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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 TOKYO 001740 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 04/19/07 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) What lies behind the clouds over Japan-US relations: Iraq, 
comfort women issue require more level-headed players 
 
(2) "Comfort women" issue by Yoshiaki Yoshimi: Need to disseminate 
clear message showing that Japan has overcome the past 
 
(3) North Korea fails to implement six-party agreement; Pyongyang 
eyes change to America's "hostile policy"; Pyongyang unlikely to 
abandon nuclear programs until ceasefire agreement is replaced with 
peace treaty 
 
(4) People who can't recognize North Korea threat 
 
(5) US district court decides blanket cattle testing is legal: 
Government has no authority to place ban; Private company wins case 
 
(6) Japan, behind in FTA race, urged to craft global strategy 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) What lies behind the clouds over Japan-US relations: Iraq, 
comfort women issue require more level-headed players 
 
SANKEI (Page 13) (Abridged) 
April 19, 2007 
 
By Tadae Takubo, visiting professor at Kyorin University 
 
What happens if US troops leave Iraq? 
 
It is still fresh in our memory that Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao 
highhandedly broached historical issues in his meeting with Prime 
Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit held 
in Vientiane in November 2004. Japanese people also still remember 
Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing's thunderous look before 
television cameras during massive anti-Japan demonstrations in China 
in 2005. Demons can sometimes behave like angels. During their 
recent visits to Japan, Wen and Li presented themselves as likable 
Chinese leaders, wearing smiles all the time. Japan welcomed them 
with open arms. I have no intention of discussing the 
appropriateness of this sort of reaction to the Chinese leaders in 
this paper. What truly worries me is the fact that dark clouds are 
beginning to hang over Japan-US relations, which must be rock solid 
in dealing with China. 
 
First, one cause lies in Japan's frivolous attitude of having gone 
along with the Bush administration on the Iraq war without bothering 
to determine its essence. Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan) 
President Ichiro Ozawa described the Bush administration's actions 
as "egoistic" and urged Tokyo to make a decision not to follow the 
United States. Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma also said twice that the 
Bush administration's decision to launch the Iraq war was a 
"mistake." Those thoughtless remarks are seemingly attributable to 
calls for withdrawal from Iraq rising in the US from the Democrats, 
who won the midterm elections last November. 
 
I have three questions for the lawmakers: (1) Is the Iraq "war" a 
war between states? (2) Who is fighting for what? (3) What will 
happen if the US troops abruptly withdraw from Iraq? Because this is 
not a war under international law, there cannot be negotiations for 
a ceasefire. Sooner or later, the US will withdraw from Iraq. But 
 
TOKYO 00001740  002 OF 009 
 
 
before doing so, the Iraqi government must become able to defend 
itself. The war on international terrorism will continue even after 
the US troops leave Iraq. The war on terrorism is not going to end 
with the Democratic Party in charge of the US government. The United 
States is fighting back some Islamic fundamentalists who are 
challenging democracy. A steep rise in oil prices would not be the 
only consequence of turbulence in the Middle East resulting from a 
Kurdish attempt for independence in a civil war after America's 
departure. The defense minister is not the only one who offers his 
view like an umpire in defiance of the country's dangerous 
position. 
 
Japan-US crisis and Japan and US experts 
 
The second cause is Japan's inept response to the so-called comfort 
women resolution presented to the US Congress by Representative 
Michael Honda and others. At issue is whether or not the former 
Imperial Japanese Army used coercion in recruiting the comfort 
women. The absence of coercion would mean that the Japanese military 
had bordellos just like the militaries of other countries. The Honda 
resolution relies on the Kono Statement that simply complied with 
Seoul's request for acknowledging the use of coercion for the honor 
of the former South Korean comfort women. Prime Minister Abe's 
remarks intended to correctly clarify the background of the comfort 
women issue by explaining the word "coercion" from both the broad 
and narrow senses were twisted and drew flak from the US media. The 
US media reaction was unfair. 
 
