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Viewing cable 07TOKYO1538, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 04/09/07

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TOKYO1538 2007-04-10 00:08 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO9031
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #1538/01 1000008
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 100008Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2442
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 3036
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 0580
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 4107
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 9898
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 1514
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6491
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 2568
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3845
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 001538 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 04/09/07 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Prefectural assembly elections: Minshuto makes giant leap in 
urban areas; LDP alarmed at Minshuto's increase of 145 seats with 
approach of Upper House election 
 
(2) Mainichi exit polls: Unaffiliated voters turn to incumbents 
 
(3) Danger of Japan-US alliance being shaken; US might lower level 
of information to Japan 
 
(4) Ishiba tells of Aegis destroyer information leak on Fuji TV 
program aired on Apr. 8: Calls for exposure system matching IT 
society 
 
(5) Activating PAC-3 emergency response system without public 
announcement might trigger national panic; Defense Ministry plans to 
flexibly transfer interceptors from Iruma to metropolitan areas 
 
(6) Commentary: Accountability needed to extend SDF Iraq mission 
 
(7) JACL National President Larry Oda expresses concern over issue 
of comfort women may aggravate racial prejudice against Japanese 
Americans 
 
(8) Editorial: Comfort-women issue: Tenacious effort to clear up 
misunderstanding needed 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Prefectural assembly elections: Minshuto makes giant leap in 
urban areas; LDP alarmed at Minshuto's increase of 145 seats with 
approach of Upper House election 
 
YOMIURI (Top play) (Excerpts) 
April 9, 2007 
 
It has become clear that the largest opposition party Minshuto 
(Democratic Party of Japan) expanded its base in both urban and 
rural areas through the 44 prefectural assembly and 15 
ordinance-designated major city assembly elections that took place 
yesterday. This has prompted the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to 
become alarmed at the largest opposition party's growing strength. 
The skirmish between the LDP and Minshuto is likely to continue with 
an eye on the Upper House election this summer. 
 
In the 44 prefectural assembly elections, the LDP won 1,212 seats, 
or a record low of 47.6% of the total. Minshuto, on the other hand, 
garnered 375 seats, or 14.7% of the total, showing a significant 
increase from the previous race's 230 seats (including those won by 
the now defunct Liberal Party). 
 
LDP Secretary General Hidenao Nakagawa, speaking to reporters in 
Tokyo this morning, indicated that the races were not uphill 
battles, saying: "Our party narrowed down our candidates. We also 
backed some 200 independent candidates, and they all fought well. 
Minshuto has increased its seats, and that to some extent is 
ascribable to (municipal) mergers." 
 
But some LDP lawmakers are wary of a possible negative impact on 
national politics by the declined LDP share at the local level. 
"Many LDP candidates were lost to Minshuto rivals in urban areas in 
such regions as Tokai and Kinki. Prefectural assemblymen are 
 
TOKYO 00001538  002 OF 010 
 
 
expected to serve as 'frontline troops' in the upcoming the Upper 
House election, so their defeats worry us," a senior LDP campaign 
officer said apprehensively this morning. 
 
(2) Mainichi exit polls: Unaffiliated voters turn to incumbents 
 
MAINICHI (Page 3) (Full) 
April 9, 2007 
 
The Mainichi Shimbun conducted exit polls asking for whom people 
actually voted for in Sunday's Hokkaido, Iwate, Tokyo, Kanagawa, and 
Hiroshima gubernatorial races and Sapporo and Hiroshima mayoral 
elections. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)-backed 
candidates and candidates backed by the largest opposition party, 
Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan) locked horns in the five 
gubernatorial and two mayoral elections. Excluding the Iwate 
governorship race, which was fought by two new-face candidates, the 
four other gubernatorial elections were races between a new-face 
candidate and an incumbent. In the four exit polls, 40 to 61% of the 
unaffiliated voters voted for the incumbents. This meant that 
unaffiliated voters did not show their force in yesterday's 
elections. 
 
