3 to 4 times, and returnees can quickly become self-sufficient and 
earn money.  A number of NGOs are training oxen and farmers and 
selling ox plows.  Irrigation pumps can boost production of 
high-value cash crops during the dry season when prices are high. 
Selling, repairing, and maintaining equipment should be done by the 
private sector to ensure sustainability. 
 
--NUTRITION:  Malnutrition rates among children are still above the 
emergency threshold, and have not improved since the CPA.  The 
association between malnutrition, food availability, and 
socioeconomic status is weak.  Poor child feeding practices, 
morbidity, and factors underlying morbidity, including distant and 
unsafe water sources, delayed and inadequate health care, and poor 
personal and environmental hygiene, have stronger links to 
malnutrition than food availability or access.  Nutrition 
interventions are more effective when supported by national systems 
for nutrition education and surveillance.  National or regional 
systems are not yet fully in place in Southern Sudan. 
 
--SEEDS:  During the civil war, NGOs and the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) provided most seeds, often with doubtful 
certification and poor quality.  At the time of this assessment, 
FAO, NGOs, and GOSS were in the process of buying and transporting 
seeds for distribution to returnees in Southern Sudan.  The GOSS 
will soon establish a policy and infrastructure for seed testing, 
certifying, and import control at borders.  Seed supply should 
eventually be managed by the private sector. 
 
--AGRICULTURE AND PEST CONTROL:  Post-harvest crop losses in 
Southern Sudan are very high, with a negative impact on food 
security.  Local traditional means of pest control combined with 
 
KHARTOUM 00000800  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
integrated pest management can reduce losses substantially.  GOSS is 
establishing a program to do this that will need support to reach 
rural areas. 
 
POWERS