Every time tensions have grown between Japan and the United States, 
the automatic self-correcting mechanism worked properly with US 
experts in Japan persuading Tokyo not to go overboard and Japan 
experts in the US checking Washington's mistakes. For instance, a 
movement spread in the US in 2001 to expand the scope of 
compensation for wartime Nazi slave laborers to include those worked 
for Japanese companies. Then Secretary of State Colin Powell opposed 
it, and three former US ambassadors to Japan, including Walter 
Mondale, issued a statement critical of the US Congress. I was so 
impressed that I contributed to this column an article praising 
their action as mirroring American conscience. 
 
Japan bashing by China, South Korea, and the US 
 
This time, no one but Daniel Inoue raised objections to the Honda 
resolution. Even US Ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer joined the 
Japan bashing by saying: "It would have a destructive impact if the 
American people took it that Japan was backing away from the Kono 
Statement." It is also absurd for China, South Korea, and the United 
States to try to squash Japan's view, which is just. Many people 
believing in the Japan-US alliance hold correct views. 
 
During his stay in Japan, Wen delivered a speech at the Diet, giving 
a positive evaluation to Japan's sincere apologies and remorse over 
historical events and urging Tokyo to match them with action. His 
speech elicited huge applause from the audience. Many ruling and 
opposition leaders also made courtesy calls on Wen at his Tokyo 
hotel - something that has never taken place during visits to Japan 
by President George W. Bush. China's "magical" diplomacy was utterly 
amazing. Japan-US relations are far more mature than Japan-China 
relations, but that warrants no optimism. 
 
(2) "Comfort women" issue by Yoshiaki Yoshimi: Need to disseminate 
clear message showing that Japan has overcome the past 
 
 
TOKYO 00001740  003 OF 009 
 
 
AKAHATA (Page 15) (Full) 
April 19, 2007 
 
Yoshiaki Yoshimi, professor of modern Japanese history at Chuo 
University 
 
Prime Minister Abe's response to a US House resolution on "wartime 
comfort women" is sending out ripples. His response was that there 
was no "coercion in the narrow sense," and that he had no intention 
to offer apologies. Afterwards, however, Abe came under strong fire 
from abroad, so he said he stands by a government statement issued 
in 1993 by then Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono (commonly called the 
Kono Statement), but he has not taken back his previous response on 
"coercion." 
 
Well, how about historical facts? 
 
It is strange in the first place to draw a line between the term 
"taking away" (renko) and the term "work or employment" (shieki) and 
take issue only with the former. Whatever the forms of "taking away" 
were, the question is whether women were forced to work at comfort 
stations. 
 
The point at issue is not limited to abductions by using violence or 
intimidation. Even under the law at the time, if someone takes 
someone out of the country by force or intimidation and detains that 
person, this act constitutes human trafficking and the act of taking 
someone to elsewhere by cajolery or allurement. Specifically, these 
acts correspond to "abduction and transfer from the country", "human 
trafficking", and "abduction, kidnapping and transfer from the 
country." 
 
It is also impossible to say that the government would not be 
responsible if the rank and file of either the military or the 
police authorities were not involved directly. That is because the 
former Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) created, managed, and expanded 
the wartime comfort women system. In Korea and Taiwan, Japanese 
military police and police told brokers to recruit women and put 
those brokers under their control. 
 
The leading role in the system was played by the military, not by 
brokers. Proof of this is official military documentation that has 
already been disclosed. If the recruitment of women and management 
of comfort stations were entrusted to brokers, the military and 
brokers were equally guilty because the military did not put an end 
to the detention of women. 
 
Much more serious a problem than that is that the wartime comfort 
women system was essentially sexual slavery -- exclusively for 
military use. Most women were detained in comfort facilities as a 
result of human trafficking or after being kidnapped or abducted. 
They had no freedom to refuse to provide sexual service or to go out 
or to retire. All these things have been proved by not only victims' 
testimony but also a number of military files and records and 
soldiers' memoirs. 
 
