VZCZCXRO8949
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0331/01 1080825
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 180825Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5155
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000331 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV SU CD
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY MEETING WITH DARFUR REBELS 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: Representatives of Sudanese rebel 
movements from JEM, NMRD and SLA met with Deputy Secretary 
Negroponte in Ndjamena, April 17.  The movements explained 
that three months of meetings in Chad had failed to unify the 
movements, but that they were still trying.  The effort by 
GNU Vice-President Salva Kiir to unify the movements was 
deemed helpful but still in the early stages.  Movement 
leaders stated that the Government of Sudan (GOS) was 
re-arming the janjaweed with stronger weapons, and reiterated 
that they would not deal with members of the AU's Abuja 
negotiating team.  A JEM representative stressed the need for 
a mechanism to allow non-signatories to participate in 
Cease-Fire Commission meetings and argued that UN 
peace-keepers should only come to Darfur once a real peace 
had been signed.  Deputy Secretary Negroponte noted that - in 
fact - Darfurians on the ground wanted peace-keepers now to 
stabilize the situation.  He urged the movements to find 
unity in order to return to the negotiating table.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Deputy Secretary John D. Negroponte met with 
members of Sudanese rebel groups in Ndjamena, Chad on April 
¶17.  Assistant Secretary Frazer, NSC Director Pittman, USAID 
Deputy Assistant Administrator Garvelink, Colonel Giddens of 
the Office of the Defense Secretary and DCM (notetaker) 
attended the hour and a half discussion at the Ambassador's 
residence.  On the rebel side, representatives of three major 
non-signatory factions attended: Khamis Abdullah, Chairman of 
the SLA and member of the National Redemption Front (NRF), 
Tadjadine Bechir Niam, NRF Coordinator and Representative of 
the JEM Executive Bureau and Khalill Abdulah of the NMRD. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The Deputy Secretary explained that he had just 
returned from visiting Darfur and eastern Chad and wanted to 
hear from the rebels how best to advance the cause of peace 
in the region.  Speaking for SLA, Chairman Khamis Abdullah 
thanked the United States for its support for Darfurians, and 
for having been the first to have identified the problem in 
Darfur as "ethnic cleansing."  Bachar Idriss, speaking for 
the JEM, explained that the movements had been in Chad for 
about three months seeking to unify.  He acknowledged that 
despite some good discussions, they had not yet succeeded in 
unifying.  He thought that a couple more months might be 
necessary.  Bachar Idriss seconded the points made by Khamis 
Abdullah concerning the importance of the United States, 
noting that the United States was pressing the issue in the 
Security Council.  Bachar Idriss explained that the root 
cause of the Darfur conflict was the marginalization of the 
Darfur people.  The movements sought fair representation for 
all the Darfur people. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Tadjadine Niam (JEM) explained that the movements 
were ready to cooperate with  United States; peace had been 
near at Abuja, but the imposition of an artificial deadline 
had made it impossible to achieve a just agreement. He 
stressed the importance of a functioning Cease Fire 
Commission (CFC) to document violations and recommend 
sanctions to the AU Peace and Security Council. Since August 
2006, non-signatories had not attended the CFC sessions and 
the security situation had deteriorated.  He explained that 
different modalities could allow their delegates to attend: 
either create a new Commission, or allow different meetings 
for signatories and non-signatories.  He called the AU 
"directly responsible" for the deterioration of the security 
situation and noted that movements were  now documenting 
violations on their own.  Tadjadine also related the three 
concerns of the movements:  equal representation at the 
central level, wealth sharing and compensations, and 
arrangements whereby Darfurians -- who constitute some 75% of 
the Government of Sudan armed forces -- would be fairly 
represented in the top military leadership. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Speaking last, Khalil Abdullah (NMRD) explained how 
his group had been denied a place at the table in Abuja.  He 
stated that all of the movements were ready to discuss -- but 
pressure needed to be put on the GOS. The current meeting of 
Field Commanders in Darfur was not helping unity. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The Deputy Secretary described the U.S. position 
concerning the proposed hybrid force  with up to 20,,00 
peacekeepers and under UN command and control. He agreed with 
the movements that their speaking with one voice was key to 
returning to the negotiating table.  He explained that the 
United States fully supported the efforts of Jan Eliasson and 
Salim Salim to advance peace in Darfur. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  In response, Bachar Idriss (JEM) agreed that no 
less than 20,000 peacekeepers on the ground were needed.  But 
he argued that the peacekeepers should only come once a new 
peace agreement was signed.  He stressed that a political 
 
NDJAMENA 00000331  002 OF 002 
 
 
settlement was needed first, before the troops.  The Deputy 
Secretary pointed out that Darfurians on the ground saw it 
 
SIPDIS 
differently and were calling for forces now to stabilize the 
situation.   Bachar Idriss responded that the GOS and the AU 
were complicating the situation: The GOS was re-arming the 
janjaweed  with heavier weapons and artillery, and with cars 
rather than camels.  All this had happened under the eyes of 
the AU.  Furthermore, the AU had tried to split the movements 
and create many factions.   He concluded that the movements 
would cooperate with the AU, but would not work with anyone 
who had been on the Abuja team. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Concerning the recent visit of Salva Kiir to 
Ndjamena, Bachar Idriss stated that cooperation between north 
and south was the only solution.  He stated that Salva Kiir 
did not have the same "stature" as John Garang, but that 
discussions were ongoing.  Bachar Idriss expressed 
unhappiness with Salva Kiir's initial approach, saying that 
he had arrived in Chad without doing any ground work.  But 
talks were continuing, and the movements were now planning on 
going to see him.  In sum, his initiative was helpful. 
 
¶9. (U) Deputy Secretary Negroponte cleared this cable. 
 
¶10. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
WALL