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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001032 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR DRL A/S BARRY LOWENKRON FROM THE AMBASSADOR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM KDEM PTER NP
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR YOUR VISIT TO NEPAL 
 
 ¶1.  Barry, I'm delighted that you are able to make it out to 
Nepal at this crucial point in the country's history.  You 
will find a country that is teetering on the brink of 
becoming either a showcase for democratic transformation or a 
failed or totalitarian state threatening stability in the 
region. 
 
The Political Context 
--------------------- 
 
¶2.  A little over a year ago in April 2006, a People's 
Movement (Jana Andolan, in Nepali), supported both by Nepal's 
legitimate political parties and by its Maoist insurgents, 
forced King Gyanendra to abandon his attempts at absolute 
rule and surrender power to a reinstated Parliament.  Since 
then, negotiations between the parties and the Maoists have 
resulted in a series of agreements ending the decade-long 
insurgency, establishing an Interim Parliament with Maoist 
participation and forming an Interim Government with several 
Maoist ministers.  Six-time Prime Minister and octogenarian 
G.P. Koirala heads what is now an eight-party coalition 
government.  Its chief focus has been on setting out a 
process supposedly leading to elections for a Constitutional 
Assembly and to the absorption of the Maoists into the 
democratic mainstream.  Always fragile, this process 
currently appears to be at risk. 
 
Getting the Maoists Into the Mainstream 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  Perhaps the gravest threat to the peace process comes 
from the Maoists.  Despite a series of signed commitments, 
they have not yet abandoned violence, intimidation, and 
extortion.  Indeed, both their actions and their leaders' 
words suggest that their goal remains a monopoly on state 
power and not power-sharing within a democratic framework. 
To date, the government has facilitated Maoist obduracy by 
refusing to enforce the law and crack down on Maoist abuses 
for fear that doing so would force the erstwhile insurgents 
to resume fighting.  Instead, the government has made a 
series of unilateral concessions to the Maoists, including 
giving them the keys to UN-monitored containers where they 
agreed to place their weapons and inviting them into an 
Interim Government before they completed the process of arms 
management. 
 
¶4.  Despite having violated their most fundamental 
commitments, the Maoists obtained five Ministries in the 
Interim Government, which was formed on April 1.  The Maoists 
were placed in charge of the Ministries of Information, Local 
Development, Planning and Works, Forestry, and Women and 
Children.  The Maoists openly maintain that the speedy 
holding of Constitutional Assembly elections is less 
important than immediately removing the King and declaring 
Nepal a "democratic republic."  They have threatened to take 
to the streets, if the Interim Government does not take 
action soon against the King. 
 
¶5.  The Maoists have neither returned captured land to its 
original owners nor stopped extortion throughout the 
countryside, as they agreed to do before entering the Interim 
Government.  To date, the Maoists have placed over 30,000 
supposed combatants into UN-supervised cantonments, but have 
only placed 3,400 weapons into containers at those camps. 
The majority of the alleged combatants appear to be recent 
recruits and children.  One positive development is that 
verification of the identity of the combatants, which the 
Maoists had been holding up, may begin the week of your 
arrival.  Recently, acts of violence by the Maoist Young 
Communist League (YCL) and by Maoist splinter groups such as 
the Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha ("Democratic Terai 
Liberation Front") (JTMM) have escalated in the countryside. 
The Maoists are finding their political influence in large 
parts of the country diminished by a flaring up of ethnic 
tensions. 
 
Addressing Marginalized Groups 
------------------------------ 
 
 
KATHMANDU 00001032  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶6.  Expectations among Nepal's many marginalized groups were 
raised by Maoist calls during the insurgency for regional 
autonomy and ethnic rights, as well as by hopes that the 
Constitutional Assembly process would lead to their having a 
greater say in national affairs.  These expectations went 
largely unmet, however, as the parties and the Maoists cut a 
deal behind closed doors in January on the Interim 
Constitution that did almost nothing to address the 
grievances of the marginalized groups.  This failure to 
address expectations has resulted in considerable 
disappointment among these groups, who appear increasingly 
inclined to use violence to advance their cause. 
 
¶7.  The first group to hit the streets to demand action was 
the Madhesis, relatively recent immigrants from India who 
live in Nepal's southern plains (the Terai) and account for 
about one-third of Nepal's population.  In February, the 
Madhesis called a ten-day strike that closed the roads from 
India, leading to severe shortages of petroleum and food in 
Kathmandu and elsewhere.  Clashes between the Madhesis and 
the Maoists (who view the Madhesi movement as a threat to 
Maoist standing in the Terai) and police (who contain very 
few Madhesis in their ranks) have to date resulted in over 
sixty deaths.  There was a particularly bloody incident in 
Gaur in March in which almost 30 people, all Maoists, lost 
their lives.  The Madhesis are demanding greater 
representation in the Constitutional Assembly through a new 
Constituency Delimitation Commission, as well as the 
formation of a Commission of Inquiry into alleged police 
brutality in the Terai.  The new Minister for Peace and 
Reconstruction is leading the government's talks. 
 
