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Viewing cable 07KABUL1170, FARAH PROVINCE SEES RISE IN TALIBAN ACTIVITY,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KABUL1170 2007-04-10 03:53 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO9139
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #1170/01 1000353
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 100353Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7386
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3925
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3571
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001170 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR KIMMITT 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A. CG CJTF-76 POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER EAID MARR AF
SUBJECT: FARAH PROVINCE SEES RISE IN TALIBAN ACTIVITY, 
PROGRESS ON POPPIES 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (U) Ambassador Neumann's March 5 visit to PRT Farah 
revealed that the province, which one year ago was a 
relatively low threat area (albeit with high rates of 
criminality and poppy production), has witnessed a 
disburing increase in Taliban activity, and its central 
districts are now considered a high threat area.  PRT 
officials attribute the increased threat to the double-edge 
sword of development: completion of the Ring Road from Herat 
through Farah to Helmand has helped the local economy, 
but has also brought increased connectivity to the 
insurgency and local crime rings.  Wedged between Iran, 
Nimroz province (which shares one of Afghanistan's most 
porous borders with both Iran and Pakistan), 
and Helmand's most troublesome districts (Musa Qala 
and Naw Zad), Farah's location is the stereotypical 
"bad neighborhood."  To combat these factors, local 
government and PRT officials have organized 
a highly active Provincial Development Council (PDC) and 
Poppy Eradication Program (PEP) Team.  The PDC has set 
clear priorities, and the province witnessed an overall 25 
percent reduction in poppy cultivation between 2005 and 
2006.  Local police officials have also developed a new 
security strategy calling for increased ISAF patrols 
between Sharar and Delaram.  End summary. 
 
---------------------------------- 
DETERIORATING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
---------------------------------- 
 
2.  (U) PRT officials noted a new trend in insurgent 
tactics throughout Farah province, not previously seen in 
other parts of Afghanistan, whereby Taliban elements have 
begun using the road as a weapon, imbedding IED's directly 
into the asphalt and detonating them as targets pass over. 
(Note:  Just four days before the Ambassador's visit, a 
roadside bomb targeting a police vehicle in Farah City left 
three civilians dead and 48 wounded.  On April 8, a 
roadside bomb struck a police convoy and reportedly killed 
nine police officers.  Taliban insurgents attacked another 
police checkpoint near the Iranian border the day before. 
End note.) 
 
3.  (U) PRT officials opined that the deteriorating 
security environment was related to completion of the Ring 
Road in Farah Province which has enabled insurgents and 
petty criminals to communicate and maneuver throughout the 
province better.  Police checkpoints remain ineffective at 
curbing insurgent activity and, in fact, are vulnerable to 
attack themselves because they are static and have no 
capacity to transfer information from one checkpoint to 
another in an emergency. 
 
4.  (U) During his meeting with the Ambassador, Governor 
Mawlawi Mohideen Baluch expressed concern about increased 
Taliban activity and particularly stressed the importance 
of improving security on the road between Farah City and 
the town of Delaram.  Governor Baluch asked for a permanent 
ISAF patrol and increased aid to Delaram.  This request was 
echoed by the local ANP commander, who specified that 
increased patrols were needed between the area of Sharar 
and Delaram. 
 
5.  (U) Attacks on local schools have also increased since 
February 2006, although there was a lull during the fall 
and winter.  (Note:  Taliban attacks on schools nationwide 
decreased during this period, as they realized such attacks 
were not winning them any points amongst the local 
population.  End note.)  PRT officials noted that there 
have also been attacks on local clinics and "night letters" 
issuing threats to the local population throughout the 
Bakwa district. 
 
 
KABUL 00001170  002 OF 003 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
A NATIONAL POLICE "IN NAME ONLY"; NEW SECURITY STRATEGY 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
6.  (U) Of the ANP in Farah, the police commander noted, 
"We have a national police in name only.  We really 
function more like a tribal system."  ANP in Farah are 
primarily made up of members of the Barakzai Pashtun tribe, 
and it is difficult to instill in officers the notion of 
loyalty to the national government rather than the 
interests of their particular tribe.  He also noted that 
no one had been willing to take on the position of 
police chief in Bakwa district since the former police 
chief's removal.  (Note:  A candidate was  assigned via 
the rank reform process, but never showed up for duty. 
MOI is in the process of replacing several dozen AWOL 
district chiefs.)  When asked, the police commander 
was adamant that bringing in ANSF from outside the 
province would be a bad idea, as it would only fuel 
local mistrust of the central government. 
 
