VZCZCXRO2756
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0278/01 0930943
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 030943Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5097
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1339

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000278 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV UNSC CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD: DAS SWAN MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
REF: USUN 259 
 
NDJAMENA 00000278  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  In a meeting with Deputy Assistant 
Secretary (DAS) James C. Swan April 2, Chad Foreign Minister 
 
SIPDIS 
Allam-mi explained that he had not yet briefed the Cabinet on 
his meetings in New York and therefore could not give an 
update on whether a green light would be given to the UN 
advance team.  He reiterated that any international force 
should be composed of gendarmes (who could certainly protect 
themselves) and focus on refugee and IDP protection. 
Including a border presence in the mandate was a red-line for 
Libya (and appeared to be one for Chad as well.)  However, 
Allam-mi explained that the mandate could always be built on 
later. Concerning Chad's internal political situation, the 
Foreign Minister indicated that the State of Emergency could 
be lifted for some areas, but not in the east of Chad.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Bureau of African Affairs DAS James C. Swan met 
with Chad Foreign Minister Allam-mi April 2 in N'djamena. 
The Ambassador and DCM (notetaker) accompanied DAS Swan.  DAS 
Swan opened the meeting by explaining to the Foreign Minister 
that the visit to Ndjamena was intended to provide him a 
better understanding of the situation in Chad, as well as to 
deliver some messages.  The first issue was Sudan.  Swan 
noted that both the U.S. government as well as U.S. public 
opinion were increasingly concerned by the lack of progress 
in Darfur.  The United States was approaching the problem 
from two fronts: working with the rebels to encourage them to 
form a united negotiating front with the Government of Sudan 
(GOS) using the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) as a base, and 
by pursuing deployment of a hybrid peacekeeping operation in 
Darfur. On November 16 it appeared that progress had been 
made in gaining GOS acceptance of a hybrid force, however, 
now it appeared that Khartoum had acted in bad faith and had 
no intention of allowing such a force in Sudan.  Consequently 
the United States was running out of patience. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Secondly, concerning the proposed international 
force for Chad, DAS Swan explained that the United States 
strongly supported a robust international force in order to 
protect the humanitarian operations and affected refugee and 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) populations in eastern 
Chad. The United States had been encouraged by the Foreign 
Minister's statements in New York (reftel) that Chad was 
prepared to discuss this issue. And finally, his third 
message was that the United States continued to vigorously 
support democratic reform in Chad and welcomed the European 
Union (EU) initiative to open up the electoral process and 
hold free and fair elections. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Foreign Minister Allam-mi responded that the 
situation in Darfur had leeched into Chad.  He complained 
that Chad was the victim of an internal Sudanese conflict; 
why was Chad being identified as a country requiring a 
peace-keeping force or support for democracy when Sudan was 
the problem?  Since independence Chad had experienced 
non-stop struggles for power; Chadian rebels were only 
settling tribal or family differences.  He argued that Chad 
needed to defend itself and needed support for that defense 
-- anarchy would not be a good environment in which to 
promote democracy. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Allam-mi confirmed that Chad had agreed to delay 
elections and reschedule the electoral census.  EU support 
would be helpful in reforming the electoral commission.  He 
also agreed that some aspects of the State of Emergency could 
be lifted (including allowing greater freedom of the press -- 
as long as the media agreed not to be "apologists" for 
rebels.)  However, the State of Emergency would need to be 
maintained in the east. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Turning to the question of an international force 
in eastern Chad, Allam-mi stated that Chad wanted the force 
to provide security for refugees, guarantee the civilian 
nature of the camps, and prevent recruitment.  Chad 
envisioned a force that would secure the camps, provide 
aerial surveillance of the area and ensure communication 
among UN forces.  Questioning why the UN Security Council 
insisted that the gendarmes have protection when they 
themselves were armed, he signaled flexibility on the number 
of forces and on the question of robust armament of 
gendarmes.  He also signaled flexibility on a separate 
mandate for operations in the Central African Republic. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  However, according to Allam-mi, it was not 
possible to open up the terms of reference to include 
"maintaining peace" when there was no peace agreement to 
maintain.  He pointed out that Sudan and Libya saw the force 
 
NDJAMENA 00000278  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
as a "Trojan Horse" -- a back-door entry way into Darfur. 
These countries argued that the Tripoli Agreement was 
sufficient to secure the area.  Allam-mi noted, as an aside, 
however, that Sudan was still not living up to its promises 
as far as the agreement.  And there were some Libya observers 
in the east, but all they were doing was "collecting 
information."  That being said, Libya had tried to play a 
constructive role, as had SPLM Leader Salva Kiir in uniting 
Darfur rebels.  Libya had also put pressure on Sudan -- in 
turn, Sudan had stopped its "war machine."  However, the 
Janjaweed were still active in attacks in Darfur and in Chad, 
according to Allam-mi. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Allam-mi argued that, rather than siding with 
Sudan, the United States and the rest of the international 
community (in particular, Egypt, Libya and Qatar) should be 
working to isolate Sudan. Chad -- on the front line -- needed 
to be prudent and not take any unnecessary risks.  In 
response to a question from DAS Swan as to how to bring Libya 
on board with the international force, Allam-mi stated that 
mandate would have to exclude control of the border with 
Sudan. (Comment: this appeared to be a red-line for Chad as 
well.  End comment).  The international force's mandate 
should be limited to protecting humanitarian areas and 
actors. Securing the camps and IDP's could be a first step 
--the mandate could always be developed. 
 
Next steps 
---------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  The next steps, according to Allam-mi would be 
finding a common position within the Chadian government. 
Having just returned to Chad on March 30, he had yet to make 
a report to the Council of Ministers on his visit to New York 
and therefore had no news on whether Chad would accept the 
visit of UN Advance team or on other follow-up steps. 
 
¶10.  (U) DAS Swan cleared on this message. 
 
¶11. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
WALL