Tokyo 
 
Regarding the voting behavior by all age brackets, the percentages 
of the age brackets who voted for incumbent Gov. Shintaro Ishihara 
were higher than those of the age brackets who voted for the other 
candidates. Ishihara won support from the elderly: 58% of the voters 
aged at 70 and older and 55% of the voters in their sixties. In 
addition, 53% of the voters in their twenties voted for Ishihara. 
The highest percentage of the age bracket voted for former Miyagi 
Gov. Shiro Asano was 41% of those in their fifties, followed by 39% 
of the voters in their forties and by 26% of those in their 
twenties. Of those aged at 70 years old or older, only 27% voted for 
Asano. Fifty-one% of the male voters and 52% of the female voters 
voted for Ishihara, while 35% of the male voters and 31% of the 
female voters voted for Asano. 
 
Hokkaido 
 
The Hokkaido gubernatorial race was competed between the two 
candidates backed by the ruling and opposition camps. Of the 
unaffiliated voters, 53% voted for incumbent Gov. Harumi Takahashi, 
supported by the ruling LDP and its coalition partner New Komeito. 
Those who answered that they had voted for Satoshi Arai supported by 
Minshuto and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) was 32%. 
Eighty-seven% of the LDP supporters and 82% of the New Komeito 
supporters voted for Takahashi. Seventy-three% of Minshuto 
supporters and 58% of the SDP supporters voted for Arai. The SDP 
failed to reach a consensus in the party regarding the support for 
Arai. A majority of voters in all the age brackets voted for 
Takahashi. Sixty% of all female voters and 51% of all male voters 
voted for Takahashi. 
 
Iwate 
 
The Iwate gubernatorial race was fought among five new-face 
candidates. Eighty-eight% of Minshuto supporters voted for Takuya 
Tasso, a candidate backed by the main opposition party. Tasso also 
won 39% of the votes of the LDP supporters and 25% of the votes of 
the New Komeito supporters. Forty-eight% of the LDP supporters and 
45% of the New Komeito supporters voted for Junichi Yanagimura. Of 
 
TOKYO 00001538  003 OF 010 
 
 
the unaffiliated voters, 47% voted for Tasso, while 21% voted for 
Yanagimura. 
 
Kanagawa 
 
In the Kanagawa gubernatorial election, 61% of the unaffiliated 
voters voted for incumbent Gov. Shigefumi Matsuzawa, crushing other 
candidates. Seventy-five% of Minshuto supporters, 65% of the LDP 
supporters, and 55% of the New Komeito supporters voted for 
Matsuzawa. Matsuzawa obtained support from a broad spectrum. Only 
28% of the LDP supporters and 32% of the New Komeito supporters 
voted for Tadashi Sugino. 
 
Fukuoka 
 
In the Fukuoka gubernatorial race, 44% of the voters voted each for 
incumbent Gov. Wataru Aso and for new-face candidate Shuji Inatomi. 
Similar to the Tokyo governorship election, the Fukuoka race was 
competed between two major candidates. Seventy-four% of the 
supporters of Minshuto and 77% of the SDP supporters voted for 
Inatomi. Eighty-two% of the LDP supporters and 79% of the New 
Komeito supporters voted for Aso. Since the two candidates 
consolidated their support bases, Inatomi was defeated as he failed 
to obtain more unaffiliated votes than those secured by Aso. 
 
(3) Danger of Japan-US alliance being shaken; US might lower level 
of information to Japan 
 
SANKEI (Page 1) (Full) 
April 6, 2007 
 
There is a danger that the removal of critical data on the Aegis 
system by a Maritime Self-Defense Force seaman could severely rock 
the Japan-US alliance in a way never seen before. But that is not 
the only problem: Should information on state-of-the-art weaponry 
fall in the hands of an enemy, it could have a significant impact on 
the international military balance, as well. 
 
