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Viewing cable 07HELSINKI333, FINNS VERY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT EU-RUSSIA PCA MANDATE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07HELSINKI333 2007-05-10 09:47 2011-04-24 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Helsinki
VZCZCXRO1007
RR RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHHE #0333 1300947
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 100947Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3326
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000333 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ENRG EUN RS FI
SUBJECT: FINNS VERY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT EU-RUSSIA PCA MANDATE 
 
 
Classified By: POLCHIEF GREGORY THOME FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: The GOF is very pessimistic that the EU 
will be able to reach consensus on establishing a 
negotiating mandate for a new EU-Russia Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA).  Immediately after Poland 
blocked consensus near the end of the Finnish EU 
Presidency, the Finns expressed confidence that matters 
could be resolved during the German Presidency.  However, 
the situation has changed dramatically -- largely as a 
result of Russia's behavior -- and the Finns now believe 
that the window of opportunity has passed.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) On the eve of the EU-Russia Summit in Helsinki 
last November, Poland scuttled the Finnish EU 
Presidency's efforts to deliver to the German Presidency 
a consensus EU mandate for negotiating a new EU-Russia 
PCA.  The Finns (and Germans, we understand) were 
disappointed, but expressed optimism that Russia would 
lift its ban on Polish meat imports and that the mandate 
would be secured in plenty of time for the subsequent EU- 
Russia Summit in May. 
 
Meat Issue Still Problematic 
---------------------------- 
3. (C) However, Finnish officials in the MFA Unit for 
Russia, which spearheaded the inter-EU negotiations on 
the PCA during the Presidency and has coordinated closely 
with German counterparts since, now believe that the 
window of opportunity for a new PCA may have passed.  The 
Germans and the Finns tried mightily to resolve the 
Polish meat issue before the April GAERC, our contacts 
say, but to no avail.  Poland delivered a good faith 
"signal" that would give Russia the necessary political 
cover to lift its embargo, the Finns reported, but 
apparently Moscow did not view it as sufficient.  In 
addition, Russian contacts have suggested to the Finns 
that they have little incentive to remove the Embargo 
before the Summit -- a stance the GOF finds enormously 
frustrating, but not suprising given Russia's 
increasingly obstructive or inexplicable behavior on 
other issues. 
 
Other Irritants 
--------------- 
4. (C) Indeed, in the Finns' view, Russia has created 
additional irritants that make achieving EU consensus on 
the PCA mandate even more remote.  Even if Poland finds a 
way to resolve the meat issue, Warsaw, Vilnius and others 
could consider blocking PCA consensus over Russia's 
increasingly politicized energy policies.  The concerns 
are valid, in the Finns' view, particularly because 
Russia has not turned words into deeds on promises it 
made in connection with sensitive gas pipeline projects. 
Another potential irritant has been Moscow's irrational 
response to US missile defense plans in Poland and the 
Czech Republic.  Finnish contacts do not believe those 
countries would block the PCA mandate over this issue, 
but say "the mood has not been very fruitful."  Ditto for 
the Estonian Bronze Statue crisis:  Estonia has told the 
GOF that Russia's violations of the Vienna Conventions 
will not prompt the GOE to take action against the PCA 
mandate, and it has stepped back from early demands that 
the Summit be postponed.  However, the Finns believe that 
any additional Russian heavy handedness could prompt 
Tallinn to speak out against a new PCA. 
 
Russian Interest Waning 
----------------------- 
5. (C) The Finns suggested that the only small hope of 
achieving a new PCA mandate might stem from the fact of 
this being President Putin's last EU-Russia Summit on 
Russian soil -- but readily admit that this is likely to 
have little impact.  For one, Putin has neither the 
political will nor sufficient time before the May 18 
Summit to provide the reassurance many Member States are 
seeking; and for two, there is not enough time left in 
Putin's term for him to turn a new PCA to his political 
advantage.  Some Russian officials have even suggested to 
our Finnish contacts that "if the EU can live with the 
old PCA, so can we." 
 
Comment 
------- 
6. (C) From the Finnish perspective, the best window of 
opportunity for achieving a new PCA may have passed.  The 
Finnish and German Presidencies gave it their best shot. 
However, the new Member States have proven they are not 
shy about using their ability to block consensus as a 
means of protecting their own interests vis--vis Russia, 
and Russia has done little to provide them reassurances. 
HYATT