Abductions by the military or military police, in other words, cases 
coming under the so-called "coercion in the narrow sense," cannot be 
rejected, either. Even a Japanese court has acknowledged that 
Japanese military personnel abducted women by force in China's 
Shanxi Province. Many testimonies by Philippine women indicated the 
same. A 1994 research report by the Dutch government recorded that 
there were eight cases of this kind, including not only the Semerang 
 
TOKYO 00001740  004 OF 009 
 
 
Comfort Station incident but also failed attempts to abduct. There 
is also documentary evidence of the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East (Tokyo Trial) and soldiers' memoirs. 
 
In conclusion, it is impermissible to back away even a single step 
from the Kono Statement. But the Kono Statement is not necessarily 
perfect, because although it admitted it "severely injured the honor 
and dignity of many women," it employed the phrase "with the 
involvement of the military authorities" to make it ambiguous as to 
who injured the honor and dignity of many women. It is also a 
problem that the statement does not admit legal responsibility. 
 
Overseas media have severely taken issue with the gap in Abe's 
attitude between the abduction issue caused by North Korea and the 
"comfort women" issue, as he is eager to resolve the former but less 
eager to deal with the latter. Both issues are important human 
rights issues and remain pending. If the Japanese government clearly 
acknowledges its responsibility for the "comfort women" issue and 
compensates each victim, that will be a big contribution to human 
rights issues. It will also enhance Japan's prestige and undergird 
Japan's position on the abduction issue. 
 
Japan should not escape into the Kono Statement as a makeshift 
measure. Rather, it should reform itself into a country that can 
send a clear message for the future by showing that Japan has 
overcome the past and is contributing to preventing a recurrence of 
wartime violence. 
 
(3) North Korea fails to implement six-party agreement; Pyongyang 
eyes change to America's "hostile policy"; Pyongyang unlikely to 
abandon nuclear programs until ceasefire agreement is replaced with 
peace treaty 
 
YOMIURI (Page 15) (Abridged) 
April 18, 2007 
 
The six-party talks held on February 13 adopted an agreement 
obligating North Korea to shut down its Yongbyon nuclear facilities 
and accept IAEA inspectors within 60 days as its initial steps. 
 
Conditioning its work to shut down the nuclear plant on Washington's 
move to fully unfreeze North Korean accounts at Banco Delta Asia 
(BDA), Pyongyang missed the February 14 deadline. 
 
Amid growing skepticism about Pyongyang's commitment to the 
six-party agreement, an American delegation led by New Mexico Gov. 
Bill Richardson visited Pyongyang on April 8-11. Arriving in Seoul 
on his way back to the US, Richardson indicated that he has sensed 
Pyongyang's intention to implement its initial steps. 
 
Once the funds at BDA are withdrawn, North Korea is certain to shut 
down its Yongbyon nuclear complex. 
 
Then, what was the purpose of the North's adherence to its BDA 
accounts that hold only 25 million dollars? 
 
The answer lies in North Korea's assertions and moves since last 
spring. Simply put, Pyongyang used its BDA funds in a bid to bring 
changes to America's hostile policy toward North Korea. The North's 
standpoint is that the July 1953 ceasefire agreement of the Korean 
War should be swiftly replaced with a permanent peace treaty. 
 
Starting last spring, North Korea pressed the US behind the scenes 
 
TOKYO 00001740  005 OF 009 
 
 
for a shift from the ceasefire agreement to a peace treaty. 
Washington's rejection resulted in missile launches in July and a 
nuclear test in October by North Korea. Following US-ROK joint 
military exercises, the Panmunjom mission of the Korean People's 
Army released a statement on Aug. 22 noting: "We consider that the 
US has declared the ceasefire agreement as invalid." 
 
Pyongyang's view is that as long as the US sticks to its hostile 
policy toward the North that threatens the security of the region, 
it will not abandon a nuclear deterrent, and that once the US has 
adopted policy of coexistence in place of hostile policy, it is 
ready to dismantle its nuclear programs. 
 
Although this logic is self-centered, in dealing with North Korea, 
which is extremely cunning, it is essential to be aware of 
Pyongyang's way of thinking. 
 
