VZCZCXYZ0005
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #0782/01 1401154
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201154Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7248
INFO RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 2628

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000782 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF/EX 
DS/IP/AF FOR BARRY, DS/C/PSP, DS/PSD/PCB FOR LIPTAK 
D/IPRD 
OBO/AM/AF, OBO/PE/DE/SB 
AID/W FOR DCHA/SUDAN TEAM, OMS, SEC, AFR/SP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OTRA ASEC AMGT EAID SU
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR SECURITY WAIVER AND EXCEPTIONS - JUBA, 
SUDAN 
 
¶1. (U) Summary: Post requests expedited consideration of the 
following waiver request, for an interim, unclassified U.S. 
Government facility in Juba, Southern Sudan.  Charge signed 
COM statement on May 17, 2007.  The package, including 
attachments, will be forwarded via DHL. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) ACTION MEMORANDUM/ISSUE FOR ACTION -  Requesting the 
"Chief of Mission's statement" for the request for a setback 
waiver to the Secure Embassy Construction and 
Counter-Terrorism Act (SECCA) and exceptions to the Overseas 
Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards to establish an 
interim, unclassified U.S. Government (USG) facility on the 
former USAID office building/compound under lease by USAID, 
in Juba, Southern Sudan. 
 
¶3. (SBU) ESSENTIAL FACTORS - In January 2005, the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed ending a 21-year 
civil war between northern and southern Sudan. USAID has 
plans underway to establish a new interim unclassified office 
site on an existing USAID compound that will provide support 
services to all U.S. agencies through International 
Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS).  Thusly, 
there will be no co-location waiver required. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The USG has leased a new 19-acre site in Juba from 
the host government for the construction of a permanent 
facility meeting all the OSPB standards and the requirements 
of SECCA.  The Overseas Building Office (OBO) in the 
Department of State (DOS) is responsible for the design and 
construction of the new 19-acre USG compound in Juba. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Currently USAID maintains ownership of two compounds 
in Juba: the residential compound leased November 19, 1979, 
with the lease expiring on December 31, 2029, and the interim 
office compound leased April 24, 1980, with the lease 
expiring on December 31, 2030.   USAID and ConGen Juba are 
required to implement OSPB security standards to the maximum 
extent feasible, and seek OSPB exceptions for those that 
cannot be achieved.  USAID will fund the initial renovations 
of the interim office and residential compounds to include 
the implementation of all security upgrades. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In September 2005, the USAID Office of Security and 
Diplomatic Security conducted a joint physical security 
survey that outlines the security upgrades that would be 
required for the two existing USAID compounds. It should be 
noted that at the time, the sites were planned to be used by 
USAID for its programs in Southern Sudan, with the 
possibility of a very limited Department of State presence. 
The paradigm changed in 2006 when the Deputy Secretary of 
State declared the presence of DoS personnel on the Juba 
housing compound to be a "Consulate General." 
 
¶7. (SBU) The results of the above mentioned survey are 
contained at Tab 1.  In February 2007, a Department of State 
Office of the Inspector General team visited both sites.  In 
March 2007, RSO/Khartoum staff surveyed the facilities (Tab 
2).  This request incorporates recommendations from all three 
surveys, and the RSO (Tab 3).  Based on these reviews, USAID 
and ConGen Juba are of the opinion that the proposed 
upgrading of the USAID "GSO" compound to include office space 
presents the best option in meeting security objectives for 
the creation of interim offices for the ConGen and USAID 
pending completion of the New Consulate Compound (NCC) in 
Juba.  The proposed USAID office compound achieves the 
following: 
 
--Allows the quickest relocation of ConGen and USAID 
employees from the residential facilities operating as office 
space to more secure office facilities. 
 
--Will accommodate the current USAID/USG staff as well as 
proposed staffing increases starting in FY 2007. 
 
--Provides a reasonable level of protection to USG employees 
under the Chief of Mission authority in actual office spaces. 
 
