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OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHKUK RUEHLZ RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0740/01 1441435
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O 241435Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8293
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1144
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000740 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING; 
H FOR MARK SMITH; CAIRO PLEASE PASS TO CODEL PRICE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL LE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL PRICE'S 5/28-29/07 
LEGISLATIVE STRENGTHENING TRIP TO LEBANON 
 
¶1. (SBU)  The House Democracy Assistance Commission last 
hosted Lebanese members of parliament (MPs) for a legislative 
strengthening visit to Washington in April.  Then, as now, 
Lebanon was in deep crisis.  Your visit comes amidst 
heightened tensions and renewed security concerns that will 
likely continue until the international tribunal to try 
suspects in the 2005 Hariri assassination is established, and 
a new president is elected.  The clashes one week before your 
visit between the terrorist group Fatah al-Islam and the 
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as well as a series of bombings 
in civilian neighborhoods have created an atmosphere of 
intimidation.  Yet the impact of today's crisis -- when 
Syria's allies seek to paralyze and make irrelevant the 
cabinet and the parliament and then install a pro-Syrian 
president in autumn -- stands in sharp contrast to the July 
2006 crisis, when Hizballah dragged Lebanon into war with 
Israel.  Then, facing bombs and the massive internal 
displacement of civilians, the Lebanese rallied around the 
Prime Minister and the institutions of the cabinet and the 
parliament.  Today, the Lebanese are divided, with the 
government portrayed by Hizballah, Michel Aoun, and their 
partners as a U.S.-directed puppet. 
 
¶2. (SBU)  Also worrying, a growing number of those once 
identified with the pro-democracy March 14 bloc -- and who 
still sympathize with the movement's principles of freedom, 
sovereignty, and democracy -- are "tuning out" in disgust at 
the political stalemate and increasing security problems. 
Even March 14 activists worry that the USG and others are 
losing interest in Lebanon and favor re-engagement with 
Syria, due to larger, regional considerations. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  Thus, we welcome your visit as an opportunity to 
promote several goals: 
 
--  Strengthen the institution of the parliament and 
encourage March 14 MPs to work together on a cohesive agenda 
to reinforce the position of the government against the 
opposition. 
 
--  Shore up the ranks of the March 14 movement by showing 
that U.S. and international support for Lebanon remains 
unshakable and non-negotiable. 
 
--  Inspire those becoming disillusioned with politics by 
reminding them that the upcoming presidential election is a 
remarkable opportunity for ensuring that Lebanon's future 
remains in the hands of the Lebanese. 
 
--  Reassure all Lebanese that the United States supports a 
prosperous, democratic, united, sovereign Lebanon with strong 
institutions and at peace with its neighbors; and underscore 
that we are not seeking to isolate or disenfranchise any of 
Lebanon's communities. 
 
OPPOSITION TO SINIORA 
--------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU)  The support that PM Siniora once enjoyed has been 
eroded by the opposition, but Siniora has been resolute, 
withstanding an assault that includes the walk-out of 
Syria-aligned ministers and the assassination of Minister of 
Industry Pierre Gemayel in November, a sit-in outside 
Siniora's offices beginning in December, violent street 
demonstrations in January, commuter bus bombings in February, 
car bombs in civilian areas in May, and the insistence by 
pro-Syrians that the Siniora cabinet is null and void.  But 
while still in office, the PM and his cabinet are decidedly 
weakened (as, arguably, are those who tried but failed to 
remove him) and find it increasingly hard to take, implement, 
or enforce decisions.  Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri has 
refused to convene the Parliament throughout its current 
session, which was to have begun in mid-March and run through 
May 31.  As a result, no legislation has been adopted.  For a 
while, it looked as though the two sides -- March 8-Aoun and 
March 14-GOL -- had exhausted themselves into a draw. 
However, over the past month rhetoric against Siniora and 
bombings in civilian areas escalated sharply, suggesting that 
pro-Syrians have entered a dangerous new phase meant to call 
into question international support for UN Security Council 
passage of the international tribunal under Chapter 7 of the 
UN Charter.  We expect a possible UNSC vote on the 
international tribunal the week of May 28, and the imminence 
of this action has sent Syria's sympathizers into action. 
 
