VZCZCXYZ0020
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0762/01 1141256
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 241256Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8949
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000762 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR LEDDY 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR THE 
WEEK ENDING APRIL 20 
 
 
This is CWC-36-07. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
INDUSTRY CLUSTER - OCPF SITE SELECTION METHODOLOGY 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶1. (U) Facilitator Luis Garcia (Spain) held an April 17 
consultation to discuss the opinion of the Legal Advisor 
Santiago Onate regarding what information could be made 
available on an anonymous facility list.  Onate carefully 
laid out his opinion, based on the Verification Annex part 
IX, Section B, paragraphs 25, 8, 1 and 4.  Onate opined that 
it would be easy to provide information as laid out in 
paragraphs 1 and 4, referred to directly in paragraph 25. 
However paragraph 25 did not exclude the possibility of 
providing States Party information discussed in paras 5 and 
6, providing that the Executive Council approved such 
inclusion.   Finally, the key is the random selection 
process, regardless of what mechanisms are put into place. 
 
¶2. (U) Delegations agreed that Onate's exposition was very 
clear and well thought out.  However, some (Mexico, Turkey, 
Cuba, India, Iran, Brazil, South Africa) heard that only 
information in paras 1 and 4 could be used by states to make 
anonymous facility selections.  Others (Canada, Netherlands, 
Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, U.S.) heard that other 
information could be included, but only with long 
negotiations leading to consensus.  Germany, supported by 
China, Cuba, Brazil, Mexico, and New Zealand, urged 
delegations to restrict themselves to the anonymous 
information presented in para 4, in order to reach agreement 
quickly. 
 
¶3. (U) The facilitator noted that he had heard no delegation 
state that it could not consider supporting his proposal 
(although del rep explicitly stated that the U.S. could not 
join consensus on the proposal; Switzerland also was very 
negative).  He announced that he would revise his proposal 
based on the discussion and circulate it in the next week or 
so for discussion during the June industry week.  Canada 
called for consideration in a separate venue of the 
information provided in OCPF declarations.  Such discussions 
would allow delegations to find information that would better 
reflect the relevance to the Convention of OCPFs.  Finally, 
Garcia stated that if prospects for consensus did not appear 
promising, he would step down as facilitator. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
INDUSTRY CLUSTER - TRANSFER DISCREPANCIES 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) The co-facilitators (Merel Jonker of the Netherlands 
and Kiwako Tanaka of Japan) held a consultation on this topic 
on April 17.  They circulated a very slightly modified 
non-paper (dated 10 April 2007) on "Understanding/Guideline 
on import and export data for the AND declaration for 
Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals and for Schedule 2 plant site 
declarations."  They made it clear that the intention of such 
a guideline or understanding would not be to harmonize 
national legislation on data collection, but rather come to a 
common understanding about the types of data that needs to be 
collected in order that future declarations generate fewer 
discrepancies.  They also acknowledged that these 
improvements will still result in some discrepancies. 
 
¶5. (U) The heart of the guideline would be definitions for: 
 
-- Import and export: "The physical movement of scheduled 
chemicals from the territory of one State to the territory of 
another State, excluding mere transit operations and 
transshipments where there is not change in the original 
country of destination of the Scheduled chemicals." 
 
-- Transit: "... physical movements in which goods are 
passing through the territory of a country." 
 
-- Transhipment: "the procedure under which goods are 
transferred from the importing means of transport to the 
exporting means of transport within the same port, free zone 
 
or other area outside the customs territory of the State 
concerned." 
 
¶6. (U) Germany proposed a slight modification to the 
definition of "transhipment": "The procedure under which 
goods are transferred from one means of transport to another 
means of transport within the same ..." 
 
¶7. (U) There was some concern expressed by Germany, the UK, 
and Italy about the amount of time something can be stored 
within a free port, etc. before it needs to be declared as an 
import.  They also expressed concern about the complexity of 
the issue of free ports in general. 
 
¶8. (U) Turkey expressed concern about the true value of this 
exercise, given that so many SPs do not as yet have 
legislation.  Although a valid point, it was also pointed out 
that such guidelines might ensure that legislation yet to be 
developed could incorporate these guidelines from the 
beginning. 
 