--In the opinion of USAID and ConGen Juba, the proposed 
compound offers the most practical and cost effective option 
for the USG for the short term on an interim office building. 
 
¶8. (SBU) BACKGROUND - The two existing USAID compounds in 
Juba are the only two compounds that provide basic 
infrastructure and facilities to establish a USG presence. 
 
There are no commercial and/or residential buildings or 
compounds that are presently available in Juba.  The existing 
USAID/USG office compound was sub-leased to Action Contre la 
Faim during the last ten years of conflict in the south.  The 
compound is approximately 77,000 square feet or 1.7 acres. 
There are currently four structures on the compound: an 
office building, warehouse, tukul/conference room, and guard 
booth.  Existing setbacks for buildings on the office 
compound are as follows: 
 
--Office Building: North 135.5 feet, south 24 feet, east 23 
feet, and west 309.6 feet. 
 
--Warehouse: North 45.6 feet, south 141.7 feet, east 110 
feet, and west 54.3 feet. 
 
--Tukul/Conference:      North 162.4 feet, south 23 feet, 
east 145 feet, and west 237.8 feet. 
 
¶9. (SBU) USAID recently negotiated an MOU with the EU/EC to 
secure easement to increase setback by two meters on the 
USAID compound on the south perimeter. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The existing office building is planned to be used 
as office space for up to 40 desks.  It is constructed from 
local brick and masonry work with the exterior wall 300 mm 
(12 inches) thick.  The structure has concrete spread 
footings with 6 inch minimum concrete structural slab over 
compacted earth fill.  The roof is constructed from steel 
frame and covered with 24 gauge corrugated metal sheets.  The 
doors and windows are commercially fabricated with 
non-standard grille work on the windows. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The existing warehouse is constructed from local 
brick and masonry work with the exterior wall 250 mm (10 
inches) thick.  It will not be used as office space.  The 
structure has concrete spread footings with 6 inch minimum 
concrete structural slab over compactedearth fill.  The roof 
is constructed from steel frame and covered with 24 gauge 
corrugated metal sheets.  The doors and windows are 
commercially fabricated with non-standard grille work on the 
windows. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The existing tukul will be converted into a 
conference room with a capacity up to 45 people.  It is 
constructed from local brick and masonry work with the 
exterior wall 250 mm (10 inches) thick.  The structure has 
concrete spread footings with 6 inch minimum concrete 
structural slab over compacted earth fill.  The roof is 
constructed from steel frame and covered with thatching 
material.  The doors and windows are commercially fabricated 
with non-standard grille work on the windows. 
 
¶13. (SBU) USAID/SEC supports the use of the existing USAID 
office compound on an interim, unclassified basis.  This 
support is given with the understanding that once the new 
office building/compound is complete on the new 19-acre site, 
that all USAID office space will be maintained within the new 
USAID/Consulate office building/compound, and that Washington 
approves the interim use of the existing USAID compound as 
the interim ConGen/USAID office compound. 
 
¶14. (SBU) JUSTIFICATION - The interim USAID/USG facility has 
been inspected and security recommendations to improve the 
overall security posture at this facility are outlined in the 
USAID/SEC security assessment.  Implementation of the 
recommended security enhancements is underway.  The physical 
security applications will be in place and operational before 
USAID/USG employees can occupy the compound. 
 
¶15. (SBU)   The proposed USG office compound will be an 
unclassified interim solution to provide safe and secure 
 
SIPDIS 
office facilities until the new Consulate General Compound 
(CGC) is completed, at which time all USG offices will 
collocate on the CGC compound. 
 
¶16. (SBU)   The joint USAID/SEC and DS physical security 
survey that was conducted in September 2005 is based on the 
OSPB standards to a high political violence threat for a sole 
occupant of building or compound. 
 
