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Viewing cable 07USUNNEWYORK318, UNSC/DARFUR: STILL NO HYBRID CLARITY AFTER AU

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07USUNNEWYORK318 2007-04-24 23:12 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY USUN New York
VZCZCXRO5737
PP RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA RUEHMR
RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #0318/01 1142312
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 242312Z APR 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1757
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0397
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1258
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 1038
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0822
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0676
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0271
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0727
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0869
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 000318 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: UNSC/DARFUR: STILL NO HYBRID CLARITY AFTER AU 
BRIEFING 
 
REF: A. USUN NEW YORK 00272 
 
     B. SECSTATE 50365 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000318  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  High-level United Nations (UN), African 
Union (AU) and Member State officials participated in an 
April 16 informal meeting on Darfur intended to allow an 
exchange of views on next steps on the political, 
peacekeeping and humanitarian tracks.  UN and AU leadership 
concurred that a consolidated position among non-signatories 
to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) is needed to set the 
stage for negotiations with the Sudanese Government of 
National Unity (GNU), and that aspects of the DPA might have 
to be re-visited along the way.  Participants agreed that the 
measure of GNU commitment to the second stage of the current 
Darfur peacekeeping plan - the Heavy Support Package (HSP) - 
would be in the HSP's implementation, not expected before the 
fall, and in the GNU's acceptance of modalities of the third 
stage, the hybrid operation.  No substantive progress was 
made between the AU and the UN on hybrid details, including 
its leadership, but the UN Security Council (UNSC) Presidency 
issued a Press Statement at the conclusion of the meeting to 
urge such progress, text in Paragraph 12.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (U) In attendance at an April 16 informal meeting, billed 
as an "interactive discussion" and chaired by UK Foreign 
Secretary (FS) Beckett, were Secretary-General (SYG) Ban 
 
SIPDIS 
Ki-moon, UN Special Envoy Eliasson, AU Commission Chairperson 
Konare, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Djinnit, AU 
Special Envoy Salim, Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO) Under-SYG Guehenno, Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) U/SYG Holmes and Department of 
Political Affairs (DPA) U/SYG Pascoe.  Mission 
representatives included Slovakian Foreign Minister (FM) 
Kubis, French Minister of Cooperation, Development and 
Francophonie Girardin, and Italian Under-Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs Craxi.  The USG was represented by 
Ambassador Wolff, A/S Silverberg and Ambassador Sanders. 
 
NEED HOLISTIC APPROACH ON DARFUR 
-------------------------------- 
3. (SBU) SYG Ban commented on what he saw as a need for a 
"holistic approach" toward Darfur, incorporating political, 
peacekeeping and humanitarian tracks.  Citing UN and AU 
Envoys' assessments that the opportunity for political 
progress existed, Ban urged respect for diplomatic space to 
get all parties back to the negotiating table and advised the 
audience to be prepared for amendments to the power-sharing, 
wealth-sharing and security arrangements contained in the 
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) as this new negotiation process 
unfolds.  Consistent with previous statements (ref A), he 
also urged the audience not to do anything to jeopardize this 
process.  He insisted the hybrid operation could deploy only 
when the political environment permitted (i.e., when GNU 
consent was forthcoming).  He welcomed the GNU's acceptance 
of the HSP but said only sincere follow-up would demonstrate 
GNU good will. 
 
4. (SBU)  Eliasson supported the SYG's appeal for a holistic 
approach and focused on its political aspect, urging that all 
initiatives on Darfur mediation be combined under a UN-AU 
umbrella.  He welcomed the April 28 Tripoli meeting.  He 
urged examination of root causes of the crisis and 
consideration of the inter-tribal dimension, which was now 
killing more civilians than were battles between DPA 
signatories and non-signatories.  Eliasson said rebel groups 
should coordinate their positions to prepare for negotiations 
with the GNU in such a way that the DPA would neither be 
re-negotiated nor regarded on a "take or leave" basis.  Salim 
cautioned that not all non-signatories would commit to 
negotiations.  In addition to examining "unsatisfactory" DPA 
elements, the negotiations should explore ways of providing 
peace dividends, according to Salim. 
 
5. (SBU) Konare advocated "vigilance" in monitoring 
implementation of political agreements, advising that the 
international community exert the same amount of pressure on 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000318  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
rebel groups as it does on the GNU to uphold outstanding 
commitments.  He echoed earlier statements from Eliasson that 
civil society not be excluded from eventual negotiations, 
given the fragmentation of the political movements.  Konare 
urged close cooperation with the Arab League in the wake of 
the Riyadh Summit and maintainance of a "spirit of dialogue" 
with President Bashir. 
 
FUNDING NEEDED ASAP 
------------------- 
6. (SBU) Ban declared that "only a multidimensional 
peacekeeping operation with predictable funding" could bring 
peace to Darfur.  Konare was emphatic that the AU Mission in 
the Sudan (AMIS), which was "doing its best," owed its 
existence and activity to the UN and partners and was in 
desperate need of "sustainable financing" through the UN for 
the whole AU role in the Darfur peacekeeping operation.  "If 
the AU fails," he warned, "the UN fails and no other action 
will be possible on the ground in Darfur."  Konare said that 
two donor conferences had failed to produce adequate 
resources for AMIS and that those resources were dedicated 
had been exhausted at the end of March with no indication of 
additional funding on the horizon.  DPKO U/SYG Guehenno urged 
donors to support AMIS once its mandate expires June 30, 
since UN assessed funding would not take effect until the 
hybrid operation deploys (NOTE: According to Guehenno, the 
hybrid would not begin deploying until winter 2007 at the 
earliest. END NOTE). 
 