 
BEIRUT 00000740  002 OF 004 
 
 
PALESTINIAN CAMPS 
----------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU)  The opposition may repeat the charge that the USG 
is working to "implant" permanently into Lebanon the largely 
Sunni Palestinian refugee population, thus giving the Sunnis 
a surge of demographic power at the expense of the Christians 
and Shia.  To avoid giving fodder to those who use this issue 
politically against us, when the question of the "right of 
Palestinian return" is raised -- as it often is -- we state 
simply that, once the question of Palestinian refugees can be 
addressed, certainly Lebanon's special needs and concerns 
will be taken into account. 
 
CABINET CRISIS UNRESOLVED 
------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU)  While the UNSC underscored recently that the 
Siniora cabinet is the legitimate government of Lebanon, the 
lack of Shia representation, a gap created by the Shia 
ministers themselves in their resignation from the Cabinet, 
still creates problems in sectarian-sensitive Lebanon.  The 
demand for a National Unity Cabinet that would include 
Christian opposition leader General Michel Aoun and give a 
blocking minority to Hizballah and its allies, is the 
ostensible justification for the anti-Siniora protests.  The 
PM and others propose various solutions.  Siniora offers a 
17-13 cabinet based on a new agreed cabinet agenda; some 
speculate that the resigned ministers will return to work as 
caretakers; others favor a technocratic cabinet until 
presidential elections.  We do not believe that either bloc 
is serious about fixing the cabinet before having more 
clarity regarding presidential elections.  In the meantime, 
President Lahoud maintains that the cabinet has ceased to 
exist, leading to fears that he will appoint a competing 
Prime Minister, creating a "two government" scenario akin to 
the disastrous 1988-1990 period.  We see increasing evidence 
that the "two government" scenario is, indeed, what the 
pro-Syrians intend to create. 
 
PARLIAMENT CLOSED, 
BUT NOT INACTIVE 
----------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU)  Speaker Berri has refused to open a formal 
parliamentary session despite weekly protests by March 14 
MPs; Berri argues that the parliament cannot refer laws to an 
unconstitutional cabinet.  Some parliamentary committees 
continue to meet to discuss draft legislation and initiatives 
with "resigned" and acting ministers.  Your visit will be an 
apt reminder to Berri that he has a constitutional as well as 
a personal role to play in resolving the political stalemate, 
while your legislative strengthening mission will help 
bolster an institution that has eroded to the detriment of 
the nation.  Parliamentary effort will be an essential part 
of any enduring political resolution; key laws on economic 
and political reform are awaiting parliamentary review and 
action.  These issues were raised by Speaker Pelosi when she 
led a House delegation to Beirut on April 2, which included 
meetings with PM Siniora and Speaker Nabih Berri. 
 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 
---------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU)  With no other easy resolution in sight, the 
Lebanese have focused on the November 24 expiration of 
Lahoud's extended term as the opportunity to solve this 
crisis or, alternatively, as the time Lebanon will descend 
definitively into chaos.  Unless assured they approve the 
choice, the pro-Syrians and Aoun threaten to boycott the 
parliament session that will elect Lahoud's successor.  While 
the March 14 majority could elect a new president despite a 
boycott, that president would suffer problems of legitimacy 
due to quorum questions and to a possible lack of Shia 
participation in the voting.  This, too, could lead to a "two 
government" crisis, with the March 8-Aoun bloc following a 
Lahoud-appointed cabinet, and uncertainty over how the army 
would react. 
 
HIZBALLAH'S ARMS 
---------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU)  Given the focus on the international tribunal, 
cabinet crisis, and presidential elections, little has 
happened practically to restrict Hizballah's arms.  We await 
 
BEIRUT 00000740  003 OF 004 
 
 
the arrival of a UN team to look at the Syrian-Lebanese 
border soon, with a view toward developing future efforts to 
stem arms smuggling to Hizballah from Syria.  Arms smuggling 
continues, and there is widespread public speculation that 
Iranian-funded land purchases are linking the 
Hizballah-controlled areas in the south to 
Hizballah-controlled parts of the Biqa' Valley.  While there 
have been a few "good news" stories (including the Lebanese 
army seizure of weapons claimed by Hizballah), the GOL has 
not undertaken any serious, sustained efforts to control 
Hizballah's arms.  This is another reason why the presidency 
is so important:  the cabinet could more easily take 
meaningful steps, if the president is on the side of the 
state. 
 