¶17. (SBU) SECCA WAIVER - The Secure Embassy Construction and 
Counter)Terrorism Act 1999 (P.L.106-113) requires two 
elements of the law to be met: 100 feet of setback on all new 
 
USG office buildings and that all USG agencies under the COM 
be co-located on the Embassy or Consulate compounds. 
 
¶18. (SBU) A co-location waiver is not required for USAID/USG 
Juba as the two existing USAID compounds (functional and 
housing) will be used by USAID, Consulate General and other 
agencies under the COM authority. 
 
¶19. (SBU) ACTION - ConGen/USAID is seeking a 100 feet setback 
waiver to Public Law 106-113 in accordance with the Secure 
Embassy Construction and Counter)Terrorism Act 1999. 
 
¶20. (SBU) To mitigate the vulnerability to vehicle borne 
improvised explosive devises (VBIED) USAID has constructed a 
DS approved anti-climb and anti-ram perimeter wall around the 
office compound.  In addition, USAID has/is implementing the 
following counter measures: 
 
--Mitigate the lack of setback and blast resistant perimeter 
wall by placing extremely large boulders or DS approved 
planters in front of the existing wall outwards to the 
maximum extent feasible to limit vehicle traffic on all sides 
of the compound. 
 
--Install sand-filled 20 foot shipping containers between the 
anti-ram perimeter wall and the warehouse building. 
 
--Improve the drainage ditch on the attack-side of the east 
perimeter to add another layer of protection. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) Standards - 
The following OSPB standards apply to the USAID/USG office 
compound in Juba: 12 FAH-6 H-113.6 Physical Security (Sole 
Occupant of Building or Compound): 
 
a. Perimeter walls will be constructed to a minimum of nine 
feet (2.75 meters) on the attack side and non-attack sides, 
and without footholds or handholds. 
 
b. Perimeter walls provide anti-ram protection to all areas 
that are accessible to vehicle approaches to prevent or limit 
vehicle penetration, equal to that identified for primary 
vehicle barriers, in accordance with DS/PSP/PSD 
specifications (SD-STD-02.01). 
 
c. Traffic lanes will be a maximum width of 12 feet (3.7 
meters), but no less than 10 feet (3.1 meters) wide, with a 
gate and active anti-ram barrier(s) as a means of containing 
a halted vehicle during vehicle inspection or identification. 
 
d. A compound access control (CAC) allowing passage through 
the perimeter will include a guard booth, a nine-foot 
(2.75-meter) anti-climb wall or fence, and a personnel and 
package screening area. The guard booth, from which vehicular 
access through the perimeter entrance is remotely controlled, 
will provide 15-minute forced-entry and ballistic-resistant 
protection. The walls of the remaining portions of the CAC 
will be constructed of some substantial material, i.e., 
concrete masonry units or "cinder block," masonry, brick or 
concrete. All non-FE/BR windows and door glazing on the 
street side will be grilled and provided with an application 
of eight mil (0.2 mm) of performance equivalent 
shatter-resistant window film to the interior side or with 
laminated glass (12 mm thick) in a steel frame with 25 mm 
bite. 
 
e. New office buildings and newly acquired buildings will 
provide a minimum standoff distance of 100 feet (30 meters) 
between the protected side of the perimeter barrier and the 
building exterior. Existing office buildings will provide a 
minimum standoff distance of 100 feet (30 meters) to the 
maximum extent feasible. 
 
f. A clear zone on new office building and newly acquired 
building compounds, free of auxiliary buildings, parking, or 
man-made obstructions, will be provided which extends 20 feet 
(6 meters) inward from the protected side of the perimeter 
barrier. Existing office buildings will comply to the maximum 
extent feasible. 
 
g. Employee parking at new office buildings will be located 
at least 20 feet (6 meters) from the office building. 
Employee parking at newly acquired buildings will be located 
at least 50 feet (15 meters) from the office building. 
 
