VZCZCXRO6984
RR RUEHCI
DE RUEHKA #0743/01 1270131
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 070131Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY DHAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3984
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 9879
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 9076
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1638
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 7915
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 2542
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//ISA/NESA
RUEKDIA/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J2/J5
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI//J2/J4/J5

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DHAKA 000743 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO AIAG/HOLLIS SUMMERS, AIAG/TONY NEWTON AND 
AIAG/NICHOLAS STUDZINSKI 
DELHI PLEASE PASS TO FAS/OLIVER FLAKE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TBIO KFLU PREL PGOV BG
SUBJECT:  TRIP REPORT OF VISIT TO POULTRY FARMS IN SAVAR 
 
REF: (A) DHAKA 730, (B) DHAKA 626, (C) DHAKA 569, (D) DHAKA 533, AND 
 
PREVIOUS 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY. On May 2, Econoff visited two poultry farms in 
the Ashulia area of Savar district north of Dhaka.  Both farms had 
their entire stocks of egg-laying chickens culled due to H5N1 in 
late March or early April.  The two farms demonstrated widely 
different levels of preparation and sophistication, but both are now 
facing serious economic consequences after losing all of their 
chickens.  The economic impact of the outbreak is creating 
distorting market effects, which in turn may create additional 
potential health hazards, but the biggest hazard remains the 
economic threat to the livelihood of millions of poultry workers if 
a compensation plan is not enacted soon to ensure that culled stocks 
can be replaced by those with the least economic resources to 
restock themselves. END SUMMARY. 
 
 ¶2.  (SBU) LORAPUR FARM.  Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock 
officials provided Econoff with the name and address of Lorapur Farm 
in Ashulia, Savar, and its owner, Mr. Md. Nadim "Nick" Chowdhury. 
The farm started operation in October 2006 and employs 20 people. It 
had approximately 9,500 W36 breed layer chickens bought from the US 
and production was around 9,000 eggs per day.  Econoff saw what 
appeared to be a well-planned and executed facility with effective 
restrictions on vehicle access and decontamination equipment 
evident.  The layout of the farm is two stand-alone coops and one 
large coop separated into three chambers for a total of five 
distinct flocks.  The coop buildings seem well constructed, with 
concrete disinfection footbaths built into the stairs at each coop's 
doorway.  The gap between the wire mesh walls and the roof was 
plugged to prevent wild birds from entering.  Employees demonstrated 
their cotton masks, caps, and gowns worn around the chicken coops, 
each stenciled with their names.  The owner described a bonus system 
rewarding both production and biosafety, ensuring that the workers 
wore their protective equipment and observed good biosafety 
practices.  Even with all the coops empty due to culling a month 
before, employees still wore their masks in the coop area to 
reinforce good habits. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) PROBLEMS BEGIN.  In mid-February, the farm had an outbreak 
of worms followed by cases of Salmonella.  The owner blames 
contaminated locally purchased feed, claiming everything else was 
tightly controlled except the feed in which he claims to have found 
cigarette butts, wires, and rat feces.  By late March, one of the 
three attached coops began having sudden die offs of up to 200 
birds, but with no visual symptoms of H5N1.  The owner suspected 
Newcastle disease, fowl cholera, or fowl pest, because egg 
production did not decrease when corrected for flock deaths.  The 
die offs were not back-to-back, either; there would be a die off, 
then a lull, and then the cycle would repeat.  He began treatment 
for Newcastle disease.  [NOTE: Contrary to the owner's suspicions, 
HPAI is not inconsistent with these observations.  END NOTE.] 
 
¶4. (SBU) H5N1 DETERMINATION.  Chowdhury sent samples on his own to 
the Bangladesh Livestock Research Institute (BLRI) on April 6 for 
analysis after necropsy of several of the chickens from die offs 
showed none of the physical signs/symptoms of H5N1 highly pathogenic 
avian influenza (HPAI): internal organs were normal, throats had 
some mucus but nothing approaching the full blockage associated with 
HPAI, and there was no discoloration of combs or wattles.  BLRI 
returned a finding of QH5N1Q the same day.  The Army showed up with 
guns drawn, and a written order was faxed later that same day, 
followed by a team to cull the flock.  The owner still seriously 
doubts that his flock was infected with H5N1.  A month later, he 
still has not been provided with written official results and claims 
the Ministry will only tell him that "his two samples came back 
positive."  The owner admits to having had previous negative 
personal experiences with BLRI unrelated to avian influenza, and 
made allegations of attempted solicitation of bribery for favorable 
results. 
 
