VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0982/01 1091533
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191533Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9862
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000982 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: ALN PLANNING ROBUST OPPOSITION, BUT STARVED FOR 
FUNDS 
 
REF: MANAGUA 0953 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Leaders of the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance 
(ALN) are planning new strategies to confront the Ortega 
administration, but the party faces a severe funding shortage 
and considerable campaign debt.  The party is conflicted on 
how to approach the 2008 municipal elections and whether the 
price for an alliance with the Liberal Constitutional Party 
(PLC) would have to somehow include a role for convicted PLC 
leader Arnoldo Aleman.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassador and Emboffs met with ALN leaders Eduardo 
Montealegre, Maria Eugenia Sequeira, and Kitty Monterrey on 
April 17 to discuss the party's opposition plans and strategy 
for the 2008 municipal elections.  Other topics included 
their recent IRI-sponsored meeting with PAN officials in El 
Salvador (which they described as "excellent") and the 
trumped-up charges the government plans to inveigh against 
Montealegre for his alleged role in the Cenis banking 
scandal.  Sequeira asked us, after Montealegre left, to 
provide "moral support" to him during this particularly 
trying time. 
 
Reluctant Donors Keep ALN on the Brink of Bankruptcy 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3. (C) Kitty Monterrey described the dire financial 
circumstances of the party, which still carries $1.2 million 
of debt from its 2006 campaign.  Monterrey claimed that the 
party needs at least $50,000 per month to maintain a minimal 
presence and structure, and $100,000 per month to challenge 
the dominance of the established parties and pay off debt. 
Some months, she admitted, the party only receives $4,000 for 
operating expenses. 
 
¶4. (C) Monterrey explained that the main problem is that 
potential contributors are afraid of persecution from 
FSLN-controlled judges, police, and municipalities if they 
are associated with the ALN.  Montealegre commented that the 
FSLN is monitoring the communications of all government 
employees, creating an atmosphere of intimidation.  They 
again requested our assistance in convincing the private 
sector to support the ALN. 
 
Plans to Sustain Party and Confront Ortega 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5. (C) Despite the ALN's precarious financial situation, 
Monterrey and Sequeira continue to seek NGO-sponsored 
projects to keep the party active and responsive to the 
community.  They are designing a media campaign using ALN 
deputies and local leaders to get the party's message on the 
airwaves. 
 
¶6. (C) Montealegre plans to confront the Ortega 
administration in his role as Assembly deputy by refusing to 
meet with any government officials in FSLN headquarters and 
by rejecting any official correspondence with the new emblem 
that violates the constitution. (He said the ALN will propose 
a bill naming the Taiwan-donated building as the official 
office of the Presidency).  Montealegre will encourage the 
international community to take the same stance.  Montealegre 
believes that the best way to weaken Ortega is by emphasizing 
his pact with Aleman and the fact that this "prisoner" is now 
able to move freely about the country.  Montealegre opined 
that the donors should threaten to cut off budget support 
unless Aleman is returned to house arrest. 
 
Unity With PLC is "Impossible Without Aleman" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7. (C) Montealegre admitted that the ALN is divided on how to 
approach the municipal elections.  Some Liberals, including 
many in the private sector, insist on unity to confront the 
FSLN, regardless of Aleman's role or influence.  Others 
reject Aleman completely and believe that the ALN should 
focus on internal strengthening or possibly an alliance with 
the Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS), while allowing the 
PLC to whither.  When asked about plans to promote unity at 
the municipal level (reftel), Montealegre skeptically 
responded that unity with the PLC at any level is "impossible 
without Aleman."  Montealegre also warned that Ortega and 
Aleman are scheming to postpone the municipal elections until 
2011 to coincide with the presidential and National Assembly 
elections, explaining that he had seen a copy of a letter 
 
from Aleman to the mayor of Rivas instructing the mayor to 
back this initiative. 
 
¶8. (C) Sequeira was confident that the ALN could triumph in 
the municipal elections by attracting disenchanted PLC 
voters, and commented that any deal with Aleman would drive 
away the ALN's core anti-pact constituency.  Montealegre and 
Monterrey were less optimistic, but did not present 
alternative strategies.  They agreed with us that the ALN 
must begin to identify strong mayoral candidates to fortify 
the party's position whether running independently or in an 
alliance. 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
¶9. (C) The ALN's weaknesses stem from insufficient financing, 
but also a lack of organization that has left many motivated 
and capable individuals underutilized.  Sequiera and 
Monterrey claimed that they are "doing everything" for the 
party.  This is not entirely true, but certainly a small 
number of individuals make decisions and accomplish the vast 
majority of the work.  Montealegre could alleviate this 
situation by empowering more deputies and party officials to 
pursue key objectives.  The technical assistance provided by 
IRI may help overcome barriers of communication and trust 
that have prevented this. 
TRIVELLI