Existing office buildings will comply with the latter 
requirement to the maximum extent feasible. There will be no 
visitor parking inside the chancery/consulate compound. 
 
h. Compound lighting will provide a minimum of 1 foot-candle 
(10.8lx) measured one meter above ground on vertical surfaces 
of buildings requiring surveillance by guards or closed 
circuit television (CCTV) to detect and deter an intrusion. 
 
i. All new office buildings are required to be constructed to 
provide protection from blast. Structural framing and the 
exterior envelope of such buildings, including the exterior 
faade (and windows), walls, and roofs, shall be designed in 
accordance with administratively controlled criteria (contact 
DS/PSP/PSD) to resist the effects of a specified 
TNT-equivalent hemispherical surface burst. 
 
j. For newly acquired buildings, a blast vulnerability study 
will be developed to identify specific 
recommendations/upgrades to mitigate the effects of blast on 
the building and occupants in accordance with 
administratively controlled criteria. 
 
k. For existing office buildings, a blast vulnerability study 
will be developed for all major facade/window and seismic 
renovation/upgrades and major building renovations to 
identify specific recommendations/upgrades to mitigate the 
effects of blast on the building and occupants in accordance 
with administratively controlled criteria. When it is 
impractical to produce a building upgrade to the full extent 
of required criteria, the blast vulnerability study will 
address feasible upgrades that mitigate lesser threats and 
indicate the resulting protection achieved. 
 
l. Building exterior walls will provide 15-minute 
forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection to a minimum 
of 16 feet (5 meters) above grade or accessible platform. 
 
m. Building exterior doors will provide 15-minute 
forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection. 
 
n. Building exterior windows will provide 15-minute 
forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection to a minimum 
of 16 feet (5 meters) above grade or accessible platform. 
 
o. All major renovations involving newly acquired buildings 
and existing office buildings will be provided with exterior 
laminated windows composed of thermally tempered glazing or 
heat-strengthened glass, except those areas that provide 
15-minute forced-entry and ballistic resistant protection. 
Existing exterior windows not laminated must be treated with 
eight mil (0.2 mm) of performance equivalent 
shatter-resistant window film. 
 
p. All new interior glazing will be composed of laminated 
thermally tempered glazing or laminated heat-strengthened 
glass. All existing interior glazing will have a daylight 
application layer of eight mil (0.2 mm) of performance 
equivalent shatter-resistant window film applied to the 
protected side if the glazing is not a laminated product. 
 
q. All man-passable non-window openings in exterior walls 
below 16 feet (5 meters) above grade or accessible platform 
will be grilled or louvered to provide 15-minute forced-entry 
protection. 
 
r. The interior hardline will provide 15-minute forced-entry 
and ballistic-resistant protection. 
 
s. All public access control operations will include 
provisions for active inspection of personnel before allowing 
passage through the building hardline. 
 
t. The guard booth from which access through the hardline is 
controlled will provide 15-minute forced-entry and 
ballistic-resistant protection, whether a Marine, Diplomatic 
Security guard or local guard is assigned there. 
 
u. In the public access area, where teller windows or 
transparent partitions are part of the hardline, 15-minute 
forced-entry and ballistic resistant protection are required. 
 
v. Where public access areas are located behind the hardline, 
a DS-approved nonman-passable barrier system to provide 
 
office staff protection is required. 
 
w. A safe haven will provide a minimum of 60-minute 
forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection, emergency 
power, ventilation, communications, and emergency egress. 
This applies equally to new office buildings, newly acquired 
buildings, and existing office buildings. 
 
x. The safe haven generator room will provide a minimum of 
60-minute forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection. 
This applies equally to new office buildings, newly acquired 
buildings, and existing office buildings. 
 
¶22. (SBU) ACTION - ConGen Juba/USAID are seeking exceptions 
to the following OSPB standards (12 FAH-6): 
 
e. Setback - New office buildings and newly acquired 
buildings will provide a minimum standoff distance of 100 
feet (30 meters) between the protected side of the perimeter 
barrier and the building exterior.  Existing office buildings 
will provide a minimum standoff distance of 100 feet (30 
meters) to the maximum extent feasible. 
 