¶9. (U) The co-facilitators intend to start preparing a first 
draft of a decision that would lay out the guidelines as 
discussed to date.  Again, this would not be legally binding 
on SPs to change their legislation, but rather present the 
guidelines in a formal way.  This will be discussed at the 
next round of consultations. 
 
------------------------------------ 
INDUSTRY CLUSTER - LATE DECLARATIONS 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (U) The facilitator (Larry Denyer, U.S.) met with the TS 
at their request the day prior to the consultation (April 17) 
to discuss additional comments from the Legal Adviser's 
Office (LAO) on the latest draft decision.  The comments were 
not substantive - they still think the concept of "nil 
declarations" is defensible - but rather a concern about the 
term "nil declarations" itself.  They suggested avoiding the 
introduction of this new term but rather working around it in 
the text of the decision.  It was too late to introduce these 
changes to delegations during the consultation.  Rather, 
these comments were summarized at the end of the consultation 
and will be considered in the next draft. 
 
¶11. (U) The consultation on April 18 was sidetracked by 
early, general interventions by South Africa, Iran, and, to a 
lesser extent, India, Turkey, and New Zealand.  This 
concerted intervention was surprising, as there has been 
little concern expressed to this concept in the past.  Their 
questions dealt with the overall intention of the decision, 
how it would adequately address the issue of late 
declarations, etc.  This seemed to be somewhat orchestrated, 
at least by Iran and South Africa, but it did indicate a 
fundamental lack of understanding on the part of these 
delegations on how we have gotten to where we are. 
 
¶12.  (U) This resulted in rehashing information that has been 
presented in the consultation previously in detail.  This 
also resulted in the TS defending the need for such a 
decision for probably the first time publicly.  Italy, 
Australia, and the UK intervened to express support for the 
need for "nil declarations" and their general satisfaction 
with the current decision text. 
 
¶13. (U) Iran requested that the TS prepare a paper to outline 
the nature of the problem, current TS practices, how data 
(particularly late data) is used by the TS, and how this type 
of decision would help the TS.  The other protagonists, 
joined surprisingly by Germany, supported this request for a 
TS paper.  The TS did not object to preparing such a paper. 
 
SIPDIS 
In a subsequent meeting with the TS, the facilitator agreed 
to outline a general structure for such a paper upon which 
the TS would build. 
 
¶14. (U) The next steps for the facilitator are: (1) to 
develop (in the next few days) an outline for the paper the 
TS will prepare; and (2) prepare and distribute a revised 
 
SIPDIS 
draft of the decision text to take into account the most 
 
recent comments by LAO.  The facilitator is also concerned 
with the general timing for this consultation, as there are 
only two more EC sessions (June and September) before the 
next CSP.  Serious consideration will be given to additional 
consultations outside of the usual Industry Cluster week or 
multiple sessions during those weeks to speed up progress 
toward a decision this year. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
OPEN-ENDED WORKING GROUP (OEWG) ON THE SECOND REVCON 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶15. (U) Ambassador Parker (UK) chaired a meeting of the 
open-ended working group for the Second Review Conference on 
April 20.  The meeting covered national implementation 
measures (Article VII) and consultation, cooperation and 
fact-finding (Article IX).  As has been the case to date, the 
meeting only filled the morning session. 
 
¶16. (U) Parker began the meeting by briefly reminding 
delegations where things stand regarding a topic from the 
previous meeting - NGO participation.  He encouraged 
delegations to provide the names of possible NGO participants 
to the TS in advance of the next OEWG meeting.  If 
delegations have any concerns about specific NGO 
participants, he suggested that, in addition to bringing 
those concerns to the next meeting, that they share these 
concerns with their Bureau representative so that these could 
be discussed in advance within the Bureau.  The TS will 
distribute a paper within the next week or two that will 
summarize these procedures. 
 
