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FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 HELSINKI 000321 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MOPS MARR EUN FI
SUBJECT: FINLAND'S NEW GOVERNMENT: TURNING A PROMISING NEW 
TONE INTO SUBSTANCE 
 
 
Classified By: POLCHIEF GREGORY THOME FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION 
------------------------ 
¶1. (C) Finland's new center-right government is eager to 
reverse the malaise that often typified US-Finnish 
relations after 2003, and from the Foreign Minister on 
down a palpable shift in tone is already evident. 
Trans-Atlanticists have replaced notorious US-skeptics 
at the MFA, the MOD and elsewhere, offering us the 
chance to make real progress on several US regional 
security and freedom agenda initiatives.  We now see 
enhanced Finnish participation in Afghanistan, in 
NATO-related security operations, and even in Guantanamo 
resettlement as very real possibilities. 
 
¶2. (S) However, to achieve our goals we must move with 
some caution.  Key ministers are sincere in saying they 
want to work with us, but the thorny task of undoing a 
legacy of entrenched "allergy" to NATO and knee-jerk 
opposition to American foreign policy will not happen 
overnight -- especially with President Halonen still in 
place for the next five years.  With her Social 
Democratic allies now in opposition, the President's 
hand is weakened, but her skepticism toward US policy 
remains resilient and many of our key goals run contrary 
to her instincts.  Our job, as we see it, will be to 
help the new center-right government solidify 
cooperation on our key agenda items, without putting 
Halonen in a position where she feels boxed in and 
assumes an aggressive, defensive posture.  End Summary. 
 
NEW TONE, NEW OPPORTUNITIES 
--------------------------- 
¶3. (C) Finland's center-right government has been in 
office for fewer than two weeks, and already the new GOF 
has indicated to us in clear terms that its highest 
priorities include strengthening the relationship with 
the United States and reversing the malaise that has 
characterized the bilateral relationship over the past 
four years.  Within the new coalition, the Conservative 
Party (KOK) has taken over nearly all the key foreign 
and security policy ministries, and the change in tone 
is already abundantly clear.  Foreign Minister Ilkka 
Kanerva (who replaced Erkki Tuomioja, perhaps the 
biggest cynic in the previous GOF regarding US policy) 
has already met briefly with Secretary Rice at the 
NATO FMs' meeting in Oslo; visited the Embassy for a 
briefing on key issues (Reftel A); and sent his 
political advisor to meet our political section for a 
frank discussion of how to improve US-Finnish ties. 
Defense Minister Jyri Hakamies became the first MOD in 
Finnish history to openly announce that he favored 
Finland's joining NATO (after replacing Seppo 
Kaariainen, a staunch opponent of NATO membership).  And 
politicians from all parties -- as well as senior civil 
servants at the MFA and MOD -- have described the new 
government platform as unambiguously positive toward the 
US, and a clear departure in terms of tone from that of 
the previous government. 
 
CONCRETE OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROGRESS 
----------------------------------- 
¶4. (S) In addition to adopting a new tone, the new GOF 
has already signaled a willingness to move forward on 
several initiatives of direct interest to the US.  Over 
the medium- to long-term, we see concrete opportunities 
in the following areas: 
 
 -- AFGHANISTAN: Greater Finnish participation in NATO 
operations in Afghanistan appears feasible, to include 
additional troops and, over the longer term, leadership 
of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT).   We do not 
expect the new GOF to reverse its predecessor's decision 
not to offer lethal equipment for Afghan security 
forces, as it would provoke an early confrontation with 
President Halonen; however, we see opportunities for 
non-lethal donations and will pursue them.  Afghanistan 
will continue to be a major recipient of Finnish 
reconstruction and development aid, and the Finns will 
continue their successful model of targeting aid in 
support of PRT activities. 
 
 -- NATO RESPONSE FORCE: The new GOF sees the logic of 
participating in the NRF, both as a complement to EU 
Battlegroup activities and as a means of advancing 
Finland's international crisis management goals. 
Finland has Battlegroup commitments through summer 2008, 
but may be willing to participate in an NRF thereafter. 
 
HELSINKI 00000321  002 OF 003 
 
 
Notably, President Halonen's initial pessimism toward 
the idea has softened. 
 
 -- STRATEGIC AIRLIFT CONSORTIUM: The new GOF appears 
eager to join Sweden as the second non-NATO participant. 
Budgetary issues remain to be worked out, but MOD 
sources are pleased with the new government's interest 
in this initiative. 
 
 -- GUANTANAMO RESETTLEMENT: The previous GOF was a 
sharp critic of the US facility at Guantanamo, but 
consistently rejected our requests to address the 
problem by resettling detainees.  Legal hurdles still 
exist, but the new government has quietly shown the 
political will to explore resettling a small number. It 
is imperative that the Department obtain from the 
Pentagon requested information about the circumstances 
and reasons for the detainees' incarceration for this 
issue to move forward. 
 
 -- MANPADS: We are hopeful that Finland will transfer 
several decommissioned SA-18s to the US.  The 
willingness of the GOF to entertain our request 
promptly again indicates the shift in tone we are 
seeing. 
 
