VZCZCXRO8011
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #1315/01 1071314
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171314Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7586
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3970

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001315 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT, 
EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICCENT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF
SUBJECT: PRT LASHKAR GAH: ENSURING STABILITY IN BABAJI 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (SBU) On March 22, Afghan National Security Forces, with 
ISAF support, initiated an operation that cleared a Taliban 
enclave close to the provincial center of Lashkar Gah (the 
"Babaji region").  Following the operation, local Afghans 
expressed what the Helmand Task Force and PRT generally take 
as genuine support for the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) 
and ISAF.  This is backed by reports of a proclamation of 
support from a local shura.  The Afghan National Army (ANA) 
was well received by the local populace, while the Afghan 
National Police (ANP) force was accused of various forms of 
predation.  Locals did not report a humanitarian crisis after 
the operation; rather, they offered a familiar wish list of 
reconstruction projects (road, school and clinic 
construction).  Bringing lasting stability to the Babaji 
region would create a contiguous development zone consisting 
largely of the two districts of Lashkar Gah and Nahri Sarraj. 
 Establishing a legitimate and sustainable security 
environment, however, will prove a challenge, given the 
limitations of the ANP.  It is imperative that the GOA, with 
PRT assistance, swiftly introduce reconstruction projects 
into the area and also show a more positive GOA face than 
that of the local ANP.  To that end, the PRT is working with 
the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development to 
quickly deliver select projects, including road 
reconstruction.  END SUMMARY 
 
Winning Consent After "Babaji" Operation 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On March 22, Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF), with assistance from ISAF, launched an operation in 
an area some ten kilometers from the provincial seat of 
Lashkar Gah, described as the "Babaji region" after one of 
the villages in the area.  This operation, according to ISAF, 
was designed to put pressure on Taliban extremists, foreign 
fighters, and their narco-trafficking criminal associates who 
have operated within the general population in communities 
north of Lashkar Gah.  Having forced Taliban elements out of 
the area, the Government of Afghanistan (GOA), ISAF and the 
PRT have undertaken to stabilize the area and secure the 
support of the populace. 
 
Locals Claim and Proclaim Support for the GOA 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Not surprisingly, in the aftermath of an operation 
displacing Taliban elements, elders from the Babaji region 
have proclaimed their support for the GOA in recent meetings 
with Helmand Task Force (HTF) and PRT representatives.  HTF 
recon teams that visited the area following the operation 
also report that local Afghans in the area expressed support 
for the GOA and ISAF, which they deemed generally genuine, 
despite their general propensity to agree with whatever 
forces are in control.  More unusual is the report from local 
Afghan sources of similar sentiments proclaimed in an 
Afghan-only shura on March 31, when an estimated 500 tribal 
and religious elders from the area met to discuss the recent 
operation and its implications.  They apparently took note of 
the fact that locals (in particular women and children) and 
their property have suffered significantly whenever the GOA 
and the Taliban clash.  Those assembled decided and declared 
that anyone whose son or brother had joined the Taliban 
should convince him to renounce and return to live a normal 
life.  Failure to renounce would lead to the local Taliban 
being forcibly expelled from the village, and any house 
associated with anti-GOA or pro-Taliban activity in the 
region would be burned. 
 
It's Not Humanitarian Assistance They Need Most... 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
KABUL 00001315  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Despite the elders' references in the March 29 
meeting to losses to persons and property from GOA-Taliban 
fighting, in meetings with the PRT and provincial officials 
and in HTF recon trips, locals failed to note any 
humanitarian concerns or battle damage stemming from the 
operation.  Rather, they have pointed to a familiar list of 
reconstruction projects, e.g., road reconstruction, canal 
cleaning, and school and clinic construction. 
... But a Government That Will Not Mistreat or Ignore Them 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶5.  (SBU) In meetings with HTF and PRT representatives, local 
elders have complained about the activities of the Afghan 
National Police (ANP) following the operation.  They have 
reported illegal searches, looting, and other instances of 
intimidation and abuse.  Many locals in the area have heaped 
praise on the Afghan National Army (ANA) and scorn on the 
ANP.  Local concerns undoubtedly have been heightened by the 
departure of the more-trusted ANA from the area.  The 
provincial Police Chief has acknowledged these allegations 
and promised to investigate.  Another potential problem is 
the provincial director of the Ministry of Rural 
Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), who elders say is 
unwilling to assist them, as they claim he is pro-Taliban 
(the director has held the position for roughly the last ten 
years). 
 
COMMENT 
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¶6. (SBU) A stable and secure "Babaji region" will result in 
the linkage of two key areas of the Helmand "Aghan 
Development Zone," i.e., the districts of Lashkar Gah and 
Nahri Sarraj into one contiguous area.  The positive 
reception and perception of the GOA and ISAF can only be 
maintained and reinforced if the GOA can provide effective 
and legitimate security, which has proven difficult given 
apparent ANP misdeeds.  The HTF and PRT have increasingly 
raised the possibility of mentoring for ANP in the area, 
along the lines of that provided to the ANA.  There are no 
quick fixes for the ANP, however, so it is imperative that 
tangible reconstruction and development projects be 
implemented soon.  In addition, given that the ANP is often 
the only face of the GOA presented in districts, it is 
likewise important that other provincial institutions play a 
role in ensuring stability in the area.  The PRT is looking 
to establish regular contacts in the area to manage local 
expectations and also at ways to initiate select 
reconstruction projects swiftly, such as road reconstruction. 
 The PRT has noted some positive responses from MRRD in 
pursuing reconstruction projects, which could introduce 
another positive GOA actor into locals' lives. 
 
WOOD