The Maritime Staff Office on April 4 formed an investigative 
committee headed by Deputy Chief of Staff Tamotsu Kato and began a 
full-fledged investigation. A senior SDF officer expressed this 
concern: "We have yet to receive any inquiries from the United 
States. We are worried that the United States in future provisions 
of operational information to us might lower the (classification) 
level." 
 
The Aegis system has a sweep capability covering a radius of several 
hundred kilometers. It is capable of detecting and tracking several 
hundred targets at once and attacking over 10 targets at the same 
time. In particular, high-performance radar SPY1 serves as an eye of 
an Aegis vessel and is often used in tracking ballistic missiles. It 
is the world's most advanced radar system, a vital component in the 
missile defense (MD) system that Japan and the US will deploy. The 
United States has supplied Aegis technology only to Japan and Spain, 
as staunch US allies. 
 
In intercepting a ballistic missile by using the MD system, Japan 
and the United States must share intelligence, such as missile 
launch information collected by early-warning satellites. The MSDF 
seaman leaked information on the Aegis system, a key component in 
the MD system. Satoshi Morimoto, Director of the Institute of 
International Studies at Takushoku University, took this view: "If a 
highly-advanced enemy country got hold of the leaked data, it might 
 
TOKYO 00001538  004 OF 010 
 
 
allow the country to jam the data-link between the SDF and US Navy 
vessels or use wiretapping as Japan-US interoperability. That might 
have a serious impact on the two countries' military potential." 
 
Modern military technologies, including MD, carry great weight in 
the capability of cyberspace that includes the Internet and 
satellite communications. The Aegis system controls its radar and 
computer system that is highly capable of detecting, identifying, 
and analyzing missiles. For this reason, leaking information 
patterns in the system alone can cause significant damage, according 
to Morimoto. 
 
The US government has repeatedly expressed concern about the fact 
that MSDF destroyers' identification call signs and other 
information was leaked out last year through the Winny file-sharing 
software and that the US military's information provided to the SDF 
on a Chinese submarine leaked out to the media. 
 
Morimoto also pointed out: "Although it is possible to change 
software after information leaked out, Japan's low level of 
information control might take a toll on the Japan-US alliance in 
the future." 
 
Meanwhile, military analyst Kazuhisa Ogawa, pointing out the fact 
that the wife of the petty officer 2nd class is Chinese and that an 
intelligence leak involving a Chinese woman had occurred in the 
past. Ogawa sounded alarmed: "There is a possibility that the SDF is 
being penetrated by foreign intelligence organizations. China is not 
the only one. Countries vying for hegemony with the United States 
are all eager to obtain information on the US Navy and the MSDF. 
Japan must do everything to protect its intelligence, using any 
means available." 
 
(4) Ishiba tells of Aegis destroyer information leak on Fuji TV 
program aired on Apr. 8: Calls for exposure system matching IT 
society 
 
SANKEI (Page 4) (Full) 
April 9, 2007 
 
Former Defense Agency Shigeru Ishiba told of the incident of 
Maritime Self-Defense Force petty officer 2nd class sneaking out key 
information on Aegis destroyers. 
 
-- What are problems about the incident? 
 
"The petty officer 2nd class is not in a position of obtaining such 
information, and yet, he managed to do so. It means that a person 
who ranks above him and is in such a position, leaked the 
information outside. The problem lies in this person's security 
awareness. (The Self-Defense Forces - SDF) have toughened penalties 
and crack downs to protect against intelligence leaks, but it is 
still not adequate." 
 
-- Is there a possibility of the Chinese wife of the petty officer 
2nd class being a spy? 
 
"I do not know. It is strange that the case was exposed following a 
house search carried out after she had turned herself in for 
overstaying her visa. Other countries desire to obtain information 
on the Aegis system. Intelligence agencies carrying on activities 
are only natural. I am sure that the importance of the need to 
protect information among SDF members will be driven in by this 
 
TOKYO 00001538  005 OF 010 
 
 
incident as a lesson and will lead to boosting national security." 
 