¶5. (C) In addition to these concrete initiatives that 
are already in progress, Finnish civil servants and 
political appointees have reached out to us to inquire 
about other areas in which we could possibly cooperate. 
We have suggested several areas of the US Freedom 
Agenda, including a more pro-active role in fostering 
democracy and civil society in Russia and the Caucuses; 
more direct engagement with the US on Muslim outreach 
and combating extremism; increased support to 
Belorussian dissidents through the International 
Humanities University in Vilnius; support for former 
Finnish President Ahtisaari's plan for Kosovo; real 
leadership in Europe on combating trafficking-in- 
persons; and support for continued EU engagement with 
Turkey and keeping the accession process alive (note: 
the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, is a 
Finn). 
 
TOP DOWN CHANGE 
--------------- 
¶6. (C) The GOF's proactive approach in reaching out to 
us is the most evident sign that it truly intends to 
reinvigorate the bilateral relationship.  However, it 
will take some time for many of these initiatives to 
take shape.  New ministers understand that they must 
find a way to undo the legacy of their predecessors -- a 
legacy that in many cases was marked by skepticism 
toward US policies and a pronounced Finnish political 
"allergy" toward NATO.  Many senior diplomats and career 
MFA and MOD civil servants have openly expressed to us 
their enthusiasm for the new government's emphasis on 
improving trans-Atlantic relations.  FM Kanerva and MOD 
Hakamies have emboldened these officials, with Kanerva 
actually instructing MFA personnel to be more proactive 
contacting the Embassy.  Indeed, trans-Atlanticists 
within the ministries tell us that the stage is set for 
cooperative and constructive engagement with the US on a 
range of issues.  However, bureaucratic cultures do not 
change overnight.  In addition, the Conservative Party 
is big on enthusiasm but short on experience, having 
last held the post of Foreign Minister in the 1930s. 
 
HANDLING HALONEN 
---------------- 
¶7. (S) A far bigger challenge for both the GOF and us 
will be President Halonen.  During her first six years 
in government, she and Foreign Minister Tuomioja 
promulgated a foreign policy line that emphasized EU and 
Russian relations over trans-Atlantic ties; extreme 
caution toward NATO; an increasingly knee-jerk 
resistance to many US foreign policy initiatives, 
especially in the wake of the Iraq War; and, in the case 
of Tuomioja, a penchant for unnecessarily antagonizing 
Washington even on issues where we agreed.  Tuomioja is 
now in opposition, while the new government's platform 
highlights "the trans-Atlantic relationship" as among 
Finland's most important; specifically calls for steps 
to improve and strengthen ties to the United States; 
and, while stopping short of calling for Finland to join 
NATO, removes references to Finland as a "non-aligned 
country." 
 
¶8. (S) That said, Halonen still retains constitutional 
 
HELSINKI 00000321  003 OF 003 
 
 
responsibility for formulating Finnish foreign policy -- 
a power she has interpreted broadly as a virtual veto 
over any issue she chooses.  Both the new government 
platform and her Social Democratic allies' departure 
from government have weakened her hand, but they have 
not weakened her potential for side-tracking some 
initiatives of importance both to us and to the new GOF. 
On security policy issues in particular, Halonen remains 
the leader of the SDP's anti-NATO wing (which currently 
dominates SDP leadership but is not necessarily the 
majority) and is likely to greet some of the GOF 
initiatives listed above with skepticism.  KOK leaders 
tell us they can work with Halonen, who has developed a 
reputation for reacting harshly (and often publicly) to 
proposals she initially disagrees with, and then 
softening her stance and responding well to internal 
dialogue.  However, senior MFA and MOD officials also 
caution that she can be aggressive when she feels boxed 
in and could be quick to veto initiatives if pushed too 
hard or too quickly. 
 
THE US ROLE 
----------- 
¶9. (C) The change of government in Finland is certain to 
yield results on a range of issues that are favorable to 
US policy goals.  Kanerva's early handshake with the 
Secretary in Oslo and the possibility of an S-Kanerva 
 
SIPDIS 
meeting in June have emboldened the government, making 
leaders feel that their early effort to change the tone 
has been noticed, and offering them encouragement to 
begin managing their trans-Atlantic agenda through the 
president's office. 
 
¶10. (S) At the same time, we must do our part not to box 
Halonen in.  For example, the new government's decision 
not to press for a lethal weapons donation for 
Afghanistan is a clear attempt to avoid an early 
confrontation with her, and is one we should respect in 
hopes of making progress elsewhere in Afghanistan. 
Likewise for protocol issues.  The S-Kanerva meeting in 
June is clearly important, and the GOF will play it as a 
meeting of counterparts.  However, Halonen remains 
extremely sensitive about the fact that she has not 
secured a long-requested meeting with President Bush; 
while this is appropriate from Washington's point of 
view given the President's other priorities, we should 
tread carefully because the Finns will continue to raise 
this.  It will serve the interests of the US and the new 
GOF better to begin rebuilding the bilateral 
relationship at the foreign ministers' level, gauge the 
new government's progress in working with Halonen to 
deliver on items important to the US agenda, and 
determine later if meetings above the S level are 
warranted.  To be sure, the GOF's new trans-Atlanticist 
program represents a sea-change in tone and emphasis 
as regards Finland's foreign and security policy; 
however, it's an uncharted sea for the Finns, and the 
government and foreign minister will need our help in 
translating that tone and good intent into substance. 
WARE