VZCZCXRO6893
PP RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA RUEHMR
RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #0295/01 1061630
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161630Z APR 07 ZDK
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1705
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1243
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 1023
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0815
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0660
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0264
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0722
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0134
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0503
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000295 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CD PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: UNSC/DARFUR: CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM AFTER APRIL 9 
"SUCCESS" IN ADDIS 
 
REF: SECSTATE 48637 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000295  001.4 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. At April 12 consultations, United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) Members welcomed news of the apparent 
"success" enjoyed by Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO) Africa Division Director Dmitry Titov at the April 9 
UN/African Union (AU)/Sudanese Government of National Unity 
(GNU) High-Level Technical Consultations on the Heavy Support 
Package (HSP) in Addis Ababa.  Titov reported "exemplary 
coordination" between the UN and AU at the meeting. 
According to Titov, the GNU delegation agreed to everything 
in the HSP but needed to consult with President Bashir on the 
inclusion of attack helicopters.  Bashir's "positive 
response" was expected April 13, in time for the upcoming 
April 16 briefing to the UNSC by AU Commission Chair Konare. 
UK PR and current UNSC President Jones Parry announced his 
intention to circulate, once Bashir's response was received, 
a draft letter to the Secretary-General (provided by USUN to 
UKUN on April 11) authorizing funding for the HSP.  Sanctions 
were discussed as both incentives for and obstacles to 
political progress in Darfur; French PR de La Sabliere was 
explicit that it was only because of the threat of sanctions 
that a modicum of success was achieved on April 9.  Titov 
said the April 16 meeting with Konare would focus on possible 
timelines for HSP troop generation, results of AU-UN planning 
for the hybrid operation, and ways to give new impetus to the 
Darfur political process.  END SUMMARY. 
 
DPKO REPORTED RELATIVE HSP SUCCESS 
---------------------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) At April 12 UNSC consultations, DPKO Africa Division 
Director Titov reported on the outcome of the April 9 
UN/AU/GNU High-Level Technical Consultations on the HSP in 
Addis Ababa.  Titov had led the UN delegation; AU Peace and 
Security Commissioner Djinnit had led the AU team; and GNU 
Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Mutrif Siddiq had led the GNU 
side.  Titov reported "exemplary coordination" between the AU 
and UN both before and during the meeting, basing their 
explanations to the GNU on the November 16 Addis Ababa 
agreements, which were intended to assist the AU Mission in 
the Sudan (AMIS) in fulfilling its mandate and supporting the 
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA); on the indivisibility of HSP 
elements; and on the transparency of HSP implementation.  The 
UN and AU countered GNU arguments about the necessity of 
adding attack helicopters to AMIS' mandate but assuring that 
all military elements requested were intended for their own 
self-protection and for the protection of UN and AU forces. 
Titov added that AMIS Force Commander Aprezi made an appeal 
for such protective elements in the wake of the April 1 and 
10 killings of AMIS troops, saying his troops were 
"outmanned, outgunned and outmaneuvered."  Titov stressed the 
pressure from the AU for the UN to assume AMIS financing as 
soon as possible. 
 
¶3. (SBU) According to Titov, the GNU delegation came to Addis 
"prepared to make major concessions."  Its talking points had 
including cooperation between the HSP civilian component and 
Sudanese national institutions as appropriate and inclusion 
of the GNU as a partner in the implementation of AMIS' 
three-sector re-structuring.  The delegation also insisted 
that African troop contributors be given first crack at HSP 
recruitment, but the UN warned that with no reliable TCC 
offers and only one "solid" African contributor, this may not 
be ultimately feasible (NOTE: The UN plans to convene a new 
TCC meeting following Konare's April 16 briefing.  END NOTE). 
 The GNU delegation also asserted its right to executive 
policing authority.  On the issue of attack helicopters, 
al-Sadiq told Titov his justification was sufficient and that 
he would revert to President Bashir with a recommendation to 
accept this provision.  On April 12 the Sudanese PR told 
Titov that this recommendation had been approved and that 
Bashir was expected to sign off by April 13 "with no 
conditions attached."  al-Sadiq hoped the UNSC would issue a 
statement welcoming this acceptance and condemning the 
activity of "spoilers," which had resulted in the deaths of 
AMIS peacekeepers. 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000295  002.4 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) Noting that the April 9 meeting did not address 
extending AMIS or finalizing the hybrid, Titov said the April 
16 meeting with Konare would focus on possible timelines for 
HSP troop generation, results of AU-UN planning for the 
hybrid operation, and ways to give new impetus to the Darfur 
political process.  On command and control of the hybrid, 
Titov said the UN was awaiting Bashir's response on the 
candidate proposed for Joint Special Representative with 
which the GNU "had difficulty." Titov admitted it would take 
"months" to generate troops for the hybrid. 
 
