VZCZCXYZ0018
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #1052/01 1300914
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 100914Z MAY 07
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5200
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6745
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 7994

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001052 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - LLOYD NEIGHBORS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS 
 
 
¶1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies continued to 
focus news coverage May 10 on the 2008 presidential election; and on 
a scandal over a local TV network allegedly falsifying information 
in a documentary on the 2-28 Incident of 1947.  The pro-status quo 
"China Times" ran an exclusive banner headline on page two that said 
"The United States Rejects Taiwan's Delegation to Go to Washington 
D.C. to Campaign for [the Island's] WHO Bid."  The same paper also 
devoted two-thirds of its page two to covering the U.S. State 
Department's and Japan's responses to Taiwan's WHO bid. 
 
¶2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, a column in the 
pro-status quo "China Times" discussed Japanese Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe's ambiguous gestures in dealing with the United States 
and China.  An op-ed in the limited-circulation, pro-independence, 
English-language "Taipei Times" discussed the scrapping of 
cross-Strait issues from the joint statement following the 
U.S.-Japan Two-plus-Two security meeting and said "the US team on 
Asia probably determined that this was not the time to amplify its 
position regarding cross-Strait matters."  An editorial in the 
limited-circulation, pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan 
News" criticized the pan-Blue camp for "spinning" on the U.S.-Japan 
joint statement and said that Taiwan is not absent from the 
U.S.-Japan security dialogue.  End summary. 
 
A) "Shinzo Abe's Ambiguous Gesture" 
 
The "International Outlook" column in the pro-status quo "China 
Times" [circulation: 400,000] commented (5/10): 
 
"... Abe has never really been able to come up with a decisive Asian 
policy.  On the one hand, he wants to show the world that Japan is 
both politically and militarily a big country, but on the other 
hand, he dares not offend China and South Korea.  Abe has also been 
an appeaser during his policy coordination with the United States. 
The U.S. policy is to turn Japan into 'East Asia's Great Britain,' 
just as former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage had 
advocated, and to use it as a trusted subordinate so that [the U.S. 
and Japan] can jointly control the situation in Asia.  Japan, on the 
other hand, takes advantage of this opportunity by making use of 
U.S. support to seek to become a leader in Asia.  But in the 
meantime, the United States, in fear that its interests will be 
jeopardized, does not allow Japan to mess up the current situation 
in Asia. 
 
"The United States' current policy is to view China as 'a 
stakeholder.' It seeks resolution to certain political issues and 
economic cooperation [with Beijing] while at the same time joining 
hands with Japan, Australia, and even India to counterbalance China. 
 The U.S. move is a potential arrangement rather than a mechanism, 
and the U.S. policy will surely be sabotaged if serious conflict 
were to break between Japan and China. ... 
 
"The fact that the United States and Japan decided in their Security 
Consultative Committee meeting to scrap cross-Strait issue [from 
their joint statement] proved that Washington does not want to see 
Japan make trouble out of nothing.  It is not coincidental that both 
the U.S. government and U.S. mainstream media have been commenting 
lately on the sex slaves issue [during World War II] and visiting 
the Yasukuni Shrine. ..." 
 
B) "The Silence in the U.S.-Japan 2+2 Statement" 
 
Kurt Campbell, CEO and co-founder of the Center for a New American 
Security in Washington, opined in the pro-independence, 
English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 30,000] (5/10): 
 
"... What has raised a few eyebrows is the general absence of the 
subject of the situation across the Taiwan Strait as an enduring 
matter of mutual concern, particularly given the central treatment 
of the subject in the previous 2+2 statements, when the US and Japan 
came out firmly and in unison for preserving peace and security 
across the Taiwan Strait. ...  However, documents such as these are 
important not only for what is specifically articulated but for 
things that go unmentioned as well.  And in this respect, the 
subject of the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan itself goes unheeded.  What 
is the meaning behind such an oversight? ... 
 
"The best interpretation for the oversight -- and indeed the most 
likely explanation -- is that the central point around the emerging 
US-Japan consensus on the maintenance of stability across the Taiwan 
Strait had already been established, and further elaboration was 
unnecessary and seen to be potentially counterproductive. ... It is 
also the case that Japan seeks closer ties (or at least less 
tension) with China at this time, given all the recent turmoil in 
relations, and few things stir more Chinese suspicion and outrage 
than Japanese proclamations on Taiwan.  So it is not unreasonable to 
assume that Japanese diplomats are seeking to send a somewhat 
conciliatory message to Chinese friends in one area - the Taiwan 
Strait - while moving ahead expeditiously in other areas like 
constitutional reform and military modernization - issues that raise 
concerns in Beijing, but to a lesser degree.  In this sense, 
Japanese foreign policy and national security players are mindful of 
the balancing act they are trying to play in Asia and with China in 
particular. ... 
 
"Finally, it is also true that China has put its enormous influence 
behind the recent momentum in six-party talks with North Korea, and 
US diplomats are ever mindful of avoiding what can be seen as 
potential flashpoints in Sino-US relations.  The entire US strategy 
toward North Korea requires continuing pressure from China on 
Pyongyang in the background, and this is well understood at the 
State Department.  In the current environment -- with Taiwan 
providing disappointments in the defense arena and concerns over 
domestic provocations and China rendering quiet assistance in 
ongoing nuclear talks -- the US team on Asia probably determined 
that this was not the time to amplify its position regarding 
cross-Strait matters." 
 
C) "Taiwan Not Absent from U.S.-Japan Security Dialogue" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan News" [circulation: 
20,000] editorialized (5/10): 
 
"... This year's statement made no direct references to Taiwan, and 
in the wake of its release, PRC diplomatic analysts and media 
claimed that Taiwan had been dropped from the list of the U.S.-Japan 
'common security objectives,' attributing it to the adjustment to 
improvements in relations between Japan and the PRC, and between 
Beijing and Washington in the intervening two years. ...  This 
'spin' on the U.S.-Japan joint statement completely ignores the fact 
that the Beijing regime is now beset by serious problems of economic 
overheating and imbalances and social instability, and is based on 
the debatable assumption that the U.S. and Japan have no choice but 
to follow China's preferences and are genuinely intimidated by the 
PRC's military might. ... 
 
"In addition, the position of pan-KMT scholars that neither the U.S. 
nor Japan wish to give the Taiwan government 'misleading signals' is 
based on their own questionable assumption that the DPP government 
is 'the troublemaker' in the Taiwan Strait, an assumption that 
overlooks the fundamental changes in the cross-Strait situation 
quite 'arbitrarily' made by Beijing's massive military buildup, 
weaponry deployment and its enactment of a belligerent 
'anti-secession law' in March 2005. ...  From the above, it is 
evident that the brain trust of the pan-KMT camp is actually the 
side that is attempting to send 'disinformation' or 'wrong signals,' 
and that their intention is to convince the Taiwan people that the 
United States and Japan are afraid of the PRC and that the strategic 
objective of Washington and Tokyo is to 'contain China.' ..." 
 
YOUNG