VZCZCXRO1121
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0676/01 1201253
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301253Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORTY 7037
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0158

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000676 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS AND AF/SPG 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AU UN SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR - MOVING FORWARD FROM TRIPOLI 
 
Ref: KHARTOUM 0644 
 
KHARTOUM 00000676  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (SBU) Following the conclusion of the April 28-29 Tripoli talks 
on Darfur, Poloff met with Khartoum-based representatives of the UN, 
AU, EU, Norway, and the Netherlands, as well as the Arab League 
Secretary General's point person on Africa, to discuss ways to 
 
SIPDIS 
sustain momentum on the Darfur political process.  The 
representatives viewed the endorsement of the UN/AU lead on the 
process and regional governments', including Libya, Eritrea and 
Chad, acknowledgement of this lead as an important step.  However, 
the representatives agreed that concrete actions must be taken in 
the near future to demonstrate progress in bringing Darfur rebel 
factions to negotiations with the Sudanese Government. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Three tracks emerged from the discussions: 1) The need to 
ensure that leaders at the capital level, as well as the UN 
leadership in New York and the AU leadership in Addis Ababa, share a 
common understanding of the next steps for moving forward from the 
Tripoli meeting; 2) The necessity of establishing a mechanism, such 
as a Contact Group, to review progress on the political process, 
ensure accountability for the UN/AU, monitor coordination of the 
UN/AU initiative with the efforts of regional governments and the 
Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM); and 3) The importance of 
the UN and AU developing a roadmap, as stipulated in the Tripoli 
Consensus, in the near future, which would form the basis of 
discussions between member states and the UN/AU on the type of 
capacity-building support the bodies would need to advance their 
strategy and on the division of labor among members states (and the 
SPLM) in bringing the Sudanese Government and the Darfur rebel 
factions to negotiations.  End summary. 
 
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Understanding Tripoli 
--------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Khartoum-based representatives emphasized the 
importance of key governments, such as the USG, drawing on the 
momentum from the Tripoli talks to confirm a common understanding of 
the outcome of the meeting with capitals, the UN in New York, and 
the AU in Addis Ababa.  Points would include the UN/AU lead on the 
political process; the urgency with which the UN and AU need to 
present a comprehensive strategy and a realistic timeline to lay the 
groundwork for peace negotiations; a mechanism to monitor 
international efforts on the political process; and, in the case of 
the SPLM, a request for definition from its leadership on the role 
it seeks to play in the UN/AU-led process. 
 
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Follow-up Mechanism 
------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) A mechanism to review the progress on the political 
process, promote transparency, and ensure coordination among 
international actors is essential, according to the Khartoum-based 
representatives.  A Contact Group could exist at the 
Khartoum-level--with weekly meetings--and be mirrored at a 
higher-level, perhaps monthly.  The Contact Group would provide a 
forum for the UN/AU to describe its actions vis-`-vis the 
non-signatories and the Sudanese Government; to review the 
coordination of international initiatives, including that of the 
SPLM; and to request support from the international community for 
the UN/AU-led effort.  This mechanism would encourage accountability 
among all the actors, including the development of realistic goals 
and timelines for the UN/AU and SPLM initiatives. 
 
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UN/AU Roadmap 
------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The final statement of the Tripoli meeting stipulates that 
the UN and AU will develop a roadmap and strategy for laying a 
foundation for negotiations between the non-signatories and the 
Sudanese Government.  UN Envoy Jan Eliasson and AU Envoy Salim Ahmed 
Salim asked their staff in Khartoum to prepare a draft of this 
roadmap by May 4, according to the UN Director of Political Affairs 
in Khartoum.  The Khartoum-based Darfur watchers said that the 
international community should urge Eliasson and Salim to finalize 
their strategy by May 15. 
 
¶6. (SBU) This strategy will form the basis of subsequent discussions 
with the UN/AU on concrete methods for the international community 
to provide support for the UN/AU and SPLM initiatives, through the 
 
KHARTOUM 00000676  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
existing Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST) comprised of UN/AU 
staff in Sudan.  Working-level UN and AU representatives emphasized 
that it would be premature to provide any assistance prior to the 
presentation of the roadmap because the UN and AU would have neither 
the capacity to absorb nor a strategy to utilize such support. 
(Note: USG support would likely include the provision of experts on 
power-sharing, wealth-sharing, rebel factions, and the legal aspects 
of the Darfur Peace Agreement.  The UN and AU have underscored that 
such experts would need to be full-time and willing to commit to 
working in Sudan for a minimum of six months in order to be 
effective.  End note.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) The UN and AU will have to develop the roadmap in 
consultation with regional actors, including the SPLM.  Support from 
the international community would also need to involve facilitation 
of an SPLM role, after the SPLM leadership has clarified its view on 
next steps.  An AU representative reported to the group that the 
SPLM timeline for the peace process was significantly longer than 
that envisioned by the UN and AU and expressed his doubts about the 
SPLM's real commitment to its ambitious plan--which includes a 
request for 1.6 million dollars--to work with the non-signatories. 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) If the UN/AU present a the roadmap on May 15, the 
international community could study the strategy, identify methods 
of support, and endorse the plan at a Contact Group meeting at the 
end of May. 
 
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Comment 
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¶9. (SBU) Numerous Darfur watchers question the commitment of 
Eliasson and Salim to lead the effort to bring rebel movements into 
negotiations with the Sudanese Government. 
Eliasson and Salim can, however, move quickly to design a structure 
and framework for the UN/AU initiative that their successor can 
carry forward and key governments can monitor and support.  End 
comment. 
 
¶10. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.