Article VII 
 
¶17. (U) The German ambassador suggested that Article VII need 
not receive that much attention during the RevCon because of 
ongoing efforts in this area and progress to date.  He did, 
however, suggest that implementation (including legislation 
and enforcement) be the first consideration, taking 
precedence over the challenges of scientific and 
technological developments and that, to do otherwise, would 
be an injustice to those SPs that have fully implemented 
Article VII. 
 
¶18. (U) The Netherlands ambassador agreed with the German 
prioritization, looking at the "score card" of progress, the 
likelihood that all National Authorities might be established 
before the RevCon, and assistance efforts as things to build 
on.  He also suggested ongoing exercises to build National 
Authority capabilities, addressing synergies between Articles 
VI and VII, that other regimes could benefit from the CWC 
experience, and further work on trade controls, chemical 
brokering, and integrating technologies. 
 
¶19. (U) The Iranian ambassador agreed that legislation needed 
to come first before looking to other improvements.  He also 
suggested a general review of national legislation to ensure 
conformity with the Convention and to identify legislative 
challenges, and suggested that this could guide further 
action by the TS, the EC, and the CSP.  He suggested that 
trade in Scheduled chemicals and transfers of technology were 
areas where legislation may go contrary to the CWC.  He also 
suggested a review and open discussion of the "reservations" 
that accompanied the instruments for some SPs and the 
implications.  He noted the significant progress made 
(including National Authority establishment), while noting 
that legislation is lagging, and pointed to the Plan of 
Action as the reason behind this progress.  He also suggested 
promoting public awareness of the CWC. 
 
¶20. (U) New Zealand pointed to the Plan of Action and the 
significant progress made since the First RevCon, while 
noting that more work remained.  Assistance and "gentle 
encouragement" were the heart of the success and should 
continue to address the legislative challenges that will 
still remain going into the Second RevCon.  She suggested 
that a lack of industry can cause some smaller SPs to give 
the CWC lower priority and suggested continued targeted 
assistance, focusing on senior political and parliamentary 
 
leaders, drawing on linkages to UNSC 1540, and encouraging 
high-level ministerial attendance at the RevCon as means to 
further progress. 
 
¶21. (U) Finland encouraged using current momentum as a means 
to further progress. 
 
¶22. (U) China pointed to national implementation as key, and 
noted the Plan of Action's role in the significant progress 
made.  He suggested that the progress to date is significant, 
given the relatively young treaty and organization, and that 
this indicates national commitment to the CWC.  He suggested 
review of experience gained to date from the Plan of Action 
to improve both the quality and quantity of our efforts.  He 
encouraged SPs in their commitment to their own work, as well 
as outreach, and for the TS to enhance its engagement with 
SPs to help meet their needs. 
 
¶23. (U) Japan stated that national implementation is a key 
element in counter-terrorism efforts.  He noted that about 50 
percent of SPs are still without comprehensive legislation. 
He encouraged more coordination between the TS and SPs to 
effectively use expertise in solving existing problems.  He 
also encouraged the TS to continue to share its lessons 
learned in its documents, etc. 
 
¶24. (U) Mexico suggested that continuing technological 
developments are a challenge to industry, the CWC, and 
individual SPs.  The RevCon should encourage enhanced SP 
efforts, taking into account progress made under current 
"encouraging" efforts.  He encouraged States Parties to 
particular focus on legislation and reporting their progress 
to the TS. 
 
¶25. (U) The Del referenced the non-paper that would be 
released on this topic next week and placed on the external 
server.  The Del also deployed Washington guidance. 
 
¶26. (U) The UK stated that national implementation is 
fundamental, noted progress made under the Plan of Action, 
and indicated that more needs to be done.  He indicated the 
importance of initial declarations and notifications and 
pointed to the implications of late declarations, asking the 
RevCon to encourage full and timely implementation of all 
aspects of the CWC.  He suggested that industry can help in 
this process, as compliance with the Convention is an issue 
of their reputation within their communities, much as it is 
with environmental responsibilities, Responsible Care, and 
supply chain management.  He also pointed to the industry 
advisory committee to the UK National Authority as an example 
of how sharing ideas in this area can be done. 
 