--A setback waiver to SECCA is requested. 
 
f. 20-foor clear zone. A clear zone on new office building 
and newly acquired building compounds, free of auxiliary 
buildings, parking, or man-made obstructions, will be 
provided which extends 20 feet (6 meters) inward from the 
protected side of the perimeter barrier.  Existing office 
buildings will comply with the regulations to maximum extent 
feasible. 
 
--Justification: The requirements outlined in this standard 
are existing conditions on the site and cannot be altered. 
USAID will incorporate additional close circuit television 
(CCTV) to overcome this deficiency. 
 
j. Blast vulnerability study - For newly acquired buildings, 
a blast vulnerability study will be developed to identify 
specific recommendations/upgrades to mitigate the effects of 
blast on the building and occupants in accordance with 
administratively controlled criteria. 
 
--Justification:  The requirements outlined in this standard 
cannot be achieved without extensive renovation to the 
structure and cost to the United States Government (USG).  To 
implement this standard would not be practical or cost 
effective to the USG for an interim office building.  USAID 
has installed sand-filled 20 foot shipping containers 
adjacent to the warehouse to mitigate blast.  USAID will 
submit design and location of the containers to DS for 
concurrence.  USAID is also planning the installation of 
HESCO bastions along the interior side of the perimeter walls 
adjacent to the proposed office building to mitigate the 
effects of a blast. 
 
l. Exterior wall. Building exterior walls will provide 
15-minute forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection to 
a minimum of 16 feet (5 meters) above grade or accessible 
platform. 
 
--Justification: The requirements outlined in this standard 
cannot be achieved without extensive renovation to the 
structure, which would not be practical or cost effective to 
the USG for an interim office building.  USAID will 
incorporate 15 minute forced entry requirements such as 
grilled windows and forced-entry doors in accordance to the 
OSPB standards. 
 
n. Exterior windows. Building exterior windows will provide 
15-minute forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection to 
a minimum of 16 feet (5 meters) above grade or accessible 
platform. 
 
--Justification:  The requirements outlined in this standard 
cannot be achieved without extensive renovation to the 
structure, which would not be practical or cost effective to 
the USG for an interim office building.  USAID will 
incorporate 15 minute forced entry requirements (grilles) in 
accordance to the OSPB standards to all windows on office 
spaces. HESCO bastions described above will mitigate 
ballistic threat. 
 
r. Interior hardline. The interior hardline will provide 
15-minute forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection. 
 
--Justification:  The requirements outlined in this standard 
cannot be achieved without extensive renovation to the 
structure, which would not be practical or cost effective to 
the USG for an interim office building.  USAID will 
incorporate 15 minute forced entry and ballistic-resistant 
doors and 15 minute forced entry to the windows in accordance 
to the OSPB standards.  USAID will establish public access 
control (PAC) at the entrance to all office buildings with a 
walk through metal detector as required by public law. 
 
w. Safe haven. A safe haven will provide a minimum of 
60-minute forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection, 
emergency power, ventilation, communications, and emergency 
egress. This applies equally to new office buildings, newly 
acquired buildings, and existing office buildings. 
 
--Justification: The requirements outlined in this standard 
cannot be achieved without extensive renovation to the 
structure.  USAID will incorporate 15 minute FE walls, 
windows, and doors to establish an area of protection in the 
office building.  The area of protection will have emergency 
communications and power. 
 
x. Safe haven generator room - The safe haven generator room 
will provide a minimum of 60- minute forced-entry and 
ballistic-resistant protection. This applies equally to new 
office buildings, newly acquired buildings, and existing 
office buildings. 
 
--Justification: USAID will incorporate the same security 
applications as the area of protection for the emergency 
generator room.  To implement this standard would not be 
practical or cost effective to the USG for an interim office 
building. 
 
