VZCZCXRO9390
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHPF #0535/01 1000935
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 100935Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8306
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2275
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 3151
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PHNOM PENH 000535 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2017 
TAGS: PTER PREL EAID CB AS JA
SUBJECT: TRILATERAL COUNTERTERRORISM DIALOGUE IN CAMBODIA 
 
REF: A. REFTEL A: PHNOM PENH 489 
     ¶B. REFTEL B: PHNOM PENH 455 
 
Classified By: Acting DCM Margaret McKean; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary.  At the Australian High Commission's 
invitation, representatives of the U.S., Japanese and 
Australian missions met on April 5 for a Cambodia-specific 
trilateral counterterrorism (CT) dialogue.  Australia framed 
the dialogue as part of the follow-up to the October 2006 
high-level meeting in Tokyo and preparation for the June 5-6 
session in Sydney.  Australia would like to move beyond the 
four focus countries (Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Indonesia) and the GOA reportedly sees Cambodia as a possible 
addition.  The two-hour session was useful in highlighting 
some areas of mutual interest and/or programmatic overlap. 
However, the Japanese questioned whether CTAG, although 
moribund over the last 16 months, might be a more efficient 
format.  The Australians want to maintain an informal U.S., 
UK, and Australian coordination on CT matters.  All three 
countries fund CT-related programs in Cambodia, and promote 
basic English language training as the necessary first step. 
End Summary. 
 
Opening Remarks 
--------------- 
 
¶2. (C)  On April 5, the Australian High Commission invited 
representatives from the political/economic, defense, 
regional security, and law enforcement offices of the 
Japanese and U.S. embassies to join in a trilateral 
counterterrorism (CT) discussion.  Australian Charge Ruediger 
opened the meeting, presenting it as an opportunity to 
exchange information about counterterrorism capacity building 
and operational activities, including priorities, training 
curricula, assessments, and lessons learned.  He suggested 
the three countries could coordinate CT assistance to ensure 
activities undertaken or being planned do not conflict with 
or duplicate one another.  He proposed that the trilateral 
format could generate ideas for future capacity building, 
either individually or collectively. 
 
¶3. (C)  More specifically, he suggested the group discuss 
perceptions of the threat both internally and in the broader 
region, the capacity/ability of domestic law 
enforcement/intelligence to deal effectively against 
terrorism, and CT programs already in place.  He said we 
should identify overlap or gaps, including between training 
and other programs to enhance CT efforts.  Ruediger noted 
that Australia is just starting to focus on what steps might 
be taken to assess the effect of Wahabi proselytizing of 
Cambodia,s Cham Muslim minority, and the High Commission has 
proposed that Canberra fund a poll of Cham opinions. 
 
Border and Transport Security 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C)  Australia seeks to strengthen border control data 
collection by training border control staff in collection and 
data analysis.  They have also performed capacity building 
with regard to detecting fraud, via interviewing techniques, 
and provided English language training.  Their core focus is 
to develop a holistic government approach for Cambodia, 
including the establishment of the necessary structures, 
e.g., the National Committee on counterterrorism headed by 
the Prime Minister; under the Committee is the Secretariat 
comprised of senior members of the MOD, MOI, and other 
relevant ministries; as well as the National Counterterrorism 
Center (NCTC), which acts as the operational arm of the 
Secretariat. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶5. (C)  Australia will conduct a workshop from April 26-27 to 
prepare for a June counterterrorism desktop exercise 
involving an airport scenario.  The exercise will focus on 
Secretariat members' decision-making during three unfolding 
 
SIPDIS 
scenarios; starting with a fire, moving into another phase, 
and concluding with a terrorist incident.  The intent is to 
expose the Secretariat to the kind of activities that they 
would have to perform in the event of a real world incident. 
The Cambodians hope to come out with a "plan of action." 
Australia does not currently see its role as being the 
primary drafter of such a plan, but will help.  The U.S., 
Japan, Singapore, ROK and UK will be invited to observe. 
(Comment: This proposal was originally given by the 
Australians to the Cambodians in July 2005, with proposed 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000535  002 OF 003 
 
 
execution dates of November 2005 for the seminar and February 
2006 for the exercise.  Also, the seminar had been intended 
to teach the Cambodians how to conduct such an exercise, with 
them then having the primary responsibility of organizing and 
executing it. The role of the Australians would have been 
merely shadowing and advising designated members of the 
Secretariat. The delays and scaling down of this clearly 
 
SIPDIS 
demonstrates the difficulty in getting the Cambodians to act 
on an idea that requires substantial work on their part for 
no clear material benefit.  End Comment.) 
 
¶6. (C)  The U.S. reps briefed on Mission efforts to build 
Cambodian military (RCAF) capacity along designated border 
areas.  We also noted efforts to bolster RCAF CT ability and 
reported that the RCAF's vision is to build sufficient forces 
to permanently base platoon-sized quick reaction forces at 
those locations determined by the RCAF to be the most likely 
for some kind of terrorist incident -- the three 
international airports and the Sihanoukville port.  U.S. 
Mission elements also described assistance to Cambodia for 
border/airport controls (PISCES) and watchlisting. 
 
