VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBK #2578/01 1290403
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 090403Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6734
INFO RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 6098
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 3893

UNCLAS BANGKOK 002578 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PREL TH BM
SUBJECT: MATERIAL SUPPORT LEGISLATIVE FIX STILL NEEDED FOR 
BURMESE REFUGEE PROCESSING 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  Waivers for material support have allowed 
major resettlement programs for Karen and Chin refugees from 
Burma to move forward.  However, a significant number of 
Karen and Chin refugees continue to be ineligible for U.S. 
resettlement because their previous activities are not 
waiverable under current legislation.  Post recommends that 
Washington agencies move forward with efforts to make 
legislative changes that will remove this block to Burmese 
refugee resettlement.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Post greatly appreciates the material support 
waivers that have been granted for refugees from Burma. This 
has allowed large resettlement programs for Chin and Karen 
refugees in Malaysia and Thailand, respectively, to get back 
on track.  At the same time, a sizeable percentage of refugee 
cases from these two groups are still being placed on 
indefinite hold for material support because the refugees 
previously engaged in activities, such as receiving military 
training or being a combatant, that current waiver authority 
does not cover. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Recent statistics for the Tham Hin program in 
Thailand, which is largely for Karen refugees, show that 
6,611 persons have come forward to apply for U.S. 
resettlement.  Of this total, 807, or about 12 percent, have 
been placed on indefinite hold for being former combatants. 
Another 421 have not appeared for their Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) interviews.  Refugee processing staff 
believe that a significant portion of this latter group, 
perhaps as many as 75 percent, are self-selecting out.  That 
is, they were former combatants who expect that their cases 
would be placed on hold.  They are therefore not bothering to 
show up for their interviews.  If those placed on hold and 
those who are self-selecting out are added, the percentage of 
those held back in Tham Hin for being former combatants rises 
to about 17 percent. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Recent statistics for Chin refugee processing in 
Malaysia show that DHS has placed about 10 percent of cases 
on indefinite hold for non-waiverable material support 
reasons.  DHS interviews in Mae La Camp in Thailand, which is 
largely composed of Karen refugees, recently began. 
Statistics so far show that only a small portion of cases, 2 
percent, are being held up by material support.  This is 
partly because many of those interviewed so far came to 
Thailand originally when they were young or were even born in 
Thailand.  So the likelihood that they would have been 
combatants or participated in some material support 
disqualifying activity in Burma is low.  Post expects that 
the 2 percent figure will rise as interviewing moves to later 
arrivals.  At the same time, there also is a 10 percent 
no-show rate for DHS interviews in Mae La.  Refugee 
processing staff believe that, as in Tham Hin, a large number 
of refugees are choosing not to go forward with their cases 
after they have already gone through initial steps because 
they think they will be placed on material support hold. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Besides these refugees, who at least opted to take 
initial steps towards U.S. resettlement, it is also likely 
that other refugees have chosen not to come forward at all to 
apply because of a material support concern.  Post has seen a 
significantly lower-than-expected level of interest in Mae La 
Camp for U.S. resettlement.  Only about 17,000 in the 
approximately 49,000 person camp have entered the 
resettlement program.  It is likely that an important reason 
for this lower turnout is refugee confusion about material 
support and a concern that applying for resettlement will 
result in cases being put on indefinite hold. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Experience so far in Tham Hin Camp shows that a 
significant number of camp leaders get caught by material 
support.  The general refugee population tends to listen to 
its leaders.  If some leaders have no buy-in to resettlement 
because their own cases are effectively being turned away 
because of material support, it is harder to attract average 
refugees to resettlement.  Tham Hin also shows that some 
refugee families are faced with an extremely difficult 
decision about whether to leave behind family members who 
have engaged in material support activities that are not 
waiverable. 
 
¶7. (SBU) As refugee processing continues in Tham Hin, Mae La 
and Malaysia, the number of persons who will be placed on 
material support hold will grow.  We must also interview a 
larger total number of refugees in order to meet refugee 
resettlement targets given that a certain percentage of cases 
will not be approveable because of material support.  This 
reduces efficiency and drives up costs. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Action request:  To fix the continuing, significant 
problems stated above, Post recommends that Washington 
agencies move forward with efforts to make legislative 
changes that will remove the final materal support blocks to 
Burmese refugee resettlement. 
BOYCE