¶23. (SBU) SUMMARY - The proposed interim, unclassified ConGen 
Juba/USAID office compound in Juba has been inspected and 
security recommendations to improve the overall security 
posture at this facility are outlined in the security 
assessment conducted by USAID/SEC and DS in September 2005 
along with the additional security requirements outlined in 
this document.  Implementation of the security 
recommendations is currently underway.  All security 
enancments  will be in place and operational before USG 
employees can occupy the compound.  The majority of all 
security equipment is on site and installation is underway. 
USAID will fund the renovation of the new compound to include 
the security upgrades.  To ensure the security requirements 
are met, Diplomatic Security and the Regional Security 
Officer will be provided the opportunity to review and 
provide comments on design documents prior to construction. 
 
¶24. (SBU) The interim office property will be an unclassified 
interim solution to provide safe and secure office facilities 
to ConGen Juba/USAID staff until the new Consulate General 
Compound (CGC) is completed by OBO, at which time all USG 
agencies in Juba will collocate on the CGC compound. 
 
¶25. Attachments (to be sent by DHL): 
 
--Tab 1 ) USAID/Juba Security Design Plan 
 
--Tab 2 ) Security Assessment, USAID/Sudan*Juba 
 
--Tab 3 ) Hesco Bastions to Mitigate Ballistic Threat 
 
--Tab 4 ) Map and Photos of Proposed USAID/USG Office 
facility 
 
---------------------------- 
Chief of Mission's Statement 
---------------------------- 
 
¶26. (SBU) Chief of Mission's Statement ) I have reviewed the 
documents submitted in support of the request for a setback 
waiver to the Security Embassy Construction and 
Counter-Terrorism Act (SECCA) and exceptions to the Overseas 
Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards to establish an 
interim U.S. Government office facility on the former USAID 
office building compound in Juba, Southern Sudan.  I have 
also been briefed by USAID and Embassy Khartoum's Regional 
 
Security Officer concerning this request.  I am keenly aware 
of my statutory responsibilities, as the Acting Chief of 
Mission, for the safety and security of U.S. government 
employees who serve under "Chief of Mission authority."  I am 
also aware of the RSO's similar responsibility.  After 
careful consideration of the RSO's comments and a balancing 
of the risks inherent in any waiver of security standards 
with our Mission's overall objectives in achieving 
reconstruction and redevelopment in Southern Sudan, I have 
determined that this waiver request merits Washington review 
and recommend that it be granted. 
 
¶27. (SBU) In Juba, USAID and State employees currently reside 
at the Consulate General compound.  These officers live in 
and work out of several houses on the compound.  Each officer 
has a single room for occupancy.   These rooms serve as 
bedrooms as well as working spaces for the officers.  Such an 
arrangement is an untenable one for the long term, and 
impedes our Mission's ability to operate effectively in the 
south.  Identifying and setting up alternative office space 
for the current officers and the additional staff required is 
critical if the U.S. Government is to maintain a robust 
presence in Juba.  Our interests in Southern Sudan are 
significant.  The requirement for increasing our support for 
the Government of Southern Sudan, and for the enforcement of 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),  are important 
components of our long term policy goals in the region and 
have a significant nexus to the global war against terrorism. 
 
¶28. (SBU) Secretary Rice's vision of "Transformational 
Diplomacy" changed the paradigm in which our Foreign Service 
now works.  As the RSO himself remarked, "the standards and 
rules that we have based much of our past risk management on 
have not kept up with the new requirements placed upon us by 
transformational diplomacy."  I believe that the goals that 
the U.S. seeks to achieve in Southern Sudan are worthy of 
taking yet one further step forward in our definition of 
"risk management" as regards transformational diplomacy 
working environments.  Given that the U.S. Government already 
has a footprint in the south with a residential compound for 
several State and AID employees, it is critical that we 
provide office space and administrative support for these 
employees to enable them to carry out their work.  The office 
facility proposed on the former USAID compound still under 
lease is aimed at doing just this.  The February 28, 2006, 
Security Design Plan developed by USAID Office of Security 
underscores the careful thought given to providing an 
adequate level of protection for the personnel envisaged, and 
sets forth a number of physical security upgrades for the 
compound.  I am confident that, with full implementation of 
these upgrades along with the recommendations from the other 
surveys included in the waiver package, there is a way 
forward that could provide adequate levels of security. 
 
