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Viewing cable 07KABUL1684, AFGHAN-PAK JIRGA PREPARATIONS BUILDING UP: NEED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KABUL1684 2007-05-20 02:55 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO0566
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #1684/01 1400255
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 200255Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8186
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4077
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001684 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT, 
EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC PASS FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICCENT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER EAID AF
SUBJECT: AFGHAN-PAK JIRGA PREPARATIONS BUILDING UP: NEED 
FUNDS 
 
REF: KABUL 1556 
 
1.  This cable contains an action request.  See 
para 9. 
 
2.  On May 16, Afghan Regional Peace Jirga 
Preparation Commission Director of Secretariat 
Farooq Wardak briefed the international community on 
latest plans for the cross-border jirga with 
Pakistan, now scheduled for the first week of August 
in Kabul.  The exact dates will be decided when the 
two sides meet again at the end of May in Islamabad. 
 
3.  Wardak indicated that both sides have agreed 
their delegations would be made up of a "national 
composition" (versus just Pashtuns as the GOP had 
wanted earlier) with 350 delegates from each side. 
Total participation is expected to be 1,050, 
including international observers and support staff. 
A joint committee of five to six members from each 
side will decide at the end of May the final agenda 
and rules of procedure (who will chair, secretariat, 
who will speak).  The actual jirga will last 
between two to six days with two preparatory days 
for the Afghan delegates only. 
 
4. (SBU) Wardak stressed the main agenda item would 
be how to deal with terrorism emanating from both 
sides of the border.  He assured the Ambassador in a 
separate meeting on May 15 that the GOA was 
determined the issue of the Durand Line would not be 
raised.  If it were raised, the GOA would be ready 
to close down the discussion by saying the issue 
could only be discussed in a Loya Jirga. 
 
Role of the International Community 
----------------------------------- 
 
5.  Afghanistan hopes to reach agreement with 
Pakistan on a mechanism for implementing any 
agreements reached and wants the international 
community to play a key role in monitoring both the 
jirga and implementation process.  Wardak told the 
Ambassador the GOA was counting on the U.S. to serve 
as "coach," providing moral, political, diplomatic, 
and financial support.  The GOA still needs to 
obtain agreement from Islamabad on this point. 
 
Budget 
------ 
 
6.  Wardak presented the donors at the May 16 
meeting a new budget request in the amount of USD 
2.6 million.  He explained that the jirga was not 
foreseen in the Afghan budget process, which meant 
that funding would have to come from external 
sources.  President Karzai would be looking for some 
internal funds, but the GOA is hoping the 
international community will fund the jirga. 
 
7.  Wardak had told the Ambassador on May 15 that the 
budget would be roughly USD 2 million.  The 
Ambassador said the U.S. would be providing support, 
but it likely would not cover the entire budget. 
 
8.  On the margins of the May 16 meeting, the Saudi 
and Japanese Ambassadors told Deputy PolCouns that 
their governments would likely be providing funding 
(amount unspecified).  UK Embassy POLOFF confided that 
said his Embassy would be requesting 100-200,000 
pounds (USD 200-400,000) from London. 
 
Comment and Action Request 
 
KABUL 00001684  002 OF 002 
 
 
-------------------------- 
 
9.  The cross-border jirga initiative has traveled a 
long road since its inception at the White House in 
September 2006.  With the jirga looking more and 
more likely to take place in early August, the 
GOA is in need of serious financial assistance. 
Post believes that early U.S. financial support 
at this critical juncture in preparations will 
get others to step up to the plate.  Therefore, 
if Washington concurs, Post would like to use 
ESF funds available at Post in the amount of 
USD 500,000, assuming the requested FY2007 
supplemental funds are appropriated in the 
coming month or so.  If these funds are not available 
soon, Post requests Washington consider financial 
support from another funding source.  The GOA would 
need access to the funds by July 1, earlier if 
possible.  The Commission's detailed budget proposal 
is being e-mailed to the Department (SCA/A). 
WOOD