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Viewing cable 07MANAGUA987, PLC VICE PRESIDENT: WE MUST ALLY WITH THE ALN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MANAGUA987 2007-04-19 21:57 2011-06-01 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4103/la-embusa-y-el-gabinete-de-ortega
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4104/d-rsquo-escoto-en-onu-ldquo-un-desafio-de-ortega-a-ee-uu-rdquo
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4102/estrada-y-la-ldquo-doble-cara-rdquo-ante-ee-uu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0987/01 1092157
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 192157Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9870
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000987 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: PLC VICE PRESIDENT: WE MUST ALLY WITH THE ALN 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 0982 
     B. MANAGUA 0953 
     C. MANAGUA 0905 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) vice 
president and National Assembly deputy Wilfredo Navarro 
informed poloffs that the PLC must form an alliance with the 
Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) before the 2008 municipal 
elections or his party will face a devastating route. 
Navarro explained how he is working with the ALN on symbolic 
measures to oppose the Ortega administration and agreed that 
the Liberal parties should work on a joint legislative 
strategy.  He admitted that convicted PLC leader Arnoldo 
Aleman is the primary obstacle to Liberal unity, but insisted 
that Aleman must work out an agreement with ALN president 
Eduardo Montealegre to end the Liberal fratricide.  End 
Summary. 
 
2. (C) PLC deputy Wilfredo Navarro reported to poloffs on 
April 18 that the ALN and PLC have begun to take symbolic 
actions against the Ortega administration (ref A).  Using his 
position as First Secretary of the National Assembly's 
Executive Board, Navarro has instituted a policy of not 
accepting government letterhead with the FSLN's redesigned 
national seal.  In addition, the PLC will support an ALN 
proposal to insist that President Ortega govern from the 
traditional Presidency building instead of the FSLN party 
headquarters. 
 
3. (C) Navarro acknowledged that, without an alliance with 
the ALN, the PLC would only win "maybe 20" municipalities 
(out of 153) in the 2008 local elections.  He commented that 
the PLC national leadership would accept consensus mayoral 
candidates proposed by local unity councils (reftels), but 
doubted that the two parties would easily reach agreement. 
Aleman is pushing to postpone the date of the municipal 
elections to coincide with the presidential elections in 
2011, but this proposal has been flatly rejected by the PLC 
mayors, he reported.  Navarro also asserted that the PLC 
caucus will not/not support the postponement of the 2008 
municipal elections, even if Aleman presses them to. 
 
4. (C) Navarro agreed that the PLC and ALN caucuses should 
seek consensus in the National Assembly on a common 
legislative agenda, which would give momentum to an alliance 
in 2008.  He noted that the official unification committee is 
still active and may gain a new impetus now that the divisive 
issue of the Supreme Court nominations has passed.  Navarro 
identified the teachers' strike, the large-scale firings of 
civil servants, and the draft Water and Coast Law as areas of 
potential cooperation between the two parties and requested 
technical assistance with these laws.  He also stated that 
the PLC would reject any constitutional reform regarding 
continuous re-election for presidents. 
 
5. (C) Navarro criticized the leaders of both Liberal parties 
for failing to meet and reach an agreement on unity, but 
insisted that Aleman and Montealegre must give their personal 
approval for any successful accord.  Navarro faulted 
Montealegre for his lack of leadership and rhetorical skills 
and predicted that the ALN leader would eventually capitulate 
to political persecution from the FSLN.  He claimed that 
Aleman's leadership of the PLC is waning -- the caudillo has 
received a cold reception on his current tour of the country. 
 Navarro stated that the majority of the PLC deputies have "a 
commitment" to Aleman to help him with his "problem" (20-year 
conviction for fraud and money laundering), which, if 
resolved, would greatly weaken Aleman's and the FSLN's 
influence over the party. 
 
6. (C) Comment: Navarro has been criticized by local PLC 
leaders and several of his fellow deputies for working too 
closely with the FSLN and failing to use his leadership 
positions in the party and National Assembly to challenge 
Aleman's leadership.  As a former presidential pre-candidate 
for the PLC, Navarro's personal ambitions are well-known.  By 
waiting for Aleman's power to deteriorate further, however, 
Navarro may be destroying his chances to replace the 
caudillo.  A number of other PLC lawmakers have also 
privately taken a firm stance in opposition to certain 
aspects of the FSLN's legislative agenda, but when it comes 
to their votes, they invariably fall in line with Aleman's 
instructions in response to Ortega's orders.  For the record, 
we also believe that any direct negotiations between 
Montealegre and Aleman on these issues would seriously 
(perhaps totally) erode the ALN's credibility. 
TRIVELLI