¶27. (U) Russia discussed the importance of keeping our 
commitments as SPs, whether they be destruction or Article 
VII.  He suggested that doing so ensures security and keeps 
toxic chemicals out of the hands of terrorists.  He pointed 
to the Plan of Action's role in the success in establishing 
National Authorities and expected a similar result for 
legislation.  He saw the RevCon having a role in helping SPs 
meet these obligations, while encouraging such SPs to request 
such assistance. 
 
¶28. (U) Algeria pointed to the good results achieved through 
the Plan of Action's cooperative, comprehensive actions.  He 
saw Article VII progress enhancing general security, while 
noting the difficulties that developing countries are 
experiencing.  He encouraged focus on legislation and 
encouraged new approaches and initiatives. 
 
¶29. (U) Italy pointed to national implementation as a 
priority and suggested that the RevCon not focus on the 
establishment of National Authorities (because of the 
progress already made) but rather on legislation and 
administrative measures.  He also encouraged SPs to get 
drafts of their legislation to the TS as soon as possible and 
report their overall progress to the TS. 
 
¶30. (U) France encouraged the RevCon's Article VII efforts to 
focus on (1) its link to universality, (2) ongoing 
 
cooperation (referencing the recent EU joint action), (3) the 
quality of our programs, (4) counter-terrorism (including 
UNSC 1540), and links with industry (synergies with Article 
VI, accurate and timely declarations, and inclusion of 
industry in committees, etc.). 
 
¶31. (U) The Indian ambassador noted the fundamental nature of 
our Article VII efforts, and pointed to our progress under 
the Plan of Action as a demonstration of political will.  She 
noted the balancing of legislative work with competing 
priorities for many SPs.  She also expressed concern for the 
ability of the CWC and national legislation to respond to 
developments in science and technology.  She also said that 
understanding of the verification regime is key to progress 
in these areas. 
 
¶32. (U) Sweden noted the progress made in the establishment 
of National Authorities, while noting the work remaining, 
particularly relating to legislation.  He also said that the 
lack of national implementation measures cannot be used as an 
excuse for failure to meet obligations under the CWC.  He 
referenced UNSC 1540 and its importance in dealing with 
non-State actors and terrorism. 
 
¶33. (U) Brazil mentioned its ongoing assistance effort with 
Portuguese-speaking nations under Article VII and 
universality (e.g., Angola). 
 
Article IX 
 
¶34. (U) For the most part, delegations simply presented 
now-familiar positions on challenge inspections.  India, 
Russia, Mexico and even Tunisia expressed a desire to resolve 
the "unresolved issues" regarding challenge inspections from 
the PrepCom, implying that a challenge inspection should not 
be requested until this has been accomplished.  Several 
delegations also implied that all other avenues of 
consultation and cooperation must be exhausted before a 
challenge inspection could be requested. 
 
¶35.  (U) Cuba stated that this is a necessary and important 
provision of the CWC, but that good faith consultations 
should prevail.  Cuba also spoke in favor of "demystifying" 
the concept of challenge inspections.  Iran supported the 
call for the TS to resolve outstanding issues regarding their 
procedures (e.g., triggering, notification, equipment, 
reporting) but also pointed to the fact that there has been 
no serious request for clarification to date implies that 
there is value in normal consultations and avenues of 
communication; Iran also made a "joking" reference to holding 
an Article XII exercise. 
 
¶36. (U) The UK recommended that the second Revcon reaffirm 
the right of States Party to use a challenge inspection as a 
valid compliance tool, and supported regular TS exercises and 
contingency planning to maintain a high level of readiness. 
The UK rep also acknowledged the concerns many SPs have 
expressed regarding the abuse of challenge inspections, but 
pointed out that the fact that there have been no challenge 
inspections to date is in itself an indication that SPs are 
not inclined to abuse this provision.  The U.S., drawing on 
the Article IX non-paper, highlighted the validity of the 
challenge inspection as an important tool for ensuring 
compliance and noted the responsibility of SPs, not just the 
TS, in ensuring fellow SP adherence to the Convention. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
DUTCH INDUSTRY CHALLENGE INSPECTION EXERCISE 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶37. (U) Amb. Martin Lak (Netherlands) provided more details 
in the April 17 WEOG meeting about their plans to hold a 
challenge inspection exercise at a chemical industry site. 
The exercise will be held the week of September 10-14 at a 
DSM plant site in Delft.  He said that representatives from a 
very limited number of delegations would be invited as 
observers for the entire week, while a much broader list of 
visitors (Del thinks this will include all members of the EC, 
but will need to verify this) will be invited to observe 
 
certain portions of the exercise. 
 
