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Viewing cable 07STATE57089, ACTION REQUEST: ENCOURAGING RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07STATE57089 2007-04-27 19:57 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Secretary of State
VZCZCXYZ0009
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #7089 1172003
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 271957Z APR 07
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 9187
INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0905
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
UNCLAS STATE 057089 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP MNUC ASEC ENRG KCRM PARM TRGY RS
SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: ENCOURAGING RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION 
IN NUCLEAR FORENSICS EXERCISE 
 
REF: A. A) STATE 049322 
 
     B. B) 2006 MOSCOW 9019 
 
1.  Please see action request in para 4. 
 
2.  (SBU) BACKGROUND: An international group of experts 
created by the G8, the Nuclear Smuggling International 
Technical Working Group (ITWG), will be conducting a 
round-robin practical exercise in the near future.  This 
exercise is the third such round-robin exercise conducted by 
the ITWG.  The first round-robin exercise in 1999 involved 
the analysis and interpretation of a plutonium sample.  The 
second round-robin exercise in 2002 involved the analysis and 
interpretation of a highly enriched uranium (HEU) sample. 
These round robins strengthen scientific support for law 
enforcement actions to prevent nuclear smuggling and promote 
necessary international cooperation in the field. 
 
3. (SBU) PURPOSE: The purpose of these round-robin exercises 
is to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of nuclear 
forensic techniques and methods, including: (1) Prioritizing 
analytical techniques and methods; (2) Evaluating attribution 
capabilities; and (3) Examining the utility of existing data 
and knowledge bases.  These goals will be accomplished by the 
upcoming exercise involving a scenario in which two seizures 
occur and laboratories then analyze nuclear material.  Each 
laboratory will develop analytical results, interpret the 
results in the context of available information, prepare a 
report documenting these results, and participate with the 
other laboratories in a post-project evaluation meeting.  So 
far, laboratories from ten countries have agreed to 
participate. 
 
4.  (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: As a Co-Chair of the ITWG and 
organizer of the round robin, the United States would like to 
encourage Russian participation in the upcoming exercise. 
While Russia laboratories have not participated in the past 
and RosAtom reps only occasionally attend ITWG annual 
meetings, the ITWG's efforts directly support the Global 
Initiative to Combat Terrorism and the International 
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. 
In addition, they build on efforts by experts from A.A. 
Bochvar All-Russian Scientific Research Institute for 
Inorganic Materials and Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory under the Counter-Terrorism Working Group to 
advance bilateral cooperation in nuclear forensics (Ref B). 
Embassy is requested to encourage Russian participation, 
preferably that of the Bochvar Institute, in the upcoming 
round-robin.  At the moment we do not have specific dates for 
the next round-robin, but believe it will be held in the 
upcoming months.  If Russia is concerned about p 
articipating in a multilateral venue, it may be possible to 
pursue it bilaterally. 
 
5.  CONTACT: Please contact ISN/CTR Michael Curry at 
202-736-7692 with further questions. 
RICE