¶29. (SBU) For the above reasons, I concur with this request 
for SECCA/OSPB waivers and exceptions. Signed Roberto Powers, 
Charge d' Affaires, U.S. Embassy Khartoum 
 
------------------------------------ 
Regional Security Officer's Comments 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶30. (SBU) Regional Security Officer's (RSO) Comments - I have 
reviewed the attached request for SECCA setback waivers for 
the Juba office facilities and the requests for exceptions 
from a number of the OSPB physical security standards for USG 
Office Buildings, sole occupant for this site. 
 
¶31. (SBU) Upon lengthy consideration and given the totality 
of the circumstances, I reluctantly cannot concur with the 
proposal put forward in this waiver/exception package, and 
will so advise my Chief of Mission. 
 
¶32. (SBU) Background - In addition to my service as a 
Regional Security Officer, I have also served as a regional 
desk officer for the Project Coordination Branch of the DS 
Physical Security Division. I have worked on, from the 
Headquarters side, a large number of waiver/exception 
packages of this nature.  I fully understand, from both 
perspectives, the risk inherent in approving occupancy of a 
facility that doesn't meet current physical security 
standards and requirements. Times, circumstances, and the 
Department's assumption of increased risk in the name of 
"Transformational Diplomacy" have changed. 
 
 
¶33. (SBU) As this waiver/exception package affects both the 
Consulate General Juba and the USAID Mission to Southern 
Sudan, we need to consider the implications of seeking so 
many OSPB security requirement exceptions. Both operations 
are presently on the cutting edge of the Department's 
development of new ways of conducting business.  Operating 
from a residential compound located about a quarter mile from 
the office site, both ConGen and USAID Juba are conducting 
their affairs in the Offices of the UN, various NGOs, and 
from the front seats of their cars.  Everyone hoped that this 
was not a situation that would long continue.  The ConGen 
wishes sooner or later to begin performing American Citizen 
Services, and is already deeply engaged in holding the "CPA," 
(the agreement that led to the cessation of 50 years of war 
between northern and southern Sudan and the division of both 
governmental authorities and oil revenues), together.  To 
have any realistic chance of success, the. ConGen staff is 
going to have to increase, and they will need something 
approaching proper office and communications available to 
them.  They can't do their jobs from their bedrooms forever, 
and the increased tempo and volume of work by the CG staff 
already is drawing more attention to the residential compound 
than this RSO is completely sanguine about. 
 
¶34. (SBU) USAID Juba faces the same challenges.  For the CPA 
to succeed, Southern Sudan must develop economically.  There 
exists in the southern half of Sudan at this moment, a 
democratic, pro-American government, which is no friend of 
the forms of belief-based terrorism that has cost America so 
dearly in the last 25 years.  The support of countries (or 
even half-countries) that are democratic secular and 
pro-American is the very core of the Department's 
"Transformational Diplomacy" initiative.  To help the 
Southerners create a viable future for themselves, and to 
continue to develop democratically, the mission of USAID Juba 
will also have to grow.  So ConGen and USAID Juba are for the 
foreseeable future joined at the hip in their striving to 
promote the Department's goals in Southern Sudan. 
 
¶35. (SBU) An inconvenient truth: Is this a waiver/exception 
package for an "existing office building" or for a "newly 
acquired office building?" The USG properties in Southern 
Sudan were evacuated for years, and during that period leased 
to an INGO for a nominal annual fee.  So there have been no 
USG employees using this office space for 10 or more years. 
It is fair for reasoned people to debate on how the site 
should be defined.  RSO will defer to DS/PSD/PCB on the 
resolution of this particular issue. 
 