7.  (U) Local police representatives announced completion 
of a new security strategy which identified the province's 
key security points as Khaki Safeid, Bakwa and 
Delaram.  It also called for 350 ANAP to be depoloyed 
throughout Farah as well as a 500-member ANA battalion 
along with one ISAF company to patrol the Delaram district, 
where the Taliban are said to have made significant inroads. 
According to the police commander, requests to the MOI 
for ammunition have fallen on deaf ears, and local police 
have been forced to buy it from smugglers on the black 
market. 
 
8.  (U) The new security strategy also calls for an 
increase in the number of border police.  Farah 
shares a 296 km border with Iran, and local officials 
noted that there is currently only one battalion 
patrolling the border (versus two battalions that 
operated there earlier).  The local ANA commander 
assessed that the insurgency was not strong enough 
to defeat the ANA.  Rather, they had filtered into 
Farah to create a distraction, as evidenced by 
their ability to carry out only scattered attacks 
against police checkpoints. 
 
------------------- 
PROGRESS ON POPPIES 
------------------- 
 
9.  (U) Between 2005 and 2006 Farah province secured a 
significant decrease, 25%, in poppy cultivation.  (Note: 
This decrease was due, in part, to a prolonged 
drought throughout the province.  End note.)  The 
UNODC's most recent Rapid Assessment Survey predicts no 
change in 2007.  Poppy cultivation takes place 
predominantly in Bakwa district, as well as the Gulistan 
and Farah Valleys.  Local representatives of the 
INL-funded Poppy Eradication Program (PEP) noted 
their focus on increased public awareness, 
expansion of job opportunities, and investment in 
irrigation systems as a means to further combat poppy 
culvitation.  They noted that one major barrier has been 
the lack of cooperation between the different tribal groups 
involved in anti-poppy programs.  Pressure from police 
patrols has been marginally successful at prompting 
self-eradication.  They stressed that government employees 
cultivating poppy must be punished and also noted that they 
were still awaiting delivery of 30 tractors for eradication 
that were promised to them. 
 
10.  (U) The local representative of the PEP program also 
shared his thoughts that last year's pre-planting program 
started too late and speculated that the province would 
have experienced a 60% decrease in cultivation had efforts 
started before drug lords had already issued "poppy loans" 
to local farmers encouraging them to grow poppy.  He 
 
KABUL 00001170  003 OF 003 
 
 
suggested a new program to provide small loans to farmers 
for plastic pipes that would help them grow vegetables 
instead.  The PEP international advisor agreed that poppy 
loans - the only source of income for many farmers - were 
a huge factor in the existing level of cultivation and 
stressed that any aid or cash programs for farmers must 
be managed to ensure that the aid is not being used to 
repay poppy loans. 
 
---------------- 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
---------------- 
 
11.  (U) It is still too soon to evaluate local leadership 
as Farah has had three different governors in the past year 
and no Deputy Governor since June 2006.  Governor Baluch 
has only been in office since January 31, 2007.  He is said 
to be close to Karzai and has attempted to assert his 
authority in part by regulating the people's access to the 
PRT.  Baluch has said that while he is willing to accept 
assistance from Iran, he does not want to foster dependence 
on Iran.  Baluch added that although he lived in Iran for 
seven years, he has no desire to build up relations and no 
political interests in Iran.  He was reportedly chosen by 
the GOA to serve in Farah partly to signal to the Iranians 
that their activities in Farah will not go unchecked. 
 
12.  (U) There was a large showing of the local PDC for the 
Ambassador's visit.  They stated emphatically that their 
first priority is security and seemed particularly 
concerned about spillover from the unrest in Helmand's 
districts of Musa Qala, Naw Zad, Kajacki, and Sangeen, 
which they described as a bridge connecting Farah to 
Helmand and Taliban networks there.  Other priorities 
include getting access to electricity, drinkable water, 
building of a dam, wells, hospitals, and schools for the 
province's 91 thousand students. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
13.  (U)  Post will continue to watch developments in Farah 
province closely, as the Taliban will undoubtedly continue 
using the province to create the illusion that the GOA is 
losing control of not only the South, but perhaps part of 
the West and North as well. 
NEUMANN