HSP IS HYBRID PRECURSOR 
----------------------- 
7. (SBU) SYG Ban welcomed the GNU's acceptance of the HSP as 
a "positive step" but said only "sincere follow-up" would 
prove Khartoum's good will.  Konare said the military 
dimension of the Darfur situation was linked to the political 
process and hoped the HSP could be quickly deployed. 
Responding to appeals by Konare and Djinnit for the provision 
of two additional battalions to ensure AMIS protection, 
Guehenno stressed that the HSP was a transition measure, not 
a stand-alone force, and he called on the UNSC to facilitate 
the deployment of the battalions so that the HSP could get on 
the ground.  Guehenno particularly pushed for 36 
Egypt-pledged APCs to be deployed, as they were necessary for 
the two battalions and for further HSP deployment.  On 
timelines for HSP deployment, Guehenno said the rainy season 
and lack of troop and police commitments would delay any 
serious deployment until the fall (NOTE: the UN will convene 
a meeting of troop and police contributing countries for the 
HSP on April 19.  END NOTE). 
 
8. (SBU) On the hybrid, Guehenno said a firm GNU response on 
the candidate for Joint Special Representative (JSR) was 
still outstanding.  He made a point of adding that the 
Tripartite Mechanism created in the November 16 Addis Ababa 
Agreements was never intended to be a vetting tool for the 
GNU.  Konare spoke to the need to name a JSR, set up hybrid 
command structures and ensure a viable ceasefire, but 
according to DPKO in a private conversation with USUN, Konare 
has been advising against the announcement of the JSR without 
GNU concurrence for fear that to do so would prevent the JSR 
from going to Darfur to begin his work.  Djinnit told 
Ambassador Wolff privately that in order to bring Konare and 
the GNU along on this score, we should sacrifice "appearance" 
for "practicality" on UN command and control by incorporating 
into an eventual hybrid resolution language deferential to 
the AU.  On force composition, Djinnit acknowledged 
non-African troops could be considered once African offers 
were exhausted. 
 
CHAD-SUDAN DIMENSION CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED 
----------------------------------------- 
9. (SBU) Konare and Eliasson stressed the "critical" Chad 
dimension of the Darfur crisis.  Konare reported that the AU 
had appealed to both the GNU and the GOC to cease 
cross-border incursions.  Konare likened the regional 
dimensions of an unchecked Darfur crisis to the potential 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000318  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
evolution of Somalia's instability into clashes along the 
lines of those in the Middle East.  French Minister Girardin, 
Congolese PR Ikouebe and Qatari PR al-Nasser also highlighted 
the need to deal with Chad and trans-border attacks. 
 
PREDICTABLE RESPONSES FROM MEMBERS 
---------------------------------- 
10. (SBU) Drawing from ref B points, Ambassador Wolff argued 
a framework and a timetable to convene DPA non-signatories 
and to begin HSP deployment.  He said the international 
community should be cautious in taking GNU acceptance of the 
HSP at face value and highlighted the GNU's still pending 
acceptance of the hybrid, with only just over two months 
remaining until the expiration of AMIS' mandate.  He appealed 
for UN-AU announcement of hybrid leadership.  Finally, he 
raised the reality for the UNSC to consider using all tools 
at its disposal in dealing with Sudan (also stated by the 
Slovakian FM) and recommended that the latest Panel of 
Experts report to the Sudan Sanctions Committee be circulated 
as a UNSC document.  FS Beckett supported this call for 
tougher measures, recommending a twin-track approach of 
incentives and pressure on all Darfur players as necessary. 
She warned "there would be a cost to those seeking to 
obstruct progress and negotiation." 
 
11. (SBU) French Minister Girardin warned the UNSC against 
taking measures that had no "political impact," stating that 
only dialogue with the GNU could make Addis Ababa Agreements 
implementation possible.  Chinese Deputy PR Liu reiterated 
Beijing's stance that sanctions should not be suggested 
lightly, as they have the potential to "create new 
confrontations and complications" in Darfur.  He urged 
treating the GNU as a partner in negotiations and suggested 
the UN meet it halfway in addressing its concerns on 
implementing the Addis Agreements.  The South African 
delegate spoke against adoption of "complicating measures" 
that might narrow political space. 
 
PRESS STATEMENT ISSUED 
---------------------- 
12. (U) The UK circulated a draft Press Statement at the end 
of the session; begin Press Statement text: 
 
The members of the Security Council welcome the decision by 
the Government of National Unity to accept in full the United 
Nations Heavy Support Package to the African Union Mission in 
Sudan as outlined in the Secretary General's report of 23 
February 2007.  They call on the Government of National Unity 
to now facilitate the immediate deployment of the Package. 
The President of the Council is writing to the Secretary 
General to enable him to request funding for the Package from 
the General Assembly. 
 
The members of the Council recall the Presidential Statement 
of 19 December 2006 calling for all parties to facilitate, 
per the Addis Ababa and Abuja Agreements, the immediate 
deployment of a hybrid operation in Darfur, for which 
back-stopping and command and control structures will be 
provided by the United Nations.  They welcome the efforts of 
the United Nations and the African Union, in consultation 
with the Government of National Unity, to reach agreement on 
the Hybrid, and call on all parties to facilitate its 
deployment, as agreed by the African Union and the United 
Nations, without delay. 
 
The members of the Council stress there can be no military 
solution to the crisis in Darfur.  They call for an immediate 
ceasefire, a reinvigorated political process, an improvement 
in the humanitarian situation and the deployment of an 
effective African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation. 
They express their full support for the efforts of the United 
Nations and African Union Special Envoys for Darfur and call 
for their work to advance with all possible speed and with 
the cooperation of all relevant parties. 
 
13. (U) End Press Statement text. 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000318  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
KHALILZAD