VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #3237/01 1292000
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 092000Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4999
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 7528
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 8965
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAY 8667
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 5036
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 5658

UNCLAS BOGOTA 003237 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KJUS PTER CO
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE'S MEETING WITH HUMAN 
RIGHTS GROUPS 
 
¶1.  (U) May 8, 2007, 0800, residence of Charge d'affaires, 
a.i. 
 
¶2.  (U) Participants: 
 
United States 
 
The Deputy Secretary 
WHA A/S Thomas P. Shannon 
CDA Milton K. Drucker 
D staff assistant Mary Sue Conaway 
Political Counselor John S. Creamer 
D/polcouns Scott I. Hamilton (notetaker) 
 
Colombia 
 
Mario Gomez, Fundacion Restrepo Barco 
Gloria Flores, MINGA 
Fernando Calado, IOM 
Barbara Hintermann, ICRC 
Olga Lucia Gomez, Fundacion Pais Libre 
 
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Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  During a cordial May 8 breakfast meeting, representatives 
of human rights NGOs and international organizations told the 
Deputy Secretary Colombia's justice system was independent 
but inefficient.  It needed more investigators and 
prosecutors to be effective.  Fundacion Restrepo Barco's 
Mario Gomez credited President Uribe's democratic security 
policy and the Justice and Peace Law process (JPL) with sharp 
reductions in violence, especially homicides.  MINGA's Gloria 
Flores urged the GOC to strengthen its protection program for 
victims, witnesses, and other participants in the JPL 
process.  All agreed Colombia's displaced population, at 
between two and three million, was a serious problem, 
although the trend was down.  The ICRC's Barbara Hintermann 
cautioned displacement could grow because of more aggressive 
military action against FARC and ELN terrorists.  End summary. 
 
------------------- 
Democratic Security 
------------------- 
 
¶2.  Mario Gomez said the results of President Uribe's 
democratic security approach were strong: crimes were sharply 
down across the country, especially homicides.  The JPL 
process, including former paramilitary demobilizations, had 
revealed mass grave locations and clarified the facts 
surrounding some major crimes.  The police were now present 
in all 1098 municipalities; five years ago 10 percent of 
municipalities lacked a law enforcement presence.  Several 
years ago, 70 mayors had to flee their towns and govern from 
a regional capital because of terrorist threats.  The 
increased police presence had allowed many of these officials 
to return. 
 
¶3.  The International Organization for Migration's (IOM) 
Calado said the GOC's challenge was to ensure communities 
were not polarized by the return of former paramilitaries. 
MINGA's Flores said the Constitutional Court decision 
modifying the JPL had made a major contribution to truth in 
Colombia by emphasizing the rights of victims and 
conditioning ex-paramilitary JPL benefits on their truthful 
testimony.  Flores agreed violence was down, but said the GOC 
needed to be more aggressive in dismantling ex-paramilitary 
criminal structures to prevent the rise of new groups.  She 
noted that violence remained a grave problem in certain 
areas, including the port city of Buenaventura, where illegal 
armed groups struggled for criminal spoils.  Criminal groups 
with links to former paramilitaries or to the FARC were a 
problem even in Bogota. 
 
------------------ 
Land Dispossession 
------------------ 
 
¶4.  The NGO representatives told the Deputy Secretary land 
dispossession was both a cause and a consequence of the 
conflict.  Gomez emphasized only 10 percent of Colombian land 
was titled before the conflict.  Most Colombian campesinos 
did not possess title to the land they occupied, making 
reparations for dispossession difficult.  Flores said former 
paramilitaries had stolen some six million hectares from 
campesinos, with ex-paramilitary nominees now using the land 
for agro-industrial projects and cattle ranching.  She cited 
 
Catatumbo in Norte del Santander department as especially 
emblematic, where illegal armed groups used kidnapping of 
family members to force sales of land.  Most of the seizures 
were in areas where land was valuable for economic or 
strategic purposes. 
 