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
-------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU)  Not unreasonably, Siniora and others are obsessed 
with security concerns:  you will note that most people whom 
we visit, fearful of assassination, are holed up in fortified 
compounds, and those political figures outside the Embassy 
are accompanied by bodyguards.  The clashes this past week 
between the army and the terrorist group Fatah al-Islam in 
Tripoli and the Nahr el-Barad Palestinian refugee camp, stand 
as the worst internal fighting in Lebanon since the 1975-90 
civil war.  The series of bombings in Beirut and Mount 
Lebanon (in a Christian neighborhood, a Sunni neighborhood, 
and most recently in a mixed Druze- Christian area) are 
similar to a series of bombings in the spring of 2005, meant 
to intimidate rather than to produce mass casualties.  In 
both cases, we -- along with most Lebanese -- suspect Syria 
or its Lebanese sympathizers of trying to foment instability 
and opposition to the establishment of an international 
tribunal. 
 
YOUR MEETINGS 
------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU)  Your meetings will include March 14 leaders Saad 
Hariri and Fouad Siniora, with their agenda that overlaps our 
own regarding Lebanon's sovereignty and independence, as well 
as a variety of parliamentarians from across the political 
and confessional spectrum.  Lest we be accused of not 
listening to the other side, we have arranged for those 
sympathetic to General Aoun to see you and for you to meet 
with Parliament Speaker Berri (a meeting that also helps 
check the Shia confessional box).  Finally, we have arranged 
for you to meet with Maronite Patriarch Sfeir, a senior 
powerbroker in the divided Christian community. 
 
¶12. (SBU)  In terms of points to make in the major meetings, 
for Siniora, the agenda is obvious:  gaining control over 
Fatah al-Islam and stemming violence in the Palestinian 
camps, winning UNSC approval of the tribunal, solving the 
cabinet crisis, stopping arms smuggling, and holding upcoming 
presidential elections.  Siniora will bring up Sheba'a Farms 
and his view about an appropriate response to the Arab peace 
initiative. 
 
¶13. (SBU)  With Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, we suggest 
focusing on the need for Berri to open parliament before the 
expiration on May 31 of the ordinary season.  This will build 
on the demands of the Lebanese themselves.  We guess that 
Berri does not want to lose the international connections and 
legitimacy that accrue to him due to his position, and we 
suggest you emphasize to Berri the need for him to think of 
his responsibilities and his  legacy.  Berri will want a 
signal from us that we are not going to impose our own 
presidential candidate.  We recommend underscoring how 
important it is for his bloc to show up for the presidential 
elections rather than try to defeat the democratic choice by 
using the quorum tool as a veto. 
 
¶14. (SBU)  Maronite Patriarch Sfeir's surprise 5/11 visit to 
President Lahoud suggests that the Patriarch may have been 
sparked to activism either by belated desperation caused by 
the seriousness of Lebanon's political crisis or by a stern 
warning from the Vatican.  While he will not choose a 
candidate for fear of splitting his own community, we should 
encourage him to make clear what qualities are needed in a 
new president.  We also suggest reinforcing to him the 
serious danger Michel Aoun's alliance with Hizballah poses 
for his relationship with us and thus for the future of 
Lebanon's Christians. 
 
BEIRUT 00000740  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶15.  (SBU)  Your meeting with Aoun's advisors (the General 
himself will be in Paris for a book signing) is a chance for 
you to deliver the message that the appeasement of Syria and 
Hizballah during a time of crisis for the GOL is 
unacceptable.  We have noted that such an approach will 
naturally limit our enthusiasm for cooperation with Aoun.  We 
should caution Aoun's followers of the cost to their 
reputations and relations with us of taking steps such as 
boycotting a parliamentary session to elect the president or 
of backing a Lahoud-appointed faux cabinet. 
 
¶16.  (SBU)  We need to push March 14 figures -- Hariri and 
the parliamentarians -- to come up with a compelling message 
to the Lebanese about why the Lebanese should continue to 
support the March 14 bloc:  what is the vision of Lebanon's 
future that March 14 can offer? 
FELTMAN