¶5. (SBU) BHUIYA FARM.  To view farms that had not been given advance 
notice, Econoff asked the owner of Lorapur Farm to introduce him to 
other neighboring farms.  They went together to Bhuiya Farm 
approximately two kilometers away which had 2,500 layer chickens, 
had been in operation for eight years, and employed five or six 
workers.  Their breed was also W36 layers, but their stock was from 
a local hatchery farm.  Bhuiya was considerably less modern than 
Lorapur.  The coops' mesh was much wider and there were large gaps 
 
DHAKA 00000743  002 OF 003 
 
 
where it met the roof.  The coops were empty of chickens and the 
doors closed, but Econoff observed wild birds flying in and out of 
one of the coops.  Backyard poultry was also present in the area at 
all times during the visit; when asked, the workers and their 
families from the small rural community surrounding the coops said 
no efforts had been made to kill any of the backyard poultry.  Also 
noted were cattle within ten meters of the empty coops. 
 
¶6. (SBU) DIE OFFS AND H5N1.  Bhuiya started having sudden die offs 
of 100 or 200 birds at a time in mid-March, accompanied by decline 
in egg production.  Their first thought was Newcastle disease, and 
they began treatment accordingly.  They sent two samples to BLRI, 
which came back positive for H5N1.  Culling at this facility was 
accomplished by the workers using "sacks of powdered CO2 to 
suffocate the birds."  The GOB provided disinfectant spray to the 
farm and a seven day supply of Osiflu to each of the employees. 
[NOTE. Osiflu is the locally produced Tamiflu equivalent. END NOTE.] 
A Ministry of Health official examined the workers at that time, but 
no follow up exam was done; the workers were simply told to contact 
local health authorities if anyone had problems.  The army was 
present during the culling, but only in the distance cordoning off 
the area. 
 
¶7. (SBU) COMPENSATION IS CRITICAL.  Bhuiya and other small farms 
face serious financial problems following culling.  They would like 
to restock after the three month post-culling waiting period, but 
financially may not be able to do so without a compensation plan for 
their lost stock.  Media continues to report that poultry farmers 
will receive compensation for culled birds, will receive replacement 
birds, feed, and medicines at no charge, and that commercial lenders 
have agreed to soften loan terms and issue new loans.  Chowdhury 
from Lorapur farm sits on the joint industry / government committee 
on compensation and confirms that while these issues are under 
discussion, nothing has been decided as yet.  He reports that the 
following sectors are represented on the committee:  Layers/Eggs, 
Hatcheries, Veterinary Pharmaceuticals, and the Poultry Association; 
the Feed Association was invited, but due to questions about 
adulterated feed is not participating at this time. 
 
¶8. (SBU) INDUSTRY ECONOMICS:  EGGS.  Chowdhury also says that since 
late March, egg prices paid by wholesalers to farmers have decreased 
from 3.73 taka per egg to 2.50 taka per egg, which is below the 
farmer's cost to produce.  The prices between wholesaler and 
retailer have not changed, however, possibly due to pre-existing 
contracts.  Therefore, the wholesalers are reportedly making 
substantial additional profits. 
 
¶9. (SBU) INDUSTRY ECONOMICS:  CHICKS.  Chowdhury reports that in 
Bangladesh day old chicks cost 40 Q 45 taka each, whereas the same 
chicks cost around 6-10 taka each in India.  This sets up a strong 
incentive to procure them from across the border, possibly bypassing 
import restrictions.  The cost to the hatchery is about the same, 
but with little competition in Bangladesh and no organization among 
the buyers, the price is artificially high resulting in huge profits 
for the hatcheries. One worrying element is that in culled area, 
farms are not buying day old chicks, since they cannot restock for 
three months.  In those areas the price has decreased slightly, 
resulting in overcrowding by some farms which were not culled but 
which are cashing in on cheap prices, putting 3,000 chicks in a coop 
designed for 1,000.  This overcrowding can be a significant factor 
towards the spread of multiple diseases. 
 
¶10. (SBU) EPIDIMIOLOGICAL INFORMATION.  Both farms bought feed from 
THE same company, AIT Feed Mill, and both were treating for 
Newcastle disease when BLRI tested their samples.  When Econoff 
asked if anyone from the government took down epidemiological 
information like this, both agreed it was very important and were 
sure that someone probably did, but were not able to provide 
specifics of who, when, or how that information would have been 
captured. 
 
¶11. (SBU) COMMENT. The field visit demonstrated that even among two 
farms as different as these, compensation is a critical issue for 
both.  It also showed a wide variety in responses by the GOB; for 
example, at Lorapur both a rapid (if untrained in HPAI procedures) 
military response and a reportedly professional veterinary response, 
while at Bhuiya, a less meticulous response had the workers doing 
the culling where there may actually be a higher risk with coops, 
country fowl, and other livestock in close proximity to a rural 
 
DHAKA 00000743  003 OF 003 
 
 
community. 
 
BUTENIS