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Viewing cable 07RIYADH797, SAUDI RESPONSE TO THE NATANZ FUEL ENRICHMENT PLANT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07RIYADH797 2007-04-16 15:13 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Riyadh 
VZCZCXRO6808
OO RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHRH #0797 1061513
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 161513Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5079
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH IMMEDIATE 8589
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHRMAKS/COMUSNAVCENT  IMMEDIATE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 
UNCLAS RIYADH 000797 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA AND IO 
STATE FOR ISN/RA FOR RNEEPHEW 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP IR IAEA PARM MNUC TRGY AORC UNSC SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI RESPONSE TO THE NATANZ FUEL ENRICHMENT PLANT 
RIBBON-CUTTING 
 
REF: SECSTATE 45884 
 
ΒΆ1.  (SBU)  As per request in reftel, Embassy delivered a 
diplomatic note with a request that Saudi Arabia refrain from 
sending a representative to the ribbon-cutting ceremony for 
the Natanz Nuclear Fuel Enrichment Plant in Iran.  In 
follow-up conversations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
International Organizations Bureau Director of Disarmament, 
Counselor Nayif al-Sudeiri noted the Saudi position on 
Iranian nuclear activities "remained very clear.  We have 
asked Iran to cooperate with all Security Council resolutions 
on nuclear issues, and we want to see more cooperation." 
International Affairs Office Director Aqeel noted that 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General 
Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei visited Riyadh on 11 April, and met 
with King Abdullah to discuss mutual concerns.  Nonetheless, 
the MFA has been unable to date to tell us if the Saudi 
Embassy in Tehran sent a representative to the 
ribbbon-cutting ceremony, although our interlocutors agree it 
is unlikely, given Saudi views on Iranian nuclear activity. 
GFOELLER