¶38. (U) Lak asked WEOG delegations to consider a couple of 
options for evaluating EC procedures during a challenge 
inspection: (1) holding a simulated EC meeting the week 
before the exercise (leadership could be simulated by someone 
other than the EC Chair); (2) holding a simulated meeting of 
the EC the week after the EC to review the report; or (3) 
hold an information meeting of the EC under its formal 
leadership several weeks after the exercise to review the 
exercise report.  Lak indicated that even in the absence of 
broad support for the first option, it might be possible to 
convene an ad hoc group of delegations on a voluntary basis. 
The Dutch NA would appreciate hearing the thoughts of WEOG 
delegations on these options.  Del will need to confirm 
Washington's thoughts on this before responding back to Lak. 
 
------------------------------ 
DESTRUCTION OF AUSTRIAN OLD CW 
------------------------------ 
 
¶39. (U) During the OEWG meeting, Ambassador Petri (Germany) 
mentioned that the Austrian old CW that was discussed during 
EC-48 was successfully destroyed on April 19. 
 
------- 
ALBANIA 
------- 
 
¶40. (U) With continuing technical problems at the Qaf Molla 
CWDF, it has become clear that Albania will be unable to 
complete destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile before 
EC-49 in June, setting the stage for a politically difficult 
EC session in which a number of delegations may look to set 
an unhelpful precedent for the U.S.  Del rep met with the 
Albanian delegation and the TS to discuss the most recent 
equipment failures at the facility and the report language 
mandated update the TS will issue on April 25. 
 
¶41.  (U) An advance look at the update indicated that it 
draws heavily on the national paper Albania submitted during 
EC-48, but also provides a general overview of more recent 
problems.  TS recommends the GOA supplement the TS document 
with a national paper, in which a greater level of detail 
will be appropriate, as soon as possible.  Del will work with 
the TS and like-minded delegations in the coming months to 
gauge what approach to Albania's inability to meet its 
established deadlines might be politically acceptable. 
 
--------------------------------- 
TS UPDATE TO WEOG ON MARADYKOVSKY 
 
SIPDIS 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶42. (U) Policy Review Branch head Per Runn provided a very 
detailed update to the original TS briefing on operations at 
Maradykovsky.  In an unexpected departure from previous 
U.S./TS discussions, the TS actually minimized its references 
to similar operations at Aberdeen, and Runn was balanced in 
his response to several politically pointed questions from 
delegations.  The schematics presented by the TS generated 
some discussion on interim versus final reporting, and France 
restated its request for a thorough TS paper on end point of 
destruction, to include a description and/or comparison of 
verification practices at all CWDFs to date. Finally, Runn 
indicated the TS would be giving a similar briefing to the 
Eastern European Group next week. 
 
¶43. (U) U.S. del indicated that experts in Washington would 
need to carefully study the Maradykovsky Facility Agreement 
and Verification Plan as soon as they were made available, 
but that the U.S. continues to define EPOD as occurring after 
the hydrolysate/reaction mass from a two-step process has 
been destroyed, and indicated a desire to see that standard 
applied to all possessor states.  The response from 
delegations was mixed; most delegations were generally 
supportive of the TS approach, citing the fact that the 
second stage was under verification as the primary concern, 
although some indicated lingering concerns that no "way out" 
is left that would result in Russia eventually opting not to 
 
destroy the reaction mass.  The UK rep indicated privately 
that London is quite satisfied with the approach, and 
inquired as to whether Washington would expect a change in 
the UK position in support of the U.S. 
 
¶44.  (U) Javits sends. 
ARNALL