VZCZCXRO8223
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0525/01 0990720
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 090720Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0006
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2041
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2075
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2046
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1658

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 000525 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EAID TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN AT THE CROSSROADS 
 
DUSHANBE 00000525  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Five months after the presidential election secured 
President Rahmonov a third seven-year term, Tajikistan seems to 
have stalled on the road of reform.  Throughout 2006, Rahmonov 
assured international visitors and his public alike that "after 
the election," new blood and new ideas would take Tajikistan to 
a new era of economic prosperity and open civil society.  This 
has not happened. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Instead of steering his country towards much needed 
reform and growth, we see a number of worrying tendencies in 
Rahmonov's leadership and government.  Increased unconditional 
economic assistance from China and Iran undermine the importance 
of creating a business climate that attracts private investors, 
and the pernicious little-brother-big-brother relationship with 
Russia works against the U.S. (and European) programs on rule of 
law and good governance.  Without sufficient incentives to 
correct these growing tendencies, Tajikistan will risk becoming 
a less stable, less prosperous country mired in poverty, 
unemployment and clan politics. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Rahmonov has not changed his "open door" policy of 
working with all countries and united diplomatic pressure can 
still counter some of the repressive tendencies.  Recently, 
coordinated efforts by the U.S and European missions and other 
donors convinced the government not to expel expatriates working 
for a registered non-governmental organization, and helped slow 
the passage of a controversial law on public associations. We 
still have the opportunity to influence Rahmonov and his 
government, but it will take heavy diplomatic push, and 
coordination with like-minded donors. 
 
The Backwards Trajectory 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) A number of trends raise concerns about the direction 
Tajikistan is moving: 
 
-- Tighter government control:  Since the November 2006 
presidential election and the government restructuring, 
Rahmonov's administration seems to be sliding backwards, 
employing more Soviet era tactics for controlling all elements 
of society.  Various ministries, including Justice, Foreign 
Affairs and Education, have cracked down on non-governmental 
organizations, using legal proceedings and extra-legal 
bureaucratic tactics to threaten expatriate workers with 
expulsion, prevent import of radio equipment, and refuse 
registration.  The government has restricted freedom of religion 
by shutting down a number of mosques and used licensing 
requirements to prevent them from operating legally.  Police 
have rounded up children found in mosques during the day. 
Government agencies have increased registration and reporting 
requirements for all organizations, local and international. 
Government agencies frequently demand a formal diplomatic note 
and the Foreign Minister's permission before agreeing to meet a 
diplomat or non-governmental organization representative, even 
at the working level.  Moving the Anti-Monopoly Committee into 
the Ministry of Economy further consolidates government control 
of what should serve as an independent watch-dog agency. 
 
-- Smaller, less competent inner circle:  Despite Rahmonov's 
claims that his new cabinet brought in new blood, the same 
favorites are at the table, just in different chairs.  In the 
worst cases, like the Ministry of Energy and Industry, an 
unqualified presidential relative replaced technically 
experienced ministers.  Rahmonov's top economic advisors -- 
"first brother-in-law" Hasan Sadulloev, head of Orion Bank, and 
uncle Matlubhon Davlatov, Presidential Economic Advisor -- have 
made considerable fortunes through privatization of Tajik state 
enterprises, but do not have the education or experience 
required to bring a post-conflict country with few resources 
into the global economy. 
 
-- Little political will to go beyond rhetoric:  Rahmonov can 
talk the talk about democracy, land reform, and anti-corruption 
measures, but has shown little inclination to do more than spout 
donor-pleasing window-dressing rhetoric.  His fight against 
corruption is weakened by the fact that the new "Agency to Fight 
Corruption" is headed by Sherhon Salimov, a former Dushanbe city 
prosecutor believed to have substantially enriched himself 
through government service.  Recent government rhetoric about 
rooting out corruption has been aimed at inconsequential targets 
-- teachers supplementing their $20 per month salaries and 
students driving nice cars -- but has avoided top-level 
 
DUSHANBE 00000525  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
offenders.  After the presidential election, the government has 
cracked down harder on free media and non-governmental 
organizations, rather than loosening up conditions, as senior 
officials predicted.  Internet sites were closed before the 
election, and some remain blocked.  Several local newspapers 
remain unregistered and the government tightly monitors 
Tajikistan's few printing presses.  The parliament only stalled 
passage of the government-supported draft Law on Public 
Associations after significant international and local 
objections to the legislation which would have introduced more 
stringent rules on registration and government oversight. 
 
-- Finally, some public outcry:  Tajiks largely believe 
political protests and street demonstrations sparked the 
1992-1997 civil war, and until recently most citizens have been 
too afraid to criticize Rahmonov or organize any public action 
that could be perceived as threatening stability.  However, the 
consistent lack of electricity in rural districts during a cold 
winter has led to a number of spontaneous public protests. 
Reports of women marching on a local government building, 
protesters tearing up pictures of Rahmonov and citizens 
vandalizing a local factory that had electricity while the town 
remained in the dark suggest that Tajiks may slowly be growing 
tired of the terrible living conditions and demand more from the 
government.  Dushanbe residents living in an area slated to be 
razed for the expansion of the presidential dacha also wrote an 
open letter to Rahmonov, complaining of the proposed seizure of 
their homes to support a new urban plan.  These small acts of 
public advocacy are unusual in the complacent post-war 
Tajikistan but could indicate mounting dissatisfaction with 
Rahmonov's regime. 
 
