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UNCLAS BOGOTA 003581 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PTER KJUS MARR CO
SUBJECT: TELLING COLOMBIA'S STORY 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  President Uribe's democratic security policy -- and the 
paramilitary demobilization -- has saved the lives of over 
40,000 Colombians, strengthened Colombia's democratic 
institutions, and led to substantial improvements in human 
rights protection.  The establishment of GOC territorial 
control and the demobilization of the AUC (United 
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia) have created space for new 
political and social groups, enabled democratic institutions 
such as the courts and media to function effectively, and 
helped extend the rule of law.  These advances are a work in 
progress, and many challenges remain.  Still, Colombia's 
progress on human rights and democracy over the last five 
years is undeniable.  End summary. 
 
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Democratic Security 
------------------- 
 
¶2.  For the vast majority of Colombians, the marked 
improvement in the public security climate in the last five 
years is a major human rights achievement.  The doubling of 
the size of GOC security forces and their increased presence 
in rural areas have made Colombians safer.  Murders are down 
almost 40 percent, falling from almost 29,000 in 2002 to 
17,300 in 2006.  Kidnappings fell 75 percent, from 2,885 in 
2002 to 687 in 2006.  Victims of massacres fell from 680 in 
2002 to a little over one third that level in 2006.  Over 
40,000 Colombian lives were saved.  The improved security 
climate promoted Colombians' freedom to travel, work, and 
socialize.  In a country fighting three Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations, economic growth has averaged over 5 percent 
since 2002. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Security Creates New Political and Social Space 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶3.  The establishment of greater GOC territorial control and 
the paramilitary demobilization have allowed civil society 
and political parties to operate more openly than ever 
before.  In May 2006, the leftist Polo Democratico candidate 
for president received over 2.5 million votes, the highest 
total ever for a leftist presidential candidate.  In 2003, 
Polo candidates won the Bogota mayoralty and the governorship 
in Valle del Cauca department.  A former paramilitary killing 
ground, Sucre department now hosts numerous victims groups 
and the Polo Democratico party is increasingly active. 
Nationwide, the willingness of over 48,000 victims -- many of 
whom continue to live in areas previously dominated by 
paramilitaries -- to denounce paramilitary crimes and assert 
their rights reflects the improved security environment. 
 
¶4. The GOC is also working to strengthen protection of 
threatened human rights activists, journalists, labor 
unionists, and participants in the Justice and Peace Law 
process.  Justice and Interior Ministry spending on special 
protection programs rose from USD 2 million in 1999 to USD 33 
million in 2007.  More than 6,900 persons received protection 
in 2006 under the Interior Ministry program, including more 
than 1,500 union members.  The labor-affiliated National 
Unionist College (ENS) reported that murders of unionists 
fell by over 60 percent over a 5-year period, dropping from 
197 in 2001 to 72 in 2006.  The number of human rights 
defenders killed or disappeared also dropped from 17 to 4 
over this period.  In addition to the Interior Ministry 
program, the Colombian National Police and the Department of 
Administrative Security (DAS) protect over 3,000 Colombians. 
 
 
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Institutions Dismantling Para Structures, Sympathizers 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶5. Over the years of paramilitary activity, illegal groups 
formed links with some Colombian politicians, businessmen, 
and security personnel, especially in the north coast.  These 
links are now being exposed, investigated and prosecuted. 
The democratic security policy and the demobilization of 
32,000 paramilitaries delegitimized the AUC (United 
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia) and broke its military 
power, creating the space needed to allow Colombia's 
institutions -- the Courts, prosecutors and media -- to begin 
the process of dismantling paramilitary political and 
economic structures.  The Justice and Peace law (JPL), which 
Inspector General Edgardo May calls the "motor" of the 
justice process, provides a framework -- as well as 
incentives -- for paramilitaries to tell the truth about 
their crimes.  President Uribe strongly backs the ongoing 
investigations, and has repeatedly stressed the need to 
uncover the truth whatever the consequences. 
 