-- What about measures for that? 
 
"The GSDF security police are definitely short of hands. Their main 
duty is now to crack down on security protection that matches a 
highly sophisticated information and technology (IT) society. The 
Defense Ministry's and the SDF's intelligence awareness is weak. 
Penalties are also too light." 
 
-- Do you think it is necessary to establish an anti-espionage law? 
 
"Yes, I do. The SDF must let all personnel know what materials are 
classified as secret. Otherwise, it would be impossible to 
familiarize personnel with information that can be disclosed. It is 
important for the public and the media to understand that protecting 
information also protects our democracy." 
 
(5) Activating PAC-3 emergency response system without public 
announcement might trigger national panic; Defense Ministry plans to 
flexibly transfer interceptors from Iruma to metropolitan areas 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 3) (Full) 
April 7, 2007 
 
The nation's missile defense (MD) system has become operational, 
with the deployment of PAC-3 anti-ballistic missile interceptors to 
the Air Self-Defense Force's Iruma base in Sayama City, Saitama 
Prefecture. The SDF can now intercept an incoming missile with the 
defense minister's order in accordance with the emergency response 
manual. However, even if the defense minister issued an activation 
order in accordance with the manual, the decision would not be made 
public. The possible transfer of PAC-3 interceptors from the Iruma 
base to a central part of Tokyo following the defense minister's 
unannounced order could trigger a national panic. 
 
To deal with a fired ballistic missile, the government envisages two 
possible cases: (1) the missile is likely to hit Japan, and (2) the 
missile might not hit Japan. In the former, the defense minister 
will issue an order to destroy the incoming missile upon obtaining 
the prime minister's approval. In this instance, the order will be 
made public. In the latter, SDF troops will take action based on an 
order already issued by the defense minister in accordance with the 
emergency response manual. In this case, the Defense Ministry will 
not publicly announce the defense minister's order so as not to let 
the enemy know Japan's cards. 
 
The PAC-3 system is capable of protecting an area with a radius of 
up to about 50 kilometers. This means the deployment of PAC-3 
interceptors to such bases as Iruma, Narashino (Funabashi City, 
Chiba), Kasumigaura (Tsuchiura, Ibaraki), and Takeyama (Yokosuka, 
Kanagawa) is insufficient to defend Tokyo from ballistic missiles. 
Given the situation, the Defense Ministry has revealed a plan to 
flexibly transfer PAC-3 missile interceptors to state-owned or 
publicly owned land in Tokyo. 
 
This specifically means that the SDF, based on intelligence on a 
possible ballistic missile launch, might relocate PAC-3 
anti-ballistic missile interceptors from the Iruma base to the 
Defense Ministry in Shinjuku Ward or Camp Asaka in Nerima Ward as 
part of its emergency response system. 
 
The transport of the PAC-3 system composed of at least five large 
 
TOKYO 00001538  006 OF 010 
 
 
vehicles is certain to draw public attention. The Defense Ministry, 
however, does not intend to make public such a step. "People won't 
be able to tell the difference with regular training," a 
happy-go-lucky Defense Ministry official commented. Another senior 
member pointed out the need to offer an explanation of some sort. 
This indicates that the government has "jumped the gun" and 
introduced the system before working out specifics. 
 
The ASDF has six air defense missile groups. Of them, three groups 
are equipped with PAC-3 interceptors: the 1st Air Defense Missile 
Group in Iruma, the 4th Air Defense Missile Group in Gifu, and the 
2nd Air Defense Missile Group in Kasuga, Fukuoka. How would the 
people in Hokkaido, Tohoku, Chugoku, and Shikoku - regions not 
covered by the PAC-3 umbrella - view the transfer of anti-ballistic 
missile interceptors to such cities as Tokyo, Nagoya, and Fukuoka in 
time of a national contingency? 
 
