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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM530, DARFUR: MORNEI, WEST DARFUR - THE EYE OF THE STORM?

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM530 2007-04-04 09:07 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO4001
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0530/01 0940907
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 040907Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6714
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000530 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, AND TSHORTLEY 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR:  MORNEI, WEST DARFUR - THE EYE OF THE STORM? 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000530  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (U) On March 5 and 6, USAID staff traveled to Mornei, West 
Darfur, to monitor USAID-funded humanitarian programs and to assess 
current conditions.  This represented the first visit by USAID 
Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance staff to Mornei in more 
than sixteen months due to restricted access as a result of ongoing 
insecurity.  Despite access difficulties in surrounding areas, USAID 
staff reported stable conditions in Mornei town and internally 
displaced person (IDP) camp where USAID programs provide essential 
services to an estimated 80,000 people.  However, the recent 
introduction of new Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) personnel, 
Sudanese government-funded local non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and nomadic Arab settlements in the area have the potential 
to undermine traditional authority, create conflict among the 
various camp ethnic groups, and disrupt humanitarian programming. 
End summary. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
2.  (U) In 2003, before the Darfur conflict began, Mornei had an 
estimated population of 7,000.  However, by the end of 2004, the 
town and surrounding area's population had swelled to an estimated 
75,000 individuals, including 68,000 IDPs from 170 villages in the 
Zalingei, El Geneina, and Wadi Salih localities.  IDPs included 
members of Fur, Maasalit, Zaghawa, Tama, Gimir, Dagu, and Tawara 
ethnic groups.  Although other areas in West Darfur have experienced 
frequent program suspensions due to insecurity, humanitarian 
agencies in Mornei have been able to maintain a consistent presence. 
 Through implementing partners Concern, Save the Children/US, ACTED, 
and the U.N. World Food Program (WFP), USAID supports ongoing 
health, livelihoods, emergency food assistance, and water, 
sanitation, and hygiene programs in the area.  USAID staff noted the 
high quality of partner operations that provide health care to 
approximately 200 people daily, access to clean water for the 
general population, livelihood opportunities for 2,437 individuals, 
and monthly food rations to 73,539 people. 
 
------------------------------- 
NEW ACTORS MAKE WAVES IN MORNEI 
------------------------------- 
 
3.  (U) In November 2006, new HAC personnel and Sudanese 
government-funded NGOs arrived in Mornei, leading to increased 
tensions and strained relations among government officials, the 
humanitarian community, and IDPs.  The arrival of three new HAC 
officials from Khartoum has increased tensions between humanitarian 
agencies and the HAC in Mornei, as well as within the local HAC 
administration.  The Mornei HAC Commissioner, Mohammed Abbas, is 
currently engaged in a political struggle with the new officials, 
who are not as cooperative or supportive of international 
humanitarian organizations and IDPs.  At the same time, Sudanese 
government-funded local NGOs established a presence in Mornei.  IDPs 
refused to accept non-WFP food assistance from the local NGO the 
Islamic African Relief Agency (IARA), which attempted to initiate 
food distributions.  IARA then established a health center adjacent 
to a Mdecins Sans Frontihres (MSF)-operated health clinic, and is 
competing with MSF for beneficiaries.  Traditional leaders, who had 
been supportive of international NGO engagement in the camp, have 
subsequently had their influence steadily eroded. 
 
-------------------------- 
LOCATION AND LAND CONCERNS 
-------------------------- 
 
4.  (U) For reasons that remain unclear, the week of February 20, 
local authorities attempted to force IDPs to purchase the land they 
were occupying at a price of USD 50 per plot.  (Note: Similar 
attempts to charge IDPs for land were made in El Geneina and Habilah 
during the same period.  However, after pressure from the U.N., 
these initiatives were stopped by the HAC in El Geneina.  End note.) 
 HAC plans to extend the camp to the east and relocate IDPs from 
crowded areas around roads in town to less congested areas further 
away.  However, IDPs view this initiative as an attempt at forced 
relocation and are not cooperating with HAC.  Traditional leaders 
perceive the relocation as an attempt to weaken their authority by 
separating their villages into multiple parts distributed around the 
camp.  U.N. agencies fear that the mixing of people from various 
ethnic groups could result in conflict.  (Note:  In June 2006, a WFP 
 
KHARTOUM 00000530  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
registration intended to improve beneficiary targeting prompted 
ethnic clashes resulting in three deaths.  Due to the violence, no 
subsequent registration attempts have taken place.  End note.) 
 
-------- 
SECURITY 
-------- 
 
5.  (U) HAC has negotiated a security agreement with several Arab 
nomad groups in the Mornei vicinity who have established 17 
checkpoints around the settlement to provide security to IDPs. 
Beyond this cordon IDP security is not ensured.  Several of the 
nomadic groups providing security occupy villages destroyed and 
abandoned earlier in the conflict; however, the scale of land 
occupation is not clear.  Although USAID staff observed several 
women returning to town from gathering grass and wood, humanitarian 
agencies reported that insecurity prevented vehicular travel outside 
of Mornei town.  The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in the 
area has a positive relationship with IDPs and humanitarian 
agencies, and maintains one civilian police (CIVPOL) station in 
town.  However, AMIS/CIVPOL will not patrol outside the station 
without an AMIS protection force. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
6.  (U) Humanitarian access in West Darfur is witnessing a limited 
recovery compared to the situation in December 2006 when 
humanitarian agencies had drawn down due to insecurity. 
USAID-funded NGOs have been successful in stabilizing conditions for 
IDPs by meeting their basic needs for water, health, hygiene, and 
food.  However, since November 2006, U.N. and NGO agencies have 
observed efforts to restrict IDPs to camps, break up traditional 
leadership structures, divide displaced groups, settle Arab nomadic 
groups on displaced African land, and provide an alternative source 
of humanitarian assistance accountable to the government. 
Donor-funded humanitarian programs provide essential humanitarian 
services to IDPs and local populations.  Changes in the HAC's 
attitude towards both IDPs and humanitarian agencies should be 
monitored in Mornei and across Darfur over the coming months to 
ensure continuation of an effective and non-politicized humanitarian 
response.  End comment. 
 
HUME