¶36. (SBU) There's a new Consulate Compound (NCC) on the 
boards, and due to start moving forward somewhere in the next 
2 to 4 years,  Recent events unfolding in Sudan cause me to 
doubt that it will  be built.  There must/must be serious 
consideration given to the reality on the ground in both 
northern and Southern Sudan by the stakeholders in Washington 
concerning this aspect of the waiver/exception request.  If 
there is even a reasonable doubt that, given the on-going 
problems that Embassy Khartoum has had with the New Embassy 
Compound (NEC), construction, that NCC Juba will be built, 
then I am not willing to sign off on a substandard "interim" 
facility that becomes the permanent one by default.  If this 
package eventually moves forward, it should only be with the 
full understanding that if the NEC is not completed, or if 
the security situation in Southern Sudan deteriorates any 
further (and it has deteriorated steadily for the last 6 
months), then the idea of expanding USG presence in the 
South, and building the facilities to support that growth, 
needs to be reconsidered. 
 
¶37. (SBU) Since USAID (and then, the Department of State upon 
the creation of The Consulate General), proposed this interim 
office building project, circumstances have changed.  The 
security conditions in the South have altered for the worse. 
I now have significant doubts about the reliability of the 
SPLA to provide security for Juba and it's environs.  The 
command and control of the SPLA troops by the Government of 
Southern Sudan (GOSS) can even be called into question.  The 
area is becoming increasingly lawless, and there are other 
larger issue.  It is beginning to appear that the GOSS wishes 
to renounce major portions of the CPA.  Relations with the 
Khartoum government are such that RSO Khartoum now questions 
how much it will be able to support ConGen Juba. So it comes 
to this. 
 
 
¶38. (SBU) There are substantial risks involved in seeking to 
occupy offices with this level of security requirement 
exceptions.  In this package USAID has done a reasonably good 
job in mitigating as many of them as the available structures 
and the funding available for them would allow.  However, one 
aspect of this waiver/exception package that I cannot support 
is the lack of a proper safe haven and safe haven generator. 
There is substantial lawlessness in the area adjacent to 
Juba, and firearms abound.  There are increasingly situations 
involving unpaid troops raids and murders by the Lord's 
Resistance Army and other armed groups (OAGs), there may even 
have been a near-miss coup attempt of late, (reporting on 
that is a little hazy). If this project is to go forward, it 
must include a proper safe haven and the protected electrical 
power to support one. 
 
¶39. (SBU) I would be more sanguine if we were able to 
re-visit the concept of embedding FE/BR trailers on the 
existing residential compound, and concentrating our security 
resources in one location rather than splitting them between 
two compounds. However, what we are now hearing at Post is 
that DoD and other USG elements are going to need that space 
on the residential compound for additional housing units. 
 
¶40. (SBU) I understand the importance of the USG policies 
directed towards Sudan, both North and South. There are big 
issues, issues of importance at stake here.  But given the 
current state of relations with the Khartoum government, 
given the steady deterioration of the security situation in 
Southern Sudan, I am deeply concerned about our ability to 
reasonably and appropriately manage the risk of our employees 
in the South.  The increase in the number of employees that 
this facility will inevitably enable, only increases the 
level of my concerns. 
 
¶41. (SBU) Given the current reality on the ground in Southern 
Sudan, I can not support this waiver/exception package. 
 
¶42. (SBU) If this waiver/exception package is approved, RSO 
Khartoum commits to working with RSO Juba, the Consulate 
General, and USAID to expedite the most effective security 
procedures and enhancements that are possible under the 
challenging conditions extant in Southern Sudan.  Steven 
Bernstein, Regional Security Officer, American Embassy 
Khartoum. 
POWERS