A senior SDF official took this view: "Introducing the MD system 
costs 1 trillion yen in total. The government cannot afford to 
introduce PAC-3 missile interceptors to the all six ASDF air defense 
missile groups in the country." 
 
Another officer explained the situation this way: "To begin with, 
the MD system is a political tool. Possessing the capability to 
intercept ballistic missiles gives Japan a strong voice against 
North Korea. Having the system carries great significance." 
 
Now that the PAC-3 interceptors are in place, the Defense Ministry 
and the SDF have no other option but to follow the emergency 
response guidelines. 
 
The Defense Ministry has yet to clarify exactly when the emergency 
response system should be activated. The ministry is likely to 
activate the system when (1) a ballistic missile has been mounted on 
a launcher, or (2) intelligence on a launch has increased. North 
Korea has made those moves often aimed at sending out political 
messages besides military training. Will the SDF transfer PAC-3 
interceptors every time the North makes such a move? "Considering 
its impact on the public, the ministry won't be able to activate the 
emergency response system so easily," a senior SDF official 
predicted. 
 
(6) Commentary: Accountability needed to extend SDF Iraq mission 
 
YOMIURI (Page 15) (Full) 
April 5, 2007 
 
Hidemichi Katsumata, senior writer 
 
A government bill to revise the Iraq Special Measures Law for a 
two-year extension of the Self-Defense Forces' deployment in Iraq is 
now before the Diet. For what reason was the SDF's Iraq deployment 
extended? The government ought to account for it. 
 
Command headquarters for the Multinational Coalition Forces Iraq 
(MCFI) is located near the Persian Gulf. The command, which is 
called the "Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC)," is where the Air 
Self-Defense Force assigns 10 echelon officers to coordinate every 
morning with US and other MCFI member forces. However, US forces and 
Iraqi security forces began full-scale operations early this year to 
mop up insurgents and militants in Baghdad and in its environs. One 
ASDF staff officer confessed, "I feel as if we were walking on thin 
ice these days." 
 
TOKYO 00001538  007.2 OF 010 
 
 
 
The biggest reason is that the ASDF has no other choice but to 
depend on the US military's intelligence for everything about the 
security of its personnel. 
 
Five US military choppers were shot down by insurgents in only two 
months after the mop-up operations began. The altitude of ASDF C-130 
transport planes differs from that of helicopters. The C-130, 
however, has to pass within the range of antitank rockets in their 
landing approach. The C-130, when its missile sensor is activated, 
has to nose down while banking. Such a random steep approach has now 
become routine with the ASDF C-130s. 
 
"We can't tell if we're actually being targeted by a missile," says 
one ASDF echelon officer. "But," this ASDF officer added, "the 
sensor never reacted when we were on a flight mission to and from 
the southern Iraqi city of Taril to back up the GSDF until last 
summer." In a coordination meeting held every morning at CAOC, a US 
military officer briefs liaison officers from MCFI member forces on 
where to carry out mop-up operations. In addition, the US military 
also gives information there about possible danger. Based on 
information given there, the ASDF changes C-130 flight routes. There 
are also many cases where the ASDF suspends flights, according to 
the ASDF officer. "We have no choice but to keep in close touch with 
the US military for any information about safety," the ASDF officer 
said. 
 
The Diet will soon debate the bill revising the Iraq Special 
Measures Law. However, some lawmakers in the ruling and opposition 
parties are reluctant or even opposed to amending the law. They are 
distrustful of the government for failing to fulfill its 
accountability to the public on what the ASDF has actually been 
doing in Iraq. 
 
The government has so far taken the position that the primary 
purpose of sending SDF troops to Iraq is to engage in "humanitarian 
and reconstruction assistance activities for the Iraqi people." When 
it comes to ASDF activities, the government has explained that the 
ASDF will "airlift supplies and the like for humanitarian 
assistance." Last summer, however, the GSDF withdrew from the 
southern Iraqi city of Samawah. The ASDF then shifted to another 
purpose of the law in terms of "security backup in rear support for 
the US-led multinational forces." The ASDF's airlift mission in Iraq 
has also changed in substance. 
 