¶6. The Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia) is spearheading 
application of the JPL.  The Prosecutor General's Justice and 
Peace Unit has taken the voluntary testimony of 22 
paramilitaries, leading to the revelation of 91 mass graves 
and solving numerous murders.  Over 2,800 paramilitaries have 
signed up to testify and make reparations to qualify for the 
reduced sentences provided under the law.  The Prosecutor 
General arrested and jailed the former head of the 
FBI-equivalent Department of Administrative Security (since 
freed by the Supreme Judicial Council on a legal 
technicality, but called for questioning again on May 11) for 
paramilitary ties.  It also jailed 15 former elected 
officials for alleged paramilitary links. 
 
¶7.  The paramilitary process has also led to the 
incarceration of over 70 paramilitary leaders in maximum 
security prisons, and the Supreme Court is investigating 
links between politicians and former paramilitaries.  To 
date, the Court has jailed 13 congressmen and two Governors. 
One Congressmen is a fugitive, and 6 more national 
legislators are under investigation.  The Court is also 
investigating 12 mayors.  President Uribe allocated an 
additional USD 1.2 million to the Court last December to 
develop its own investigative staff. 
 
¶8.  The improved security has enabled the local press to 
carry stories about paramilitary crimes, including their 
links to politicians, security force personnel, and 
businessmen.  El Tiempo editor Enrique Santos publicly said 
in March that "there has not been one act by this government 
against freedom of the press," and the number of journalists 
murdered fell from 10 during Uribe's first two years in 
office to five from 2003-06.  The Congress has held several 
heated debates on the scope of the scandal, with opposition 
legislators accusing Uribe and his family of complicity in 
paramilitary crimes.  Some legislators, as well as local 
human rights and labor groups, traveled to the U.S. to repeat 
their charges. 
 
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New Criminal Groups 
------------------- 
 
¶9.   The OAS estimates there are approximately 20 new 
criminal groups -- with 3000 members -- operating in the 
country.  These groups lack the national structure, military 
capacity, and political agenda of the former AUC, and are 
primarily involved in narcotrafficking.  To combat this 
threat, the GOC has established 107 rural police stations, 
staffed with over 4,000 new officers, in areas identified as 
particularly susceptible to the emergence of new criminal 
groups.  It has also set up special interagency search 
forces, consisting of police, military and DAS personnel, in 
several departments to pursue these groups.  These efforts 
have led to over 160 members of new groups being killed in 
combat, more than 930 arrests, and the issuance of over 230 
arrest warrants.  On April 3, the GOC captured Ever Veloza, a 
top lieutenant of former paramilitary leader Vicente Castano. 
 Castano abandoned the peace process last August and is 
actively trying to rebuild the old AUC network. 
 
--------------------- 
Military Improvements 
--------------------- 
 
¶10. Complaints against the military fell by over half from 
2002 to 2005, despite a doubling of the force and a tripling 
of military operations.  Mid-year 2006 figures show a further 
decline.  Defense Minister Santos is strengthening internal 
human rights controls and training within the military, 
assigning inspector general representatives to each Army 
division and inviting the International Committee of the Red 
Cross to train personnel in International Humanitarian Law. 
The Defense Ministry is improving cooperation with the 
civilian judiciary, signing an MOU with the Prosecutor 
General's Office giving civilian prosecutors control of 
investigations involving alleged military human rights 
violations.  The Ministry is also preparing reforms that 
would establish the military criminal justice's system's 
juridical and financial independence from the Defense 
Ministry.  From 2002-06, the Ministry used its discretionary 
authority to dismiss 1,135 officers and NCOs for human rights 
violations, corruption, incompetence or other misconduct. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Challenges Remain, but Colombia is a Different Country 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶11.  Colombia's progress over the last five years is 
undeniable, but serious challenges remain in ensuring respect 
for human rights.  Its previous inquisitorial criminal 
justice system was ineffective in resolving criminal cases, 
including investigation and prosecution of human rights 
violations, and older crimes remain under this system.  The 
ongoing transition to the new accusatory criminal justice 
system will ensure more efficient processing of recent cases, 
resolving them in months rather than years, and increased 
resources for prosecutors and judges will facilitate efforts 
to punish paramilitaries and their supporters.  Still, 
despite improved security, narcotrafficking and terrorism 
continue to generate human rights abuses.  We will focus our 
diplomacy and assistance to support the GOC's efforts to 
further strengthen democratic institutions, extend the rule 
of law, and make its citizens safer. 
Drucker