VZCZCXRO2546
PP RUEHDT RUEHPB
DE RUEHHM #0548/01 1421003
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221003Z MAY 07
FM AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2646
INFO RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI PRIORITY 1912
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 2845

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HO CHI MINH CITY 000548 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI PINR VM
SUBJECT: BIG BROTHER PACKS THE VOTE:  NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS IN 
HCMC 
 
REF: HANOI 921 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000548  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Summary 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) HCMC went to the polls on May 20 to select among 52 
candidates to fill its 26 National Assembly seats in a tightly 
controlled and scripted process.  Despite the pre-election media 
push in HCMC for "independent" candidates, of the 137 
self-nominees that registered as independent candidates with the 
HCMC Election Board, only seven survived the Party's screening 
process.  In ConGen's election monitoring of eight polling 
stations, there was little apparent enthusiasm among the voters; 
proxy voting was common. Local election officials hinted at 
intense pressure to ensure near universal voter turnout.  Final 
results will be announced after June 4.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
Centralized Democracy in Action 
 
------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) On the morning of May 20, HCMC PolOffs visited eight 
HCMC polling stations to observe how the city managed voting for 
its 26 National Assembly seats.  Our visits were authorized by 
the provincial People's Committee and vetted by the HCMC Party's 
Internal Protection Committee.  A number of plainclothes 
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) officers maintained a visible 
presence around us.  In one instance, some voters were pulled 
aside and questioned briefly by police after speaking with us. 
 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) According to local Party organizers, the script for the 
elections did not deviate from content and procedures of past 
National Assembly elections.  Local preparations for the 
elections went into high gear at least a month earlier.  Ward 
and neighborhood organizers held mandatory "education sessions" 
with local voters in which they emphasized that voting is 
required by law. Local Party workers distributed Party-approved 
bios of the approved candidates as well as similar, 
Party-cleared candidate "action plans."  In the week before the 
vote, police-escorted floats paraded slowly through town 
exhorting the electorate to vote.  The day before the vote, 
election workers went house-to-house to distribute "voting 
admittance chits" to every registered voter, which the voters 
then exchanged for a ballot.  The chit, stamped by an election 
official after voting, served as proof that the individual had 
voted. 
 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) On the day of the vote, each of HCMC's roughly 3,000 
balloting stations set up along standardized, Party-approved 
lines.  The centerpiece was an incense-shrouded picture of a 
benevolent Ho Chi Minh under which was placed the ballot box. 
Traditional patriotic music -- as well as a new election ditty 
-- beat away at volumes that drowned out the surrounding 
traffic. 
 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) The ballots were printed on plain paper with no 
security features to prevent duplication.  Voters were 
instructed to cross out all but three of the five or six 
candidates on the ballot.  The top three vote-getters from each 
electoral district would be elected to the National Assembly. 
Write-in ballots were illegal and would be rejected, election 
administrators to us.  After the polls closed, local election 
workers would immediately count the votes, in the presence of 
three "citizen observers."  Election officials told us that 
candidates or candidates' representatives would have to receive 
special permission if they wanted to observe the ballot 
counting. 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Although 60 percent of HCMC's population is under 
35-years old, virtually all the voters we saw were middle-aged 
or the elderly.  While balloting station administrators told us 
that proxy voting was illegal, it appeared to be common 
practice.  There was little apparent enthusiasm among the 
voters; a "let's get it over with" mood appeared to predominate. 
 
 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000548  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) Local election officials hinted at intense pressure to 
ensure near universal voter turnout.  When asked what the 
minimum acceptable voter turnout might be, one official told us 
"100 percent is the safest."   Most polling stations we visited 
claimed that they had up to 70 percent voter turnout by 10 a.m.; 
an impromptu visit to another balloting station not on the HCMC 
government's approved list showed a 16 percent turnout. 
Election workers told us that they would send ballot boxes 
door-to-door or announce on the neighborhood PA system the names 
of tardy voters after lunch time to get out the vote.  (Comment: 
 The unstated message was clear:  those few that did not vote 
were bucking the system, an act of disobedience that would be 
noted by the system.  End Comment.)  HCMC media reported a 
turnout of nearly 99 percent across the city. 
 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) Voter awareness appeared to be low.  All the candidates 
were described as "talented" and "deserving."  However, there 
was no opportunity for the average citizen to meet the 
candidates or to learn more about their platforms.  Attendance 
at a district-level "meet the candidates" event was by 
invitation only.  Candidates were not allowed to carry out any 
independent campaigning or to issue any supplementary election 
materials to distribute to voters.  The voters we spoke with 
repeated the Party slogan that "to vote is the right and 
obligation of the citizen," but could not or would not 
articulate how their National Assembly delegates were supposed 
to help them or their immediate communities. 
 
 
 
No Independent Candidates 
 
------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) Despite the pre-election media hoopla surrounding a 
supposed Party "push" for independent candidates, voters had 
little variety to choose from.  Of the 137 self-nominated that 
registered officially as independent candidates with the HCMC 
Election Board, only seven survived the Party's screening 
process (of a total of 30 nationwide).  These included the head 
of the Marxist-Leninism faculty at a private university, two 
members of Fatherland Front affiliates, a businessman from a 
firm linked to the military and the son of former Party 
Secretary Le Duan.  One ConGen contact who ran as an independent 
 
SIPDIS 
told us that he was pressed directly by senior Fatherland Front 
representatives to withdraw.  When he refused, Ministry of 
Public Security Officials ensured that he lost the mandatory 
"confidence votes" at his workplace and in his neighborhood. 
HCMC press reported that 27 self-nominees in HCMC withdrew their 
applications due to "pressing family circumstances".  Another 45 
self-nominees did not receive the required 50 percent confidence 
vote in neighborhood polling.  In contrast, all official 
nominees reportedly scored between 90 and 100 percent in 
confidence votes in their neighborhoods and workplaces. 
 
 
 
Comment 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) The tight control of the entire election process 
highlights the strong grassroots reach of the Party even in 
relatively open HCMC.  According to the HCMC Election 
Commission, the results of the election will be announced 
officially on June 4.  Although the process was tightly 
scripted, the results may still shed some light on the mood and 
direction of the Party.  For example, will the Party allow 
younger, more open and more business-oriented candidates -- such 
as Dong Thanh Tam, an influential Industrial Zone developer -- 
to win or will more ideologically conservative candidates 
prevail?  End Comment. 
WINNICK