VZCZCXRO6571
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #2930/01 1450949
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 250949Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7205
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4235
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 7146
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 7254
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 1749
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 002930 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FROM THE AMBASSADOR FOR A/S LOWENKRON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF KDEM TH
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DRL A/S LOWENKRON'S VISIT TO 
THAILAND 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) Your visit will help us to reinforce with top-level 
RTG officials the need to promote respect for human rights 
and the rule of law, and our continued interest in a return 
to democratic governance through elections by the year's end. 
 Political parties, NGOs, and others in the political class 
are currently debating an initial draft of the constitution, 
to be finalized by July and then put to voters in a September 
referendum.  An upcoming Constitutional Tribunal ruling may 
dissolve Thailand's two largest political parties, and 
leading figures in those parties could be banned from holding 
political office for five years.  Applying such a ban to 
deposed Prime Minister Thaksin would prevent his short to 
medium term return to political life; the authorities have so 
far been unable to present a strong case indicting him for 
the abuses of power which the coup leaders cited as 
justification for their putsch.  Public dissatisfaction with 
the current government is mounting, and there are indications 
of some friction between the military leaders and Prime 
Minister Surayud.  Despite the current government's efforts 
at reconciliation in southern Thailand, vicious insurgent 
attacks continue, and there are also unconfirmed reports of 
abuses by the security forces, including extrajudicial 
killings and the intimidation of human rights workers.  The 
RTG recently told the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) that it wanted to place conditions on their 
screening of asylum seekers.  End Summary. 
 
CONSTITUTION PAVING THE WAY FOR ELECTIONS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Despite mishaps along the way, the leaders of the 
post-coup institutions have so far managed to stick to the 
schedule they outlined right after the September 2006 coup; 
in April, the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) publicly 
released the first draft of a new Constitution.  This draft 
has proven controversial, although not unexpectedly so, as it: 
 
- provides for a Senate that would be appointed, rather than 
elected -- marking a reversion to pre-1997 ways; 
 
- creates a "crisis council" with unspecified powers and 
unclear guidelines; 
 
- effectively grants amnesty to those who launched the 2006 
coup d'etat; 
 
- provides officials of the judiciary with functions that 
appear more political than judicial, such as selecting 
members of independent government agencies; and 
 
- does not enshrine Buddhism as the state religion, 
disappointing many in Buddhist organizations and some 
ultra-nationalists. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Political parties, NGOs, media commentators, and 
other civil society members have publicly criticized the 
draft constitution.  Consequently, we believe it likely that 
the draft will be revised in significant ways, in response to 
these concerns.  The Constitution Drafting Assembly (of which 
the CDC is a subset) has until early July to produce a final 
draft.  This draft will then be submitted to the public in a 
referendum, likely to take place in early September.  If the 
electorate rejects the draft, the interim constitution 
provides that the Council for National Security (CNS) and the 
cabinet must work together to select a previous constitution, 
modify it, and promulgate it.  The deadlines established for 
this process are intended to fulfill the commitment to 
holding elections in mid or late December.  It is worth 
noting that Prime Minister Surayud and other senior Thai 
officials assured visiting A/S Christopher Hill on May 22 
that elections will be held by year's end. 
 
TRIBUNAL MAY DISSOLVE POLITICAL PARTIES 
--------------------------------------- 
 
 
BANGKOK 00002930  002 OF 004 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) The participants in those elections remain 
uncertain, however.  The Constitutional Tribunal -- a new 
institution created post-coup -- is currently determining 
whether the Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT) and the Democrat Party 
(DP) committed "undemocratic acts" in connection with April 
2006 elections.  The Tribunal's determination is expected on 
May 30.  A post-coup decree retroactively established that, 
if a party is ordered dissolved, the members of the party's 
executive board become ineligible to hold political office 
for five years.  In the case of TRT, the party of deposed 
Prime Minister Thaksin, the executive board at the time of 
the alleged infractions consisted of 119 people, including 
many traditional power brokers from the North and Northeast. 
Although the charges of "undemocratic acts" are credible 
(and, in fact, were first lodged prior to the coup), 
disenfranchising such a large group of politicians could 
prove destabilizing. 
 