¶8.  Although the Prime Minister proposed various 
constitutional reforms in February and the Interim 
Constitution was in fact amended to spell out a federal 
structure more explicitly, the government has yet to flesh 
out how far it is prepared to go to make the political 
process more inclusive.  In addition to the Madhesis, the 
Janjatis (ethnic Tibeto-Burmans who comprise about 35 percent 
of Nepal's population) are demanding a greater share of 
power.  Other groups, including Nepal's dalits (or 
untouchable castes - 15 percent of the population) and women 
(51 percent of the population) are also beginning to demand a 
voice.  While these are precisely the sort of questions that 
a Constitutional Assembly should discuss, the government's 
unwillingness to engage in a roundtable dialogue with the 
disaffected groups has allowed the situation to fester and 
raised fears that the government and parties wish to keep 
power in the hands of the political elite. 
 
The Current Stalemate 
--------------------- 
 
¶9.  The Constitutional Assembly election was supposed to take 
place in June.  Although the Election Commission made it 
clear to the government in April that a June poll would be 
impossible, the parties have yet to reach agreement on a new 
date.  An election in late November (the generally preferred 
date) will not be doable, however, if the government does not 
come to terms with the Madhesis (whose MPs have shut down the 
Parliament for a month) and other agitating groups, complete 
the necessary electoral legislation, and restore law and 
order.  Six months is not a great deal of time.  One debate 
which is just getting started is how to deal with Nepal's 
dark past.  Under the peace agreements, a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission is supposed to be established. 
Because of ongoing Maoist abuses, most Internally Displaced 
Persons have still not been able to return to their homes. 
 
Human Rights and Other Issues 
----------------------------- 
 
¶10.  Nepal's human rights situation has improved since 
parliament was restored in April 2006.  Abuses by the Nepal 
Army, the Armed Police Force (APF), and the Nepal Police 
decreased substantially after the April cease-fire 
declaration, although Maoist abuses, such as abduction, 
extortion, and violence, have continued relatively unabated. 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement in November called for the 
 
KATHMANDU 00001032  003 OF 003 
 
 
Nepal Police and the APF to enforce law and order.  That 
said, the Home Minister, who remains the chief negotiator 
with the Maoists, has in the past ordered the police not to 
endanger the peace process by taking action against the 
Maoists.  The government took steps a year ago to restore 
civil liberties that had been suspended before the People's 
Movement and repealed the Press and Publications Act, which 
had prohibited the publication of material that undermined 
security, peace, or the institution of the monarchy.  We 
continue to urge the Government of Nepal to investigate past 
abuses by the Nepal Army and the other security forces and to 
call for Maoist accountability.  The UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has its largest field 
office in the world in Nepal and OHCHR and the National Human 
Rights Commission (in spite of its lack of commissioners) 
both actively report on the country's human rights situation. 
 Meanwhile, the Nepal Bar Association has launched its 
DRL-funded program to increase civil society awareness of the 
election process. 
 
What You Can Do For Us 
---------------------- 
 
¶11.  I hope your trip will provide you a clear understanding 
of the complexities of Nepal and of how we have been seeking 
to promote U.S. interests here.  As Embassy Kathmandu's most 
senior visitor since then Under Secretary for Management 
Henrietta Fore's visit in March, you will be asked for 
Washington's latest views on Nepal's fast-paced developments. 
 In your conversations with Nepalis, you might therefore want 
to concentrate on a few core themes: 
 
-- The U.S. strongly supports Nepal's peace process, and we 
will do what we can to help ensure its success.  We want to 
see a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Nepal.  We think 
it is important that the parties reach agreement on, and 
announce, an election date as soon as possible. 
 
-- We thus want to see the Maoists come into the political 
mainstream and endorse the values of democracy.  To date, 
however, Maoist actions and words cast doubt upon their 
commitment to democracy.  Until they support the rule of law 
and abandon violence and intimidation, the Maoists cannot be 
considered a mainstream political party.  No legitimate party 
practices politics through the barrel of a gun. 
 
-- We have no position on the future of the monarchy.  That 
is for the people of Nepal to decide. 
 
-- We hope that the political parties and government will 
find ways to listen to the voices of all of Nepal's people 
and bring them all into an inclusive, democratic society.  At 
the same time, nothing justifies the use of violence as a 
political tool, including by groups that legitimately feel 
marginalized within their society. 
 
-- Coming to terms with Nepal's past is crucial to ensure 
that the people of Nepal will not suffer again in the future. 
 
I look forward to your arrival. 
MORIARTY