What will happen to the six-party talks in the future? Based on the 
February agreement, working groups have been established on five 
themes: (1) the nuclear issue, (2) economic aid, (3) improving 
US-DPRK relations, (4) normalizing Japan-DPRK relations, and (5) 
regional security. Groups for (3) and (5) are expected to function 
actively. North Korea has a particularly strong interest in group 
(5), which will handle a peace treaty. 
 
China, as the chair of the six-party talks, are lobbying other 
member countries to hold a foreign ministerial once the North shuts 
down the Yongbyon plant and accepts IAEA inspectors, as promised. 
Chances are also high for the US, China, and North Korea - the 
signatory countries of the ceasefire -- plus South Korea to hold 
talks on a peace treaty. But there is a long way to go before the 
North relinquishes its nuclear programs if it taps into a peace 
treaty after taking the initial steps. Japan would be less 
represented in the process. 
 
(4) People who can't recognize North Korea threat 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Full) 
April 16, 2007 
 
Hisayoshi Ina, senior writer 
 
In my last column "Thinking from Vientiane," I wrote that the 
present-day situation-in which Japan is facing North Korea's nuclear 
and missile threats-is akin to the Cuban Missile Crisis the United 
States experienced in 1962. I thought this sense could be shared by 
people living on the Japanese archipelago. But it does not seem like 
that. 
 
Last month, there was a Japan-US security seminar in San Francisco. 
In the seminar, I said the current state of Japan was like that 
crisis. This view encountered a counterargument on the spot from 
Hajime Izumi, a professor at the University of Shizuoka. I have his 
consent to introduce his view in this column. Mr. Izumi said, 
"Japanese people do not think so seriously about North Korea's 
nuclear development." 
 
Americans there also looked surprised. They said the United 
States-with its expanded deterrent strategy clearly shown to North 
Korea-would defend Japan. That is premised on North Korea's 
possession of nuclear weapons. This point is a problem for Japan. 
However, they consider North Korea's nuclear arsenal as a threat. In 
this respect, their perception decisively differs from Mr. Izumi's. 
 
TOKYO 00001740  006 OF 009 
 
 
 
 
Figures shown in press polls indicate the Japanese public's sense of 
menace. 
 
According to the Asahi Shimbun of Oct. 11, 2006, those feeling a 
threat from North Korea totaled over 80% -broken down into 44% 
"feeling a very strong threat" and 38% "feeling a threat to a 
certain extent." Those who "don't feel one very much" accounted for 
13%, and the proportion of those who "don't feel one at all" was 
4%. 
 
Around the same time, CNN also conducted a public opinion survey in 
the United States. In that CNN poll, 20% considered North Korea as 
an imminent threat, according to the Asahi Shimbun of Oct. 18, 2006. 
These figures came right after North Korea's nuclear test. Yet, 
there has been a similar trend. 
 
According to the Yomiuri Shimbun of Dec. 16, 2006, 40% in Japan 
answered that the international community should overthrow the Kim 
Jong Il regime in order to have North Korea abandon its nuclear 
arsenal. Among other answers in Japan, 33% opted for the six-party 
talks, with 13% choosing to toughen sanctions and 6% suggesting the 
need for the United States and North Korea to hold bilateral 
dialogue. In the United States, 50% favored the six-party talks, 
with 23% insisting on the necessity of stepping up sanctions and 7% 
calling for bilateral dialogues between the United States and North 
Korea. The option of "overthrowing the Kim Jong Il regime"-which 
topped all other answers in Japan-accounted for 6% in the United 
States. 
 
In addition, the Japanese public took a severe view of the six-party 
talks held in February. According to the Mainichi Shimbun of Feb. 
27, 2007, 63% did not appreciate the six-party talks while 31% did. 
As seen from these figures, negative answers were over twofold. The 
six-party talks reached an agreement. Asked about this, 15% thought 
North Korea would give up its nuclear arsenal in line with that 
six-party agreement, while 78% did not. 
 