The ASDF rarely airlifts supplies like foodstuffs and medicines. 
Instead, its C-130 transports carry MCFI personnel, including US 
troops, and civilians from United Nations organizations. The ASDF's 
C-130s make four flights a week to Iraq, and their flights are now 
extended to Taril, Baghdad, and the northern Iraqi city of Arbil. 
 
Then, the question is why such facts about the ASDF's activities in 
Iraq have not been made public in Japan. 
 
"Some people may say the ASDF is there to back up US forces," a 
senior Defense Ministry official said. "If the government is 
straightforward like this," the official added, "the government will 
be severely called into question over its decision to support the 
Iraq war, and the 'noncombat area' arguments could be reignited." In 
December last year, Defense Minister Kyuma remarked that US 
President Bush's decision over the Iraq war was wrong. Kyuma further 
hit the United States over the pending issue of relocating the US 
Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in Okinawa, saying: "I have told 
 
TOKYO 00001538  008 OF 010 
 
 
them not to be so arrogant. Japan will do what's concerned with 
Japan, so leave it to Japan." These critical remarks on the United 
States can be taken as coming out of Kyuma's consideration for those 
opposed to extending the ASDF's Iraq mission, the Defense Ministry 
official explains. 
 
If that is the case, SDF personnel working in Iraq must be finding 
it difficult for them to continue their work. It has been over three 
years since the government sent an advance team to Iraq in late 
ΒΆ2003. The SDF replaced its Iraq-based ground troops in about four 
months' rotation. During that time, Japan has sent a total of about 
2,300 SDF members. One of them was sent to Iraq four times. 
 
Lt. Gen. Kunio Orita, who heads the ASDF Air Transport Command at 
its headquarters, commands the ASDF's Iraq mission. Orita says, "We 
need public understanding and support for our activities, and we 
also need justification for our activities." In his directives to 
his troops, Orita never fails to lay emphasis on the significance of 
Japan's alliance with the United States. That is because Orita deems 
it impossible for Japan to go it alone to secure its people in the 
event of an armed attack against Japan. North Korea is developing 
nuclear weapons and missiles. China is also building up its military 
power. Facing such threats, it is of no use to only say Japan should 
strengthen cooperation with the United States, Orita thinks to 
himself. 
 
Four years ago, Japan supported the United States' attack in Iraq, 
which broke a number of United Nations resolutions without 
clarifying whether it had weapons of mass destruction. In Diet 
deliberations, the government must make clear the vital importance 
of Japan's alliance with the United States. The government is called 
to account to the nation for the necessity and purpose of extending 
the SDF's Iraq mission in spite of its potential danger. 
 
(7) JACL National President Larry Oda expresses concern over issue 
of comfort women may aggravate racial prejudice against Japanese 
Americans 
 
SANKEI (Page 6) (Full) 
April 8, 2007 
 
In an interview with the Sankei Shimbun, Japanese American Citizens 
League (JACL) National President Larry Oda, 62, spoke of the United 
States House Resolution 121 denouncing Japan over the issue of 
so-called comfort women. He said there is a gap between the views of 
average Japanese-Americans and the position of Japanese-American 
Congressman Mike Honda (Democratic Party), who proposed the 
resolution. Oda also expressed his mixed feelings as a 
Japanese-American, remarking, "I am worried that the commotion over 
the issue could worsen racial prejudice against 
Japanese-Americans." 
 
Upon stressing, "I am offering merely a personal view, because JACL 
is tasked with protecting the rights of Japanese-Americans is never 
involved in diplomatic issues," Oda said that on the issue of 
comfort women, "Japan has already offered its apologies. It is 
irrational for Japan to be pressed to take responsibility for 
(former comfort women's) refusal to accept its apologies." 
 
