VZCZCXRO2830
OO RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHAK #1242/01 1421319
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 221319Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2217
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001242 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PTER ETRD PGOV TU IZ IR
SUBJECT: Scenesetter for the Visit of CODEL Nelson/Lott to Turkey 
 
(U) Sensitive but unclassified - please protect accordingly. 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Your visit comes at a time of domestic political 
tumult and continued Turkish anxiety over Iraq and the PKK.  Turkey 
stands at a crucial political crossroads as early parliamentary 
elections near.  Officials here will be eager for an update on the 
ongoing congressional debate over funding for the war in Iraq and 
will press for U.S. action against PKK terrorist havens in northern 
Iraq.  End Summary 
 
Political Scene 
--------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Your visit comes during a time of political uncertainty in 
Turkey and in the midst of campaigning for parliamentary elections 
to be held July 22.  The Justice and Development Party (AKP) has 
ruled as a one-party government for four-and-one-half years, 
enacting numerous economic and pro-democracy reforms.  On April 24, 
AKP announced Deputy Prime Minister and FM Abdullah Gul as the 
party's candidate for President, a largely ceremonial office but one 
with significant veto and appointment powers currently held by the 
staunchly secular Ahmet Necdet Sezer.  In Turkey, the president is 
elected by parliament.  The first round of parliamentary voting on 
April 27 was marred by a procedural dispute and opposition parties 
petitioned the Constitutional Court to rule that the AKP did not 
have the necessary quorum to validate the results.  Late on April 
27, the TGS published a harshly-worded statement declaring its 
determination to defend the secular state against fundamentalism; 
this was perceived by many as a warning against a Gul presidency. 
The Constitutional Court annulled the first round of the 
presidential vote and interpreted quorum rules that effectively 
compelled early parliamentary elections. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Both the AKP and opposition parties believe early elections 
are in their favor and offer the only way out of the constitutional 
deadlock.  Meanwhile, Turks continue to debate the effect of the 
TGS' April 27 midnight statement and the degree to which it 
represents an undemocratic intervention into the political process. 
The European Union strongly condemned the military intervention as 
contrary to democratic development in Turkey.  AKP and many liberal 
commentators claimed that TGS' move undermined reforms to strengthen 
democracy in Turkey.  Many have also complained, however, that the 
AKP needlessly provoked the military by nominating Gul, whose wife 
wears the turban head covering common among Islamists here. 
Successive marches in various cities in recent weeks have drawn 
millions in a show of pro-secular solidarity.  A widely carried 
slogan at these rallies have read, "neither sharia nor a military 
coup" - reflecting many Turks' opposition to over-reach by both the 
military and AKP. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Our consistent message throughout this period of domestic 
political upheaval has emphasized strong support for Turkey's 
democratic institutions and constitutional mechanisms.  We have made 
clear that there should be no extra-constitutional intervention in 
the democratic process.  In your remarks here, it would be helpful 
to echo these sentiments and reiterate U.S. confidence in Turkey and 
in its democratic institutions. 
 
Incirlik Authorization Up for Renewal 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Turkish parliament's March 1, 2003 decision not to 
allow U.S. forces access to Iraq to open a northern front against 
Saddam from Turkish territory has given way to four years of crucial 
Turkish logistics support for Iraq operations from Turkey through 
the Incirlik Air Hub and by use of the land crossing at Habur Gate. 
U.S. authorization for the operations at Incirlik will expire June 
22 and we have requested a one-year extension.  It would be useful 
for you to express continued U.S. appreciation for Turkish support 
of this important logistics bridge. 
 
Iraq and Kirkuk 
--------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Iraq remains a major concern for Turkey and an ongoing 
source of friction in our bilateral relationship.  Turkey is worried 
about increasing instability in Iraq, increasing Iranian influence 
in the region, and the potential for Iraq to splinter along 
sectarian and/or ethnic lines.  They also worry about Iraqi Kurdish 
ambitions to expand their territory to include oil-rich Kirkuk.  The 
prospect of a referendum later this year on the future status of 
Kirkuk exacerbates Turkish fears that a Kurdish annexation of the 
province will lead to massive inter-communal violence and, 
ultimately, the dissolution of the country.  Transfer of control of 
Kirkuk to the Kurdish Regional Government also sparks fears of the 
creation of an independent Kurdish state.  Because of the 
concentration of Turkey's minority Kurdish population in the 
country's southeastern quadrant, an independent Kurdistan in 
northern Iraq is perceived as an existential threat to Turkey. 
 
PKK - TGS Prepared to Take Action 
--------------------------------- 
 
ANKARA 00001242  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Kurdish terrorist organization PKK's safe-haven in 
northern Iraq is a continual irritant in U.S. -Turkey relations. 
Turkey has insisted since Operation Iraqi Freedom commenced in 2003 
that the Iraqi government and/or the U.S. take steps to address this 
terrorist organization's freedom of movement in Iraq.  PKK terrorist 
attacks against Turkey from strongholds in northern Iraq killed over 
600 Turkish civilians and military in 2006 alone.  A surge in PKK 
attacks last summer prompted the Turkish government to threaten a 
cross-border operation (CBO) into Iraq.  To forestall this and to 
seek concrete actions to reduce PKK violence, the U.S. appointed 
Gen.(r) Joseph Ralston as Special Envoy for Countering PKK Terrorism 
in August 2006.  The Turkish and Iraqi governments in turn named 
counterparts for Ralston: State Minister al-Waili for the GOI, and 
Gen. (r) Edip Baser for the GOT.  Ralston has conducted numerous 
meetings with Iraqi and Turkish officials. 
 
¶8. (SBU) However, Turkey's leaders remain frustrated by the 
perceived lack of concrete results.  With continued clashes between 
the Turkish military and the PKK throughout the winter and spring, 
the government and military find themselves under increasing 
pressure to take unilateral action against PKK strongholds in 
northern Iraq.  On April 12, Chief of Defense General Buyukanit 
publicly declared that the TGS considers a CBO necessary and useful, 
but deferred to a parliamentary vote to green-light such an 
operation and said TGS had not yet requested such approval. 
 
Armenian Genocide Resolution 
---------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Turks from across the political spectrum warn that the 
passage of an Armenian Genocide Resolution (AGR) will provoke a 
harshly negative reaction from the public - and become a major 
factor in the domestic political debate.  They also argue that it 
would set back efforts to establish dialogue with Armenia, both on 
the historical issue and on the broader relationship. 
 
WILSON