VZCZCXRO7767
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #1339/01 1271548
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 071548Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5067
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0220
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0206
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0367
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1139
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0375
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0119
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1250
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 1480
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 0476
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0137
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 001339 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
TUNIS FOR MEPI 
NSC STAFF FOR WATERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM KMPI EG
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE FORUM FOR THE FUTURE 
 
REF: STATE 49586 
 
Sensitive but unclassified.  Please protect accordingly. 
 
¶1.  (U)  This is a joint cable from Embassy Cairo and the 
MEPI Regional Office in Tunis. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶2. (SBU)  MEPI RO Tunis and Embassy Cairo Political Section 
staff canvassed  MEPI and BMENA partners and other leading 
reformers in Egypt to seek their views on the Forum for the 
Future (FFF) process, per reftel request, in an effort to 
gauge the impact the FFF is having in advancing reform 
objectives in the Arab world.  According to these civil 
society (CS) representatives, the FFF has made some positive 
impact during its first three years of existence, but has had 
difficulty supporting broad political reform, impeded in 
large part by the behaviors of several Arab governments.  CS 
contacts in Cairo said that these governments have not taken 
actions consistent with their declarations to engage in 
democratic reform.  At the same time, efforts by the G8 
countries to promote political reform actually saw a 
backsliding at the last Forum held in December 2006.  The CS 
representatives agreed that while the desire and rationale of 
the USG to promote democratic reform as a top BMENA policy 
goal has been strengthened rather than weakened by the FFF 
process, the results so far have not matched the initial good 
intentions.  End summary. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  In late April 2007, Embassy Cairo POL staff, joined 
by visiting MEPI Tunis RO senior LES, met more than a dozen 
experts from Egyptian civil society to discuss the 
accomplishments and efficacy of the FFF process.  The 
Egyptian contacts included: Saad Eddin Ibrahim (Ibn Khaldun 
Center); Hafez Abou Seada (Egyptian Organization for Human 
Rights); Gamal Abdel Gawad, Ayman Abdel Wahab, and Khalil 
Anany (all of Al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies); Bahey 
Eddin Hassen and Moatez Al Fogary (Cairo Institute for Human 
Rights Studies); Amany Kandil (Arab Network for NGOs); Nasser 
Amin (Arab Center for the Independence of the Judiciary and 
the Legal Profession); Azza Soliman (Center of Women,s Legal 
Assistance); Ahmed Samieh (Andalus Institute for Tolerance); 
Ihab Salam (United Group); Said Abdel Hafez (Moltaka 
Organization); Salah Soliman (Al Naqeeb Center); and Gamal 
Barakat (Arab Center for Democracy and Human Rights).  A 
summary of their views and recommendations follow. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
REVITALIZE RATHER THAN RELINQUISH THE FORUM 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Most of the CS experts consulted recognized the 
positive impact of the Forum in fostering democratic reform, 
in varying degrees, across the region. One noted that the 
process has contributed to promoting dialogue between civil 
society and governments, while another said that the FFF has 
created a new regional dynamic which positively influences 
the local political environment.  Others observed that there 
is a growing significance internationally to democracy 
promotion in MENA countries.  As one CS expert said: "Given 
that the reform initiative was created in response to calls 
for political, economic, and social reform emanating from the 
MENA region, civil society groups would like to save and 
strengthen the Forum as its centerpiece." 
 
¶5. (SBU)  That said, some CS representatives noted that there 
is no sense of continutity or follow-up from one Forum to the 
next.  They lamented a lack of implementation of the 
recommendations adopted in previous years.  All of the 
activists voiced concern that recommendations from the third 
Forum appear remarkably similar to those from the first two, 
instead of building on work already accomplished and 
resulting in additional concrete actions.  This lack of 
continuity and follow-through has enabled governments to 
 