As well as Mr. Izumi, academics studying regional affairs are prone 
in their sensitivities to feel like people living in regions they 
study. Mr. Don Oberdorfer, who once served as chief of the Tokyo 
bureau of the Washington Post and is a most respected foreign 
affairs journalist in the United States, is now pursuing his study 
of the Korean Peninsula at Johns Hopkins University's School of 
Advanced International Studies (SAIS). 
 
Writing for the March 14 electronic version of Newsweek for South 
Korea, Oberdorfer analyzed why the United States has switched its 
North Korea policy. The first reason he cited was North Korea's 
nuclear test. He underscored the start of dialogue over the 
deepening threat. This overlaps with North Korea's logic of seeing 
its nuclear test as a political success. Even Oberdorfer agrees. 
 
Mr. Han Sung Joo, a former South Korean foreign minister, spoke at 
George Washington University. I had a chance to hear his speech 
there, and he was clear-cut in what he said there. Han, who is a 
scholar of political science, noted that the pattern of a Japan-US 
coalition vs. South Korea in the six-party talks has changed to the 
pattern of a South Korea-US coalition vs. Japan. He also ascribed 
this changeover to the "strategic decision" of the United States and 
also to the Sunshine Policy (of South Korea) toward North Korea. It 
was a "second Nixon shock" to Japan, he said. 
 
TOKYO 00001740  007 OF 009 
 
 
 
The six-party agreement of Feb. 13 set a 60-day time limit for first 
steps. When calculated normally, April 14 is the day time is up. Has 
North Korea delivered on its promise to answer the "strategic 
decision" of the United States? Has the bilateral dialogue paved the 
way for North Korea to abandon its nuclear arsenal in its entirety? 
 
If Prime Minister Shinzo Abe does not think so, he should then ask 
President Bush to reconsider policy. Otherwise, Japan and the United 
States will have strategically different dreams in the same bed. 
Consequently, the hollowing-out of their alliance will be set in 
motion. 
 
(07041804im) Back to Top 
 
 
(5) US district court decides blanket cattle testing is legal: 
Government has no authority to place ban; Private company wins case 
 
Shimbun Akahata (Page 15) (Full) 
April 18, 2007 
 
Washington, Jiji Press 
 
Creekstone Farms Premium Beef, a US meatpacker in Kansas, filed a 
complaint against the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
seeking approval for it to independently carry out BSE inspection. 
In this connection, it was learned on Apr. 16 that the District 
Court in Washington handed down a ruling in favor of the firm, 
deciding that it is illegal for the government to ban the firm from 
independently carrying out BSE inspection. The ruling is noteworthy 
of attention as paving the way for blanket cattle inspection by 
private companies. 
 
The ruling will not take effect until June 1 so as to give time for 
the USDA to respond. The firm has already constructed facilities for 
blanket cattle inspection. It said that it is ready to cooperate 
with the USDA. It will decide whether to start testing, once it 
determines whether the USDA will appeal the ruling. 
 
The ruling handed down in late March noted that the law, which 
provided the grounds for the USDA decision to place the ban, allows 
it to regulate the use of medicines by the private sector with the 
aim of determining whether cattle are infected with diseases or not, 
but gives no authorization to ban inspection of slaughtered cattle. 
 
Creekstone Farms had demanded government approval for blanket cattle 
testing from about three years ago, claiming that such a testing 
will lead to improved confidence in US beef in Japan and South 
Korea. However, the USDA is keeping the ban on cattle inspection by 
private companies in place, insisting that cattle testing by the 
private sector has no scientific grounds and will damage the 
trustworthiness of BSE testing by the government. The company filed 
a complaint last March. 
 
It is important for Japan to continue blanket cattle testing 
 
(Commentary) The ruling handed down by the US District Court in 
Washington noted that it is illegal for the USDA to ban private 
companies from conducting BSE inspections, overturning the US 
government's ban on blanket cattle testing by private companies on 
the grounds that such inspection is not based on scientific 
grounds. 
 