THAKSIN REMAINS OF CONCERN 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Nevertheless, the Constitutional Tribunal ruling may 
be one important way to begin uprooting Thaksin's influence, 
and to bar him from returning to political life in the near 
future.  The CNS established the Asset Examination Committee 
(AEC) soon after the coup, in order to investigate 
allegations of corruption by Thaksin and his cronies, but the 
AEC has worked slowly.  It has recommended charging Thaksin 
for supporting his wife's purchase of property from a state 
body.  It also has recommended indicting Thaksin's entire 
cabinet for establishing a government lottery without 
following proper procedures.  The AEC continues its work, but 
it remains unclear whether its investigations will produce 
the sort of damning evidence against Thaksin that might erode 
support for him in the rural areas where his populist 
policies endeared him to voters.  With Thaksin's popularity 
in those areas -- and his wealth -- largely intact, the coup 
leaders continue to feel Thaksin represents a substantial 
threat, and rightfully so. 
 
SUSPICIONS OF THAKSIN'S INFLUENCE WITH THE USG 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶6. (SBU) Many Thais also fear that Thaksin, by hiring 
American lobbyists and public relations firms, has been able 
to win support from the USG.  We have had to repeatedly 
explain that our policy is based on principled support for 
democracy, not on pressure from paid advocates.  The 
situation is further muddied by a public relations campaign 
by some private American firms that has been highly critical 
of Thailand's issuance of compulsory licenses for branded 
prescription medicines, and has condemned in emotional terms 
the nature of the post-coup government.  In this context, 
there are widespread Thai suspicions that our recent 
placement of Thailand on the USTR Special 301 Priority Watch 
List for IPR violations was in direct retaliation for the 
RTG's issuance of compulsory licenses.  We have repeatedly 
said publicly that this is not the case; while the compulsory 
licenses contributed to USTR's determination, they were one 
of several factors, top among them being increased, open 
availability of pirated apparel, software, and video and 
music discs. 
 
GOVERNMENT APPEARS SHAKY 
------------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) The constant anxiety expressed about Thaksin's 
lingering influence is exacerbated by the interim 
administration's low level of public support.  Although 
Surayud Chulanont was popular with the public when he 
received his appointment as Prime Minister, since then he has 
been seen as largely ineffective.  He appears ill-served by a 
cabinet made up mostly of retired bureaucrats, and he has 
proven himself averse to conducting a large scale reshuffle. 
Consequently, rumors persist of a "re-coup," and some -- 
especially die-hard foes of Thaksin -- have expressed hope 
that CNS Chief General Sonthi Boonyaratglin would nudge 
Surayud out of office and appoint himself as Prime Minister. 
 
BANGKOK 00002930  003 OF 004 
 
 
We have reinforced with Sonthi and others our opposition to 
an active duty military officer heading the successor 
administration. 
 
RECONCILIATION POLICY DOESN'T HELP DOWN SOUTH 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Surayud government continues to pursue a 
publicly conciliatory policy towards southern Malay-Muslims 
which contrasts sharply with the approach of former PM 
Thaksin.  Surayud apologized for past abuses, said he would 
talk with separatists, and reconstituted key security 
coordination centers.  Unfortunately, these positive gestures 
are having little impact on the violence.  After a brief 
hiatus following the coup, attacks in the far South have 
continued apace, and appear to be getting more brutal.  In a 
recent attack in March, eight van passengers -- all Buddhist 
-- were killed execution-style.  These and other horrific 
attacks have triggered reprisal acts of violence, raising the 
specter of communal violence. 
 