MOST MEMBERS WELCOME OUTCOME, OTHERS URGE CAUTION 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
¶5. (SBU) Chinese, Qatari and Indonesian representatives 
highlighted the effectiveness of engaging the GNU as a 
partner in Darfur peacekeeping decisions rather than as a 
bystander.  The Chinese and South African delegates supported 
the idea of a UNSC statement welcoming the HSP consensus 
reached in Addis. However, Ambassador Sanders and PRs from 
France, Belgium and the UK advised the Council to be cautious 
before pronouncing itself, since the GNU had a history of 
broken promises on Darfur.  Members were unanimous in urging 
DPKO to accelerate its preparations for HSP and agreement 
with the AU on the hybrid operation.  Some Members, including 
Qatar and Ghana, spoke to the need to pressure "spoilers" and 
DPA non-signatories, who were destabilizing the situation on 
the ground and dissuading potential TCCs. 
 
CHAD SITUATION NOW AFFECTING SUDAN 
---------------------------------- 
6.(SBU) Titov updated Members on the deterioration of the 
Chad-Sudan border situation, noting that the likely 
cancellation of a planned visit by Chadian FM Allam-mi to 
Khartoum illustrated the failure of diplomatic efforts to 
reconcile the countries' differences, especially after the 
April 9 incident at Amdjirama and For Baranga.  Russian PR 
Churkin recommended engaging AU interlocutors, and the French 
delegation, echoed by Ghana, made two interventions calling 
for the immediate dispatching of DPKO's advance mission to 
N'Djamena, something Titov said would be difficult at the 
moment, given that DPKO was "overstretched" (NOTE: 
PolMinsCouns got the same response from DPKO A/SYG Annabi 
when he made the same suggestion on April 4.  French PR de La 
Sabliere planned to call DPKO U/SYG Guehenno on April 12 to 
reinforce the point.  END NOTE).  UK PR Jones Parry reminded 
that Central African Republic was still a willing recipient 
of UN peacekeepers. 
 
SANCTIONS DEBATE STILL LOOMS 
---------------------------- 
¶7. (SBU) The Qatari representative credited intensified 
diplomacy with the positive outcome of the April 9 meeting 
and stated that the remaining problems could be resolved 
diplomatically, expressing his appreciation to the USG and 
the UK for respecting the political space sought by SYG Ban. 
He continued that it was important to safeguard the political 
achievements made, and that pressure on Khartoum would not 
bring further gains, arguing instead that pressure be 
directed at those rebels who did not sign the DPA.  In 
contrast, French PR de La Sabliere, in a surprisingly strong 
statement, noted that pressure on Khartoum must be sustained 
and that it was the very threat of sanctions that was 
responsible for the recent progress. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Chinese Political Coordinator Li Jun-hua told 
PolMinsCouns before consultations that China very much 
welcomed the April 9 agreement in Addis and that the UNSC 
needed to demonstrate progress on the "political front" to 
maintain Sudanese cooperation on the three-phase plan.  He 
said this argument had been an important part of Beijing's 
dialogue with the GNU on the HSP.  Li said that the agreement 
on the HSP needed to be implemented with "prudence," noting 
China's heavy diplomatic lifting to bring the Sudanese along 
and mentioning in particular "hard-hitting" conversations 
that Sudanese Presidential Assistant Nafie Ali Nafie had 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000295  003.4 OF 003 
 
 
during his March visit to Beijing.  Li suggested 
accommodating the Sudanese by approaching Africans for HSP 
troop contributions first and only turning to other countries 
if Africans could supply them.  PolMinscouns argued that we 
needed to do whatever would most quickly facilitate HSP 
deployment, whatever nationality the troops may be, a 
statement with which Li concurred.  He seemed surprised and 
almost dismayed to learn that DPKO estimated three months to 
deploy after HSP funding became available. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Li was concerned that we not jeopardize this 
hard-won progress by too quickly reverting to discussion of 
sanctions.  Li was skeptical about the UNSC's authorizing HSP 
deployment without a resolution, but seemed impressed by our 
plan, endorsed by DPKO, to seek such authorization in the 
form of a a letter from the UNSC President to the SYG.  Li 
hoped the USG would use its "influence" to bring Darfur 
rebels to the table and work for a lasting ceasefire.  Li 
stressed the importance of supporting the efforts of UN 
Special Envoy Eliasson and AU Special Envoy Salim. 
PolMinsCouns replied that we would continue to encourage the 
political process and take every opportunity to express 
support for the Darfur negotiators. 
WOLFF