TOKYO 00001740  008 OF 009 
 
 
 
The court decision has once again raised the responsibility of the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the New Komeito for easing 
Japan's blanket cattle testing system at the beck and call of the US 
and forcing through the resumption of US beef imports without 
blanket testing. 
 
According to foreign telegrams, the court ruling pointed out the 
efficacy of blanket cattle testing noting that it is useful as a 
measure to prevent BSE and called on the USDA to authorize such a 
testing by private companies. 
 
The court decision has brought into the bold the importance of 
blanket cattle testing as a domestic BSE preventive measure. 
 
(6) Japan, behind in FTA race, urged to craft global strategy 
 
YOMIURI (Page 9) (Excerpts) 
April 19, 2007 
 
Japan has reached a broad agreement with the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to conclude an economic partnership 
agreement (EPA). 
 
In auto parts, flat-screen TV and other manufacturing industries, a 
division-of-labor system has been widely adopted between Japan and 
Southeast Asia. In producing a plasma TVs, there are many cases in 
which value-added major parts, such as the panel, are made in Japan, 
the parts are assembled into semi-finished product in Indonesia, and 
the semi-finished product is completed in Vietnam. In this case, 
tariffs are imposed whenever products move from nation to nation. 
But once an EPA covering the region is concluded, the tariffs will 
be removed, making it easier for Japanese companies to promote the 
division of labor in the ASEAN region. 
 
An EPA between Japan and ASEAN is regarded as one step forward 
toward the concept of an East Asia EPA. Under this concept, 16 
countries - Japan, China, South Korea, the 10 ASEAN countries, 
India, Australia, and New Zealand - would seal an EPA, based on a 
free trade agreement (FTA). 
 
However, Japan has lagged behind the United States, the European 
Union (EU), and even South Korea in competition over FTA and EPA. 
Following South Korea sealing an FTA with Chile in 2004, Japan 
launched EPA negotiations with Chile. 
 
South Korea has eagerly pushed ahead with negotiations on concluding 
FTAs with economic powers. It reached a broad agreement on 
concluding an FTA with the US on April 2 and also plans to hold the 
first round of FTA negotiations with the EU in May. The EU has 
levied a 10% tariff on automobiles and a 14% tariff on flat-screen 
TV, so if the EU and South Korea strike a deal, Japanese products 
might become less competitive in Europe. In contrast to South Korea, 
Japan has yet to launch FTA negotiations with the US and the EU. . 
 
China has already put an FTA with ASEAN on goods into effect. China 
has also engaged in FTA negotiations with such resource-supplying 
countries as the six Middle East countries belonging to the 
Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) and 
Australia. 
 
Some observers attribute Japan's delay in the FTA race to an absence 
of global FTA strategy as a result of giving priority to forming a 
 
TOKYO 00001740  009 OF 009 
 
 
free trade system centered on the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
 
Nobuto Iwata, professor at Aoyama Gakuin University and president at 
the WTO Research Center, said: "Japan has yet to craft a strategy to 
seal EPAs with countries other than Southeast Asian countries. South 
Korea and China have concluded FTAs in succession. Japan needs to 
take response measures to such moves." Nihon Keidanren (Japan 
Business Federation) has called for a FTA between Japan and the US, 
from the viewpoint of strengthening the Japan-US alliance. 
 
Hidejiro Urata, professor at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific 
Research of Waseda University, commented: "It is desirable for Japan 
to establish a system to have the Kantei (the Prime Minister's 
Office) take the lead in determining the nation's external economic 
strategy while removing the conventional vertically segmented system 
of government administration." Keidanren has proposed creating a 
council on external economic strategy, stressing the need for a 
unified body going beyond the wall of government agencies. 
 
An abolishment of tariffs on rice, wheat and other agricultural 
products also stand in the way for Japan in promoting EPA 
negotiations. The Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy set up 
expert panels on agriculture and EPA. These panels have engaged in 
discussing what measures should be taken. But some reiterate the 
need to establish an institute vested with more authority. 
 
SCHIEFFER