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS REMAINS A PROBLEM 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶9. (SBU) Reports of human rights violations have continued 
since the September 2006 coup.  Despite positive overtures 
from high-level government officials, security forces 
continued to use excessive force against criminal suspects 
and were suspected of involvement in dozens of extrajudicial 
killings.  Reports of disappearances in the southern 
provinces continued, and there were claims that that the 
police tortured and abused detainees and prisoners.  Members 
of hill tribes without proper documentation continued to face 
restrictions on their movement, could not own land, and were 
not protected by labor laws. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Human rights workers, particularly those focusing 
on disappearances in the southern provinces, have experienced 
government harassment.  Little progress has been made in the 
case of the disappearance in 2004 of prominent civil 
liberties advocate Somchai Neelaphaijit, now presumed dead. 
Responsibility for pursuing the case was recently transferred 
from the Police Department's Special Investigative Division 
to the National Counter-corruption Commission. 
 
MIXED MESSAGE FOR PRESS FREEDOM 
------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) The authorities have now lifted almost all 
post-coup restrictions on broadcast media.  TV and radio 
stations no longer host armed military "observers," and 
almost all community radio stations have reopened. 
Thailand's TV networks have taken advantage of the current 
government's inexperience in media manipulation and are 
criticizing the regime on a wide variety of issues, from its 
failure to properly contain Thaksin's overseas PR campaign to 
its inclusion of an amnesty provision in the draft 
constitution. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Recent moves to control the Internet have been more 
problematic.  The appointed government has blocked several 
pro-Thaksin websites, and asked popular chatrooms to 
self-censor some of the more personal attacks on coup 
leaders.  The government also blocked YouTube.com in Thailand 
after the site refused to remove video clips deemed offensive 
to the King.  Facing international criticism, the government 
seems to have backed away from such blatant censorship; they 
have not blocked the new anti-coup "Hi-Thaksin.com" website, 
and after YouTube.com agreed to remove 14 offensive clips, 
the government now says it will lift the block. 
 
BURMESE EXILE GROUPS AGITATE FOR CHANGE 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Like us, the RTG is frustrated with the continued 
intransigence of Burma,s military junta.  We continue to 
urge Thailand to call publicly for the release of Aung San 
Suu Kyi and all other political prisoners, and for the 
 
BANGKOK 00002930  004 OF 004 
 
 
initiation of a credible, inclusive political process in 
Burma. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Thai-based Burmese exiles have expressed concern 
regarding recent attacks against ethnic Burmese populations 
and the use of a regime-affiliated organization to conduct 
attacks on and extra-legally detain citizens.  The regime's 
recent detention of students and other activists praying at 
pagodas for the release of political prisoners, including 
Aung San Suu Kyi, is especially worrisome.  These recent 
actions take place against a backdrop of ongoing human rights 
violations, including the use of rape as a weapon against 
civilian populations and conscription of child soldiers. 
 
REFUGEE ASYLUM PROCESSING SUSPENDED 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) The RTG recently told UNHCR that it wanted to place 
conditions on its screening of asylum seekers to make Refugee 
Status Determinations.  UNHCR has responded that it will 
continue to process cases already in the pipeline and 
register, but not interview, new applicants while discussions 
with the RTG on this issue are ongoing. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Thailand accommodates large numbers of refugees on 
its territory and has a generally positive record on refugee 
treatment.  More than 150,000 Burmese refugees live in 
refugee camps close to Thailand,s border.  In addition, more 
than one million Burmese migrants work illegally within 
Thailand.  The U.S. resettled approximately 2,100 Burmese 
refugees in FY2006 and we hope to resettle 13,000 in FY2007. 
 
¶17. (SBU) More than 7,000 Hmong live in a refugee camp in 
Petchaboon.  While most are economic migrants, some may have 
legitimate claims to refugee status.  Thai and Lao 
authorities are actively discussing the Petchaboon situation. 
 We, UNHCR, and other interested Embassies have proposed a 
plan that would involve Thai screening of refugee claims, 
international resettlement for refugees, and monitoring for 
those who are not refugees and are returned to Laos. 
 
FINAL WORD 
---------- 
 
¶18. (U) Your visit will be most useful in reinforcing our 
active advocacy of human rights in Thailand.  I look forward 
to your arrival. 
BOYCE