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DE RUEHBW #0643/01 1311710
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 111710Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0800
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000643 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SR
SUBJECT:  COALITION DEAL STRUCK; NO FORMAL WORD YET 
 
 
¶1.  (sbu)  Summary:  Though there is still no official word, a deal 
has been struck that will keep Kostunica at the helm of a weak 
democratic coalition government.  The deal and the politics 
surrounding it have left a pall of fear in political circles and in 
the population at large, as many saw the DSS's willingness to 
legitimize the Radical Party as a signal of a return to the 
Milosevic past.  The Ambassador will call the leaders of the new 
coalition to reinforce our expectations on ICTY, Kosovo, and 
Euro-Atlantic integration.  We recommend our leadership hold off on 
calls to the new government until it proves its commitment to these 
things.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (sbu)  At around 1130 local time, first word began coming in 
from contacts that DS and DSS had struck a deal to form a 
government.  The DS decision to deal despite DSS's decision to vote 
the Radical Party into a controlling position in the parliament was 
reportedly the result of a heated meeting of the DS presidency, 
during which proponents of a deal complained of intense pressure 
being put on them by European capitals and others.  Following the 
7-hour session, local press reported the morning of May 11 that 
President Tadic had agreed to another round of meetings and had been 
appointed sole negotiator by the DS presidency.  The elements of the 
deal are virtually identical to the last DSS proposal that came just 
before DSS voted SRS into parliament, which had been carried in 
local press. The key elements were retention of Interior by DSS and 
some sort of power-sharing arrangement for the intelligence 
service. 
 
¶3.  (sbu)  The overall mood in the political classes has so far been 
one of resigned frustration - in most camps, there is tremendous 
anger over the brinksmanship that was evidenced by both sides and 
the status-quo deal that was ultimately struck, alongside a feeling 
that there was no choice but to cohabitate again with a party (DSS) 
that few believe wants to take Serbia in a positive direction. 
Anecdotally, the mood in the population is equally dour, a sort of 
numb fear.  There was genuine anger when Nikolic was elected in a 
Milosevic-era debate, followed by fear that Serbia's leaders may be 
taking them back to an isolationist past.  EU enlargement 
Commissioner Ollie Rehn probably said it best in comments May 11, 
noting that "in two days Serbia went backward twenty years." 
 
¶4.  (sbu)  Though not officially confirmed, the projected make-up of 
the government will probably be: 
 
DS (13 Ministries including DPM): 
Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration 
Foreign Affairs 
Defense 
Justice 
Finance 
Telecommunications 
Culture 
Agriculture 
Diaspora 
Science 
Local Administration 
Social Affairs 
Ecology 
 
DSS/NS (8 ministries including PM): 
Prime Minister 
Interior 
Energy 
Kosovo 
Education 
Trade 
Religion 
Infrastructure 
 
G17 (4 ministries): 
Economy 
Health 
Sports and Youth 
Labor 
 
¶5.  (sbu)  None of the names of proposed ministers have been 
announced - in part, we are told, because DS (at least) has still 
not made decisions about filling their posts.  Some of the names 
that appear fairly certain are:  Kostunica as PM; Bozidar Djelic as 
DPM; Dragan Sutanovac as MoD; Dragan Jocic as MININT; Aca Popovic as 
Education Minister; Velimir Ilic (from DSS coalition partner Nova 
Srbija) as Minister for Infrastructure; and Mladjan Dinkic for 
Economy.  Notably, FONMIN has not yet been decided - rumors include 
presidential advisor Vuk Jeremic and current Serbian Ambassador to 
the U.S. Ivan Vujacic. 
 
¶6.  (sbu)  In addition to the deals on ministries, our contacts say 
DS and DSS have made key compromises on security issues.  Notably, 
the current arrangement would reportedly have the Security 
Intelligence Agency (BIA) run by a technical head not affiliated 
with either party (a more cumbersome alternate rumor has BIA being 
 
BELGRADE 00000643  002 OF 002 
 
 
run in tandem by DS and DSS officials serving consecutive 18-month 
tours).  The deal also includes the creation of a National Security 
Council, reportedly headed by Tadic as President, the primary 
function of which would be to serve as an intelligence coordination 
body, overseeing and directing the activities of BIA, the Military 
Security Agency (VBA), Military Intelligence Agency (VOA), and the 
MFA intelligence department (SID). 
 
¶7.  (sbu)  Other positions of interest:  DSS will reportedly keep 
control of the national public service broadcaster RTS (Aleksander 
Tijanic); DS will reportedly receive the post of Speaker of 
Parliament, and will keep the Chief of the General Staff as an 
employee of MoD. 
 
¶8.  (sbu)  SRS Deputy Leader Toma Nikolic, meanwhile, appears 
suspiciously eager to yield his post and assist the transition.  He 
has already announced he will resign his post without debate as soon 
as 126 MP's call for it (probably by signing on to a petition to 
that effect), and has said he will hand over the reins to a deputy 
speaker from DSS so as not to be accused of being obstructionist. 
He also announced he will call a session of the parliament on 
Saturday, May 12, to debate the proposal for a new government, and 
another session will be called on Monday, May 14, to pass a Law on 
the Government and confirm the new government.  Belgrade is electric 
with speculation about what other concessions SRS may have wrung out 
of DSS to play such a passive role in this theater. 
 
¶9.  (sbu)  The Ambassador will call Tadic, Kostunica, and Dinkic as 
soon as the deal is officially confirmed.  He will wish them well, 
but will reiterate our expectations that this government outperform 
the last government's poor track record on ICTY cooperation, 
maintain a stronger commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration, and 
play a more constructive role on securing a sustainable future for 
Kosovo and the region. 
 
¶10.  (sbu)  Given the distasteful way this coalition deal was 
forced, notably Kostunica's legitimization of the SRS as a tool to 
wring concessions from DS, we do not believe a call from the 
Secretary or the President would send the right message.  WE propose 
 
SIPDIS 
that such top level calls, if made at all, are better left for a 
time when a new government has established a new track record. 
 
 
POLT