Asked about Honda's intention, Oda said, "I don't know much about 
the details," but he added: "Since many Chinese people live in his 
electoral district, it might be natural to think that this 
circumstance is behind his motive." Oda said that Japanese-Americans 
 
TOKYO 00001538  009 OF 010 
 
 
had wondered why Honda had taken up the issue of comfort women out 
of the blue as a congressman representing a district in California. 
 
Oda said: "Although we are very close, I have only met him as a JACL 
member." Oda described Honda as greatly interested in social 
justice-related issues from long before. He said that Honda 
earnestly addressed, in connection with the wartime internment of 
Japanese-Americans, the JACL-led movement to restore their rights. 
 
Oda stressed the specific history of Japanese-Americans, remarking: 
"We, Japanese- Americans have mixed feelings whenever the issue of 
comfort women is taken up, because we were regarded as enemies 
(although we are Americans) and sent to relocation camps during 
WWII." He remarked that the racial prejudice has yet to completely 
disappear in American society, adding: "If Japanese people are 
regarded as the villains, racial discrimination or hatred against 
Japanese-Americans could grow stronger." 
 
(8) Editorial: Comfort-women issue: Tenacious effort to clear up 
misunderstanding needed 
 
SANKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
April 9, 2007 
 
The US House of Representatives will likely adopt in May a 
resolution seeking an apology from the Japanese government on the 
comfort-women issue. Japan should continue tenacious efforts to 
clear up the misunderstanding over this issue. 
 
The resolution notes that the former Japanese Imperial Army forced 
young women to offer sexual services during World War II. We 
sincerely sympathize with those who served as comfort women. 
However, there is no evidence that the former Japanese Imperial Army 
directly and coercively hunted those women down like slaves, though 
they might have been involved in the form of conducting inspections 
of sexually transmitted diseases at comfort stations. This is the 
biggest factual error. 
 
The Asia-Pacific Affairs subcommittee chairman of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, during a press conference in Beijing, 
indicated the likelihood of the resolution being passed. He then 
made this critical remark: "There seems to be a feeling among 
Japanese leaders to deny the existence (of comfort women)." This, 
too, is a misunderstanding. Japan has not denied the existence of 
comfort women. 
 
The Japanese government so far has taken such measures as to 
dispatch a special advisor to the prime minister to the US and have 
its ambassador to the US send a letter to the subcommittee chairman. 
We believe that it is necessary to send an even stronger message. 
 
Some US news organizations had adopted a tone of argument critical 
of the Japanese government as if it has "turned a blind eye to war 
crimes committed by Japan" (Washington Post), and treating the 
abductions of Japanese citizens by North Korea and the comfort-women 
issue on the same plane. North Korea has made a similar point. 
However, as Prime Minister Shinzo Abe rebutted, the abduction issue 
is an ongoing case of violation of human rights. The comfort-women 
issue is a totally different issue. 
 
There is an increasing need to reconsider the 1993 statement of then 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono's on the comfort-women issue, 
which has provided grounds for the US House resolution. The Kono 
 
TOKYO 00001538  010 OF 010 
 
 
Statement recognized coercive recruitment of comfort women by the 
former Japanese Imperial Army and police as fact, stating there were 
cases in which constituted authorities were directly involved. 
However, there is no evidence proving such activities in official 
documents collected by the Japanese government. The only grounds for 
such a claim are accounts given by former comfort women from South 
Korea. 
 
The Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) "Committee of Diet members to 
consider the future of Japan and historical education" intends to 
reinvestigate the data that provided grounds for the Kono statement 
and work on US Congressmen not to support the resolution. Democratic 
Party members have launched a group to probe into the comfort- women 
issue and the truth about the Nanjing Incident on a voluntary 
basis. 
 
We would like both the ruling and opposition camps to first 
thoroughly probe into the Kono statement, whose grounds are 
uncertain, by involving academic experts, and then suggest points to 
be revised to the government. 
 
SCHIEFFER