VZCZCXYZ0005
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0276 1002101
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 102101Z APR 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1664

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000276 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SENV UNGA
SUBJECT: UN SECRETARIAT THINKING ON HANDLING CLIMATE CHANGE 
AT THE UNGA 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Mission has received a copy of internal secretariat 
documents proposing various strategies for climate change 
leadership by Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and a high-level 
event on climate change at the General Assembly.  Copies have 
been forwarded electronically to IO/EDA (Tuminaro) and 
OES/EGC (Talley).  The papers, drafted primarily by Yvo De 
Boer (UNFCCC) but vetted by a group consisting of Achim 
Steiner (UNEP), Jose Antonio Ocampo (DESA) and Bob Orr, 
propose wrapping climate change around the opening of the 
62nd General Assembly with a dinner for heads of state hosted 
by the Secretary General, a panel briefing by the IPCC and 
representatives from NGOs and the business community and a 
four hour "interactive dialogue among participants."  The 
proposal includes options for an outcome document for the 
event, ranging from no outcome to a negotiated communiqu, 
and appointment by the Secretary General of five personal 
envoys (Gro Brundtland, Fernando Cardoso, Nitin Desai, Han 
Seung-soo, and James Wolfensohn) on climate change. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Ambassador Miller contacted Bob Orr April 5 to 
ascertain the status of the papers.  Orr initially did not 
know, but called back to say they had already gone to the 
SYG.  In the subsequent discussion, Miller raised several 
issues: 
 
--Timing - Having such an event at the opening of the GA 
session would raise expectations of high-level attendance and 
put pressure on leaders already planning to attend the GA to 
take public stands on climate change.  Such public posturing 
at the beginning of what is going to be a long process of 
negotiations on this issue could harden country positions and 
make ultimate agreement on actions much more difficult. 
Something later in the session, or even following the 
December UNFCCC Bali meeting, might be more appropriate and 
propitious.  The US agreed with the Secretary General,s 
earlier expressed viewpoint that the time for summits was at 
the end of a negotiation, not the beginning. 
 
-- Outcome document ) A negotiated communiqu seemed out of 
the question given the timing and circumstances. 
 
-- Inclusiveness ) Important that any GA event allow for 
participation by all UN members and expression of all 
viewpoints, particularly given the breadth and complexity of 
climate change-related issues. 
 
-- Establishment of a deadline (paper proposes conclusion of 
negotiations by 2009.)  We could not agree to a deadline for 
reaching agreement on a negotiation that had not even started 
yet. 
 
-- Sobriety rather than sensationalism - Climate change 
raised very complicated, difficult, and long-term issues that 
might require major adjustments, both economic and cultural, 
by societies.  These issues needed careful and serious 
discussion.  Good solutions would not be easy to identify or 
agree upon.  Building an international political consensus on 
appropriate actions could be the most difficult thing the UN 
had ever attempted to negotiate.  An atmosphere of 
sensationalism or the encouragement of apocalyptical thinking 
would not be conducive to progress, and we did not see a role 
for celebrities as panelists or presenters on the subject 
(this in response to an increasing tendency by the 
Secretariat to artificially raise the profile of events by 
 
SIPDIS 
including celebrities as presenters or spokespersons). 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Orr noted that he understood the US position on all 
of these issues and that the Secretary General remained 
committed to proceeding in a manner that would not make the 
US uncomfortable.  The Secretary General did not support a 
"summitesque" event on climate change.  Nonetheless, there 
was intense pressure on him to take a leadership position on 
the issue and something would have to be done at the GA.  Orr 
particularly thought a dinner for selected leaders would be 
appropriate.  A public debate would be hard to manage in the 
short time allowed, but many leaders would want to say 
something on the issue.  There might be some flexibility on 
timing.  He agreed that a negotiated outcome document was not 
feasible and that it was vital to set the right tone 
(positive, forward-looking, serious) for the UN on this issue. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Orr and Miller agreed that they would stay in touch 
as an informal way to exchange information and thinking in 
addition to Orr,s official communications on this issue with 
Undersecretary Dobriansky. 
 
 
WOLFF