VZCZCXRO4097
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0531/01 0941017
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041017Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6716
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000531 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, AND TSHORTLEY 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI SU AU
SUBJECT: DARFUR - AMIS ENGAGEMENT IN ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES RAISES 
SIGNIFICANT CONCERNS 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000531  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (U) On March 3, USAID staff attended a tense meeting in Nyala, 
South Darfur, between the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) 
Sector 2 leadership, AMIS Civilian Police (AMIS/CIVPOL), and the 
humanitarian community.  Although the aim of the meeting was to 
improve communication and understanding between AMIS and the 
humanitarian community on roles and responsibilities, the exchange 
resulted in increased tensions among the participants and raised 
several concerns regarding the commitment and priorities of AMIS as 
a peacekeeping force.  Specifically, the humanitarian community 
expressed concern over AMIS's intention to expand their engagement 
in Darfur to include assistance activities.  This is perceived by 
many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and U.N. agencies as 
inappropriate and a diversion from AMIS's primary function to 
provide security.  End summary. 
 
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UNANSWERED QUESTIONS REGARDING SECURITY AND MONITORING 
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¶2.  (U) During the March 3 meeting held in Nyala between 
representatives of AMIS, AMIS/CIVPOL, and the humanitarian 
community, the exchange between participants raised significant 
concerns among NGOs and U.N. agencies present regarding AMIS's 
commitment and capacity to fulfill its security and monitoring 
mandate in Darfur.  When asked about the creation and maintenance of 
buffer and demilitarized zones as assigned to AMIS in the Darfur 
Peace Agreement (DPA), the sector commander replied that AMIS would 
not compromise troop "safety and security to patrol areas of rampant 
insecurity."  AMIS/CIVPOL provided limited information on how it 
intended to proceed with the establishment of women's desks in 
Sudanese government police stations or fulfill its monitoring 
mandate.  During the meeting, AMIS repeatedly emphasized its strict 
adherence to the language of the AMIS mandate, referencing that the 
provision of secuQy and monitoring would be conducted by AMIS 
"within their resources and capabilities." 
 
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AMIS PROPOSES NEW ENGAGMENT IN ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES 
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¶3.  (U) At the same time, the AMIS sector commander emphasized the 
need to liberally interpret the force mandate to conduct assistance 
activities as a "confidence building" measure to "win the hearts and 
minds" of the Darfur population.  AMIS and PAE discussed specific 
plans to conduct mobile clinics and distribute water and mosquito 
nets; however, the activities are not coordinated with other 
humanitarian actors in theQegion.  (Note: USAID reported that AMIS 
mobile health clinics have targeted Nyala internally displaced 
person (IDP) camps where established clinics already exist.  The 
lack of clarity surrounding current and future locations of AMIS 
assistance activities creates the potential for duplication or gaps 
in assistance coverage.  End note.) 
 
¶4.  (U) AMIS plans have triggered significant concern within the 
U.N. and NGO community.  International NGOs maintain that AMIS 
involvement could have a negative impact on the implementation and 
coordination of assistance activities in Darfur.  Humanitarian 
assistance is outside the scope of AMIS's expertise, and AMIS 
projects would therefore be unlikely to adhere to humanitarian 
standards, be accountable to humanitarian principles, or be 
coordinated with other aid activities.  Additionally, international 
NGOs fear that AMIS involvement in assistance activities would 
further blur the lines between humanitarian and military activities, 
as well as lines between humanitarian and political actors due to 
the perception by many in Darfur of the close association between 
AMIS and the Sudanese government. 
 
¶5.  (U) NGOs and U.N. agencies are concerned that AMIS engagement in 
assistance projects to win "hearts and minds" would detract from 
AMIS's primary function as a peacekeeping force.  AMIS confronts 
significant challenges to providing security, as evidenced by 
inadequately secured humanitarian routes, reduced regular patrols of 
inaccessible areas, the failure to implement demobilization zones, 
and inadequate monitoring and reporting on ceasefire violations. 
Initiating assistance activities would further divert limited AMIS 
resources from ensuring safe and secure access to underserved 
populations, as directed under the AMIS mandate and DPA provisions. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000531  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶6.  (U) The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) has recently helped hire and place liaison officers based in 
Nyala and El Fasher, to advise AMIS on humanitarian issues.  As the 
liaison officers arrived in the last few weeks, it is still too 
early to teQwhether or not this will be an effective mechanism to 
enhance understanding and address the significant concerns between 
AMIS and the humanitarian community.  In addition, the effectiveness 
of liaison officers at the field office level is questionable given 
AMIS claims that it is acting on orders from African Union 
headquarters. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶7.  If AMIS engagement in assistance activities is viewed as a 
secondary element rather than a replacement of AMIS's core security 
mission, AMIS and PAE response to genuine humanitarian needs in 
areas otherwise inaccessible to the humanitarian community could be 
worthwhile.  Such activities could be a success if paired with 
patrols in inaccessible or recently attacked areas rather than urban 
centers or IDP camps with pre-existing services.  However, such 
targeting of assistance by AMIS appears unlikely due to AMIS's 
current policy not to patrol areas controlled by the Sudan 
Liberation Army faction led by Minni Minawi, following the attack on 
four soldiers in Gereida town, and in light of the Sector 2 
Commander's emphasis that AMIS will not compromise their safety and 
security. 
 
¶8.  While there is a significant need for AMIS to rebuild its 
relationship with the Darfur population, proceeding with ad-hoc, 
uncoordinated, and untargeted humanitarian assistance delivery as a 
confidence-building measure is detrimental and will not achieve its 
goal.  Only through a tangible enhancement of security will IDPs and 
other residents of Darfur regain confidence in the AMIS mission. 
This may be possible if AMIS pursues its core security-related 
responsibilities with equal creativity and energy as the recent push 
to provide assistance.  End comment. 
 
HUME