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Viewing cable 07BANGKOK2524, THAILAND INTERESTED IN SUPPORTING DARFUR MISSION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BANGKOK2524 2007-05-04 08:02 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Bangkok 
VZCZCXRO2098
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHBK #2524 1240802
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 040802Z MAY 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6670
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4174
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 4486
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9213
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 5167
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
 
UNCLAS BANGKOK 002524 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL UNSC KPKO SU TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND INTERESTED IN SUPPORTING DARFUR MISSION 
 
REF: SECSTATE 51828 
 
 1.  On May 4, the DCM delivered reftel demarche to MOD 
Permanent Secretary GEN Winai Phattiyakul and emphasized our 
hope that Thailand will support the Heavy Support Package 
being designed for Darfur.  Winai acknowledged the interim 
nature of the present Royal Thai Government (RTG) makes it 
difficult for Thailand to support some missions but expressed 
his belief that the Royal Thai Army (RTA) might consider 
supporting the Darfur Mission given the wide-spread 
international desire to help the people of that region. 
Winai said that he would meet with the Defense Minister and 
urge him to direct the MOD and RTA to seriously explore the 
feasibility for Thailand to provide support for the mission. 
 
2.  MOD Deputy Director of Plans and Policy LTG Naraset 
Israngura indicated that the RTA Liaison Officers (LNOs) 
based at CENTCOM Headquarters had briefed the RTA on our 
desire for Thailand to support the Darfur mission.  Naraset 
suggested that the RTA might be able to provide engineering 
support for the mission but asked whether the Embassy could 
provide greater detail on what requirements Thailand could 
best fill.  Naraset also indicated that the Thai might need 
logistic support from the United States or others for any 
deployment and noted the UN's tendency to reimburse expenses 
in a less than timely way.  Winai also asked for details on 
what type of assistance the USG intends to provide in the way 
of troops or support for Darfur. 
 
3.  Post seeks additional details we can share with the Royal 
Thai Government. We will keep the MFA informed of our 
discussions with the MOD and RTA and suggest USUN and CENTCOM 
follow-up with the Thai Mission in New York and the RTA LNO 
at CENTCOM. 
 
BOYCE