¶7. (C)  The Japanese representative said Japan's efforts on 
border controls are centered on building capacity.  The GOJ 
has a program to assist the RGC with fraudulent documents, 
although that program is geared more towards immigration 
matters, and is not CT specific.  Japan noted it is 
considering work at river border posts along the Tonle Bassac 
and the Mekong Rivers, due to the use of internal waterways 
for illicit trafficking of people and goods.  The U.S. DAO 
representative said that the USG hopes to provide some river 
patrol assistance in the Stung Treng region, although under a 
counternarcotics program. 
 
Law Enforcement 
--------------- 
 
¶8. (C)  The Australian National Police (AFP) sponsors a team 
of eight Cambodian National Police (CNP) focused on 
transnational crime; mostly narcotics and trafficking in 
persons (TIP).  They also provide some capacity building 
(e.g., funding English language training) moving towards 
sending Cambodians abroad for training.  This fiscal year, 
the GOA plans to provide $100,000 for motorbikes, computers, 
and office furniture, as well as a needs analysis.  The CNP 
have recruited some younger, more dynamic college graduates 
as recruits to CT responsibilities with a focus on 
information sharing.  The U.S. noted the soft opening of the 
FBI Legatt office with the arrival of a TDY Legatt.  Japan is 
considering more direct assistance: "Koban" village-level 
patrols and training for units at international airports. 
 
Legal and Justice Issues 
------------------------ 
 
¶9. (C)  Draft CT legislation has been developed with support 
from Australia and the UK, and is with the National Assembly. 
 The text has already been approved by the Council of 
Ministers.  Australia will sponsor a workshop on April 25 to 
help lawmakers better understand the draft law and its 
implementation.  The U.S. asked whether human rights NGOs had 
directly shared with Australia their concerns.  Australia 
committed to providing us the latest draft of the text and 
the U.S. undertook to check with the NGOs on civil society 
reaction to the draft law.  The U.S. briefed on the Embassy's 
regular update of all countries, status vis--vis the main 
international counterterrorism conventions and protocols and 
undertook to provide Australia and Japan a list of which 
instruments we believe Cambodia has ratified.  Japan provides 
some technical assistance annually to help Asian countries 
better understand the legal implications of ratifying the 
various conventions, and how to practically implement them. 
Japan has conducted seminars in this regard (most recently 
March 27-28, 2007 in Kyoto) and includes a limited number of 
Cambodians as well other ASEAN officials in such programs. 
The U.S. briefed on our recent efforts with Russia on the 
Global Initiative to combat Nuclear Terrorism (reftel B). 
Australia later provided us with the names of three 
Cambodians traveling to Australia for a conference in June on 
nuclear terrorism. 
 
Maritime Security 
----------------- 
 
¶10. (C)  Australia is organizing a workshop in October 2007 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000535  003 OF 003 
 
 
to identify current and future threats, the resources needed 
to tackle these threats, and a plan forward.  The RCAF is 
trying to strengthen cooperation with other elements within 
the Cambodian government.  The U.S. referred to PACFLEET 
Commander Admiral Roughead,s visit earlier this year and 
said we have currently programmed funding for FY 09 to 
support maritime security efforts.  These efforts would be 
contingent on Cambodia establishing the legal authority for 
multiple agencies to work together.  The U.S. Coast Guard 
currently conducts inspections of Cambodian 
government/commercial maritime ports and reviews RGC 
procedures to ensure compliance with ISPS standards.  The 
USCG has expressed an interest in conducting training with 
RCAF/maritime police forces as well.  The U.S. noted that 
there is possible Singaporean interest in providing support, 
and China also is likely to provide patrol boats and radar in 
¶2008.  Japan discussed the need for legislative action to 
establish a single Cambodian maritime authority.  Japan 
distributed a project description (emailed to desk) targeted 
at the civilian port and announced they will have 
groundbreaking ceremony May 1 for the project. 
 
Terrorist Financing 
------------------- 
 
¶11. (C)  The U.S. provided a readout of the  Asia-Pacific 
Group (regional financial standards body similar to the G8's 
Financial Action Task Force), and the World Bank (WB) recent 
joint assessment of Cambodia's financial regulatory system, 
summarizing the vulnerabilities identified by those 
interviewed by the APG and the Bank.  The U.S. also discussed 
the system for sharing terrorism financing information with 
the RGC.  Japan noted that there are a number of North 
Korean-run restaurants in Cambodia and speculated about money 
laundering through these sources.  Australia provides some 
assistance in this area to the police, but the lack of a 
Cambodian Financial Investigative Unit (FIU) hamstrings 
effective cooperation. 
 
Bioterrorism 
------------ 
 
¶12. (C)  Australia has hosted a workshop on the Chemical 
Weapons Convention and bioterrorism, looking specifically at 
RGC regulations and airport controls.  While the RGC has 
passed a royal decree establishing a secretariat to manage 
its obligations under the CWC, there is no implementing 
legislation and no budget to set up such a body.  Australia 
may provide additional assistance and CWC accession 
requirements.  Australia noted that they have been providing 
some support to Cambodia to address a radiological orphan 
source.  Ruediger later told the DCM that the Australian 
nuclear center (ANTSO) is in contact with the U.S. Department 
of Energy (DOE), and we anticipate a DOE visit in the near 
future.  Japan previously invited four Cambodians to a CBRN 
capacity building seminar. 
 
MUSSOMELI