CAIRO 00001339  002 OF 003 
 
 
"pretend" to support reform, with public displays of 
rhetoric, rather than building platforms to establish 
tangible results.  To date, there has been little serious 
follow-up, according to the Egyptian CS activists, on the 
recommendations put forth during the CS parallel meetings. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Notwithstanding these shortcomings, Egyptian 
activists agreed that the FFF has put pressure on 
authoritarian Arab regimes to discuss reform.  They urged the 
USG and other G8 countries to build on these gains and to 
continue engaging with Arab leaders, rather than 
relinquishing the process.  They added that building on 
achievements already made will provide hope to CS 
organizations, most of which still believe that the FFF 
process presents the only regional framework where these 
groups can discuss reform issues in the presence of their 
governments and at the ministerial level. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
USG COMMITMENT AND CREDIBILITY QUESTIONED 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU)  While those consulted agreed that the Forum's 
distinctive relationship with civil society is the main 
reason many NGOs in the Arab world have welcomed it--and 
taken the initiative to stage parallel CS meetings--they also 
feared that the way the USG is currently handling the FFF 
sends the wrong message to the region.  The USG, they said, 
is no longer giving high-level attention to the FFF, 
particularly compared to the priority we placed on the 
process during the first two forums held in Rabat and Manama. 
 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  CS activists underlined the importance of 
enhancing the momentum gained on the reform agenda through 
the FFF, yet wondered if the USG and others were willing to 
work with civil society to implement previous 
recommendations.  They also questioned whether the G8 
countries still see real value in continuing this process. 
Some contacts expressed dismay at the lack of follow-up to 
the first two Forums ) on the part of both governments and 
civil society.  As one activist said, "The recommendations we 
have so far need to be turned into practical project plans, 
time-bound and tailored according to specific country needs." 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Among CS representatives in Cairo, attitudes 
toward the USG in general have worsened over the past year, 
with U.S. foreign policy and actions taken toward Iraq, Iran, 
Lebanon, and the Palestinians as the chief reasons for this 
decline in esteem.  They see the war in Iraq and the 
continuing Arab-Israeli conflict as having significant 
negative impact on the credibility of USG.  CS experts said 
that the failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict 
prevents the United States from gaining credibility as an 
advocate of democracy in the Middle East.  Even liberal 
Arabs, they said, perceive claims by the United States that 
it wants democracy in the Middle East as hypocritical, 
pointing to what they see as American indifference to the 
rights of the Palestinians and unconditional support for 
Israel.  Until this credibility is restored, they added, 
Washington's effort to stimulate democratization and 
political reform in the region will be severely constrained. 
 
------------------ 
CS RECOMMENDATIONS 
------------------ 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  The CS representatives cited a lack of 
information among Arab CS groups on the substance and 
planning for upcoming FFF events, stating that none of 
them--or other activists they had spoken with-- have so far 
received materials about the process from official sources. 
They lament that they depend on unofficial, informal 
networking with other contacts or published reports in the 
Arab media--both unreliable sources at best--to learn about 
new FFF developments.  They urged the USG and other G8 
countries to consider establishing a permanent secretariat to 
 
CAIRO 00001339  003 OF 003 
 
 
provide information, including backgroud papers and other 
reports, through a central wesite, database, or regular 
newsletter. 
 
¶11.  (BU)  They also asserted the importance of establising 
mechanisms to ensure sufficient preparation or both the FFF 
ministerial and the parallel CS eent.  All the Cairo 
activists support holding a onsultative meeting with local 
CS organizations n order to share their opinions on all 
issues reated to the process, such as the agenda for the 
ext meetings, topics of discussion, representatives and 
follow-on procedures.  In addition, most acivists argued 
that there is an urgent need to adress the organization of 
the CS parallel event, n tandem with the FFF. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  Although Egytian CS leaders said that civil 
society groups acoss the region welcomed the establishment 
of theFoundation for the Future (i.e., the grant-making 
organization affiliated with the Forum), they als expressed 
confusion over whether and when it wold become fully 
operational.  Some of the CS reprsentatives said that much 
of the euphoria at thelaunching of the Foundation in Manama 
more than  year ago, with its promise of technical and 
finncial support, had faded--particularly in the faceof its 
slow formation, recent resignations of boad members, and the 
prospect of a "competing" foudation funded by the Government 
of Qatar.  To reain lost footing, they urged that the USG 
shouldsupport the Foundation to become visibly active as 
soon as possible. 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  Finally, Egyptia activists acknowledged that it 
may prove impossible to reach consensus on who should be 
considered the "legitimate" representatives of civil society 
in the Arab world.  Most agreed, however, on the necessity of 
inviting leaders from a range of CS organizations, based on 
such conditions as strong CVs, documented achievements, 
well-respected reputations, and/or published papers on 
relevant topics.  As one Cairo contact said, "Credible NGOs, 
national platforms or federations, and regional networks 
should be properly involved."  Another noted that "while 
Islamist organizations might only participate in CS events to 
undermine the effort and put an end to international support 
to reform in the region, many Arab democracy activists 
believe that we should allow the Islamists' participation 
also." 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  Speaking with these leading Egyptian civil 
society representatives, it became clear that the "democracy 
deficit" in Arab countries remains a major concern for them 
and, despite the many weaknesses thus far of the Forum for 
the Future, there continues to be a hunger to revitalize this 
process by reconsidering strategic visions and adjusting 
current policy agendas.  The Cairo activists stressed almost 
unanimously that the time has come to bring together 
different actors from across the region to evaluate and 
redefine the FFF, reconstituting it is as a key tool for 
promoting reform across the region. 
RICCIARDONE