¶5.  Gomez disputed the size of the land seizures, but 
conceded the difficulty in ensuring reparations.  He said in 
many cases poor campesinos were struggling against each other 
for the same land, with neither having title as proof of 
ownership.  Calado said the judicial process was slow and 
cumbersome.  Gomez added that the GOC was looking at 
compensating some dispossessed with alternative land parcels. 
 The National Reparations and Reconciliation Commission was 
assessing the viability of alternative compensation schemes. 
 
------------------- 
How Many Displaced? 
------------------- 
 
¶6.  Calado told Negroponte estimates of Colombia's displaced 
population range from two to three million, depending on how 
they are counted.  Mario Gomez said the GOC number is closer 
to 2 million, based on those who register with the government 
and receive benefits.  In Colombia's most recent census, 
700,000 respondents claimed to be displaced, a number MINGA's 
Flores discounted as too low.  She noted social stigma and 
fear of retaliation from armed groups encouraged people to 
reject displaced status.  Gomez said if all those 
historically displaced are counted, the figure would be close 
to three million.  He said the number is alarming no matter 
which total is used.  Calado told Negroponte the GOC was in 
the process of complying with a Constitutional Court judgment 
that mandated higher GOC spending on displaced populations. 
 
------------------------------ 
More Displacements on the Way? 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7.  The ICRC's Barbara Hintermann noted an increase in 
"massive displacement" in the first two months of 2007, 
especially in Arauca and Antioquia, and warned there could be 
more to come.  She said the Colombian military was entering 
areas formerly occupied by the FARC or ELN, leading to combat 
that generated displacement.  She voiced concern that the 
distinction between participants and non-participants in the 
conflict was becoming blurred.  Both GOC forces and 
terrorists were pressuring civilians to cooperate, as well as 
using civilian property and goods.  The GOC should do more to 
curb the activities of new criminal groups, groups that 
further exacerbated displacement.  MINGA's Flores said the 
U.S. should evaluate Plan Colombia's effect on Putumayo 
department, where she alleged elements of the Colombian 
military had colluded with former paramilitaries.  Flores 
claimed remnants of the "Los Rastrojos" paramilitary group 
remained in the department.  FARC and ELN retaliation against 
purported paramilitary collaborators was causing additional 
population displacement, she said. 
 
------------------------------ 
Justice System and Bottlenecks 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  Gomez said Colombia's justice system was independent but 
inefficient.  In the past, it would have been easy to find 
"brutal indications of impunity," but there were signs of 
progress.  Calado said some 50 major ex-paramilitary leaders 
were in jail and would be tried for their crimes under the 
JPL process.  The challenge was to help ensure the GOC had 
adequate resources to meet its JPL obligations.  This 
required increased assistance to victims, and more forensic 
investigators and prosecutors.  Olga Gomez of the 
anti-kidnapping group Fundacion Pais Libre said the 
transition from the old inquisitorial criminal justice system 
to the oral accusatory process had caused significant 
problems.  In some cases, witnesses feared to confront their 
accusers.  In others, prosecutions failed because lawyers and 
judges did not understand the new system.  She claimed only 
20 kidnapping cases were prosecuted in 2005 due to 
prosecutors' problems in implementing the oral system.  In a 
similar vein, Flores claimed 2,500 unionists had been killed 
since the early 1990s, but few had been prosecuted for the 
crimes. 
 
¶9.  Flores argued there were a number of bottlenecks that 
inhibited faster results.  She asserted paramilitary 
infiltration of the Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia) 
was at its height under Prosecutor General Luis Camilo Osorio 
 
(2001-2005), but criminal penetration remained a problem. 
This caused cases to stall and allowed victims and witnesses 
to be intimidated.  She urged strengthened GOC protection 
programs for victims, witnesses, and other participants in 
the JPL process.  Olga Gomez said increased Fiscalia 
resources could help resolve cases quickly, but without such 
resources the cases could drag on for up to 10 years. 
 
¶10.  Deputy Secretary Negroponte cleared this message. 
 
 
Drucker