Tajikistan at a Crossroads 
 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Although Tajikistan has slid backwards in many areas, 
it still sits at a crossroads, figuratively and geographically. 
On the positive side, Rahmonov remains genuinely popular and at 
the very least knows the buzzwords Western donors and investors 
want to hear: anti-corruption, democracy, free elections, a 
better business climate, investing in health and education.  His 
government restructuring demonstrates that on the surface, 
Tajikistan can respond to donor suggestions for better 
governance, and we see signs of progress in local governance and 
decentralization.  The economy is growing -- more cars on the 
street, more goods in the markets, and a construction boom 
driving up rents.  Tajikistan's cooperation on counter-narcotics 
and counter-terrorism programs has given us a reliable partner 
for regional security, particularly in regards to Afghanistan. 
Should these patterns continue, Tajikistan could have the basis 
for a prosperous and stable country, despite the tough 
neighborhood. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) But things could easily move in another direction. 
Rahmonov has not always demonstrated the political will or 
bureaucratic tenacity  to implement fully all the changes he 
touts,  Nepotism and regionalism prevent almost any talented 
newcomer not from Danghara or well-connected in the system from 
rising above the rank of department head in a ministry.  The 
older Soviet-trained bureaucracy is having trouble adjusting to 
new realities; and the crumbling education system shows little 
promise of training competent replacements. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Rahmonov's recurring emphasis on Tajikistan's Persian 
roots seems mostly symbolic and has not contributed visibly to 
national unity.  During the Navruz Persian New Year festival 
March 21-22, Rahmonov publicly announced he was changing his 
name to "Rahmon" rather than the Russified Rahmonov, as a sign 
of respect for his Persian heritage.  (Comment: One theory 
suggests he changed his name so it could rhyme better in poetry. 
 End Comment.)  Rahmonov hosted a trilateral 
Iranian-Afghan-Tajik summit in July 2006, and he declared 2006 
the Year of Arian Culture (probably not understanding how that 
resonates in Western ears). 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The Persian push is, in part, a search for national 
symbols and identity other than Islam.  The Tajik authorities 
still maintain strong feelings against anything resembling 
Islamic fundamentalism.  However, Rahmonov's recent trips to 
Syria, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates show Rahmonov is 
willing to take advantage of Tajikistan's Muslim heritage too, 
especially as he seeks closer ties with other Muslim countries 
that do not necessarily support democratic change or economic 
 
DUSHANBE 00000525  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
freedom.  The recent announcement by the Tajik Deputy Prime 
Minister supporting Iran's rights to peaceful nuclear technology 
is probably equal parts pan-Persian solidarity and support for 
the greater Islamic world, mixed with a dose of practical 
recognition that Iran is a useful donor. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Meanwhile, the crumbling education and health 
infrastructure has left the next generation of Tajiks with 
significantly fewer intellectuals capable of managing 
Tajikistan.  The paucity of English speakers-and opportunities 
to learn English-means that Tajikistan continually looks to 
Russia and Russian-speaking countries, rather than seriously 
engaging India and Pakistan. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Iran, Russia and China all exert increasing influence 
on Tajikistan through substantial infrastructure projects 
totaling more than $1 billion.  This influx of investment funds 
allows the Tajik government to brush aside the U.S. message that 
fiscal responsibility, an improved business climate, rule of 
law, and transparent and accountable institutions are necessary 
to attract investment.  Tajik authorities still believe the 
relative lack of U.S. direct investment is a political decision 
of the U.S. government and for the most part fail to understand 
the economic implications of their own political decisions, 
e.g., clamping down on free media and NGOs.  Despite its lack of 
capacity and natural resources, Tajikistan seeks to follow 
China's development model -- something that does not necessarily 
bode well for our priority of promoting just governance. 
 
How the U.S. can nudge Tajikistan down the right path 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
-------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) In a risk-averse culture like Tajikistan, change 
comes in increments and we still have a window to help 
Tajikistan move in the direction of democratic growth and 
political stability.  Our current assistance programs do provide 
important support in key sectors, including security and 
counter-narcotics, agriculture, education, health and 
governance.  But it will take heavy engagement in three key 
areas to make meaningful progress in putting Tajikistan on the 
right path: 
 
Educational and professional exchanges 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) If we want Tajiks to have a model other than China, 
Russian or Iran, we need to provide them the opportunity to see 
another way of living and doing business, through increased 
exchange programs.  Tajiks pay lip-service to the ideas of 
democracy and market economics, but real change only comes when 
the officials and leaders exposed to these ideals in practice 
also have the capacity and influence to internalize the message 
and advocate for reform.  True reform is a long-term goal, which 
is why we were particularly disappointed to learn of the 10% cut 
to our FLEX (Future Leaders) program.  The Future Leaders 
program has a potentially greater impact than any of our other 
exchanges, as it gives citizens of an isolated country the 
ability to develop an appreciation for democracy and an 
understanding of individual rights and responsibilities, while 
they are still young enough to absorb fully the messages (and 
are more likely that older educational exchange students to 
return home.) 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Peace Corps would also be a tremendous public 
diplomacy and assistance tool.  Nothing has an impact on a poor, 
isolated country like a cadre of motivated young Americans 
living in communities, teaching English or small business 
development and sharing U.S. values and ideals.  A program in 
Tajikistan would also train a group of public service-minded 
Americans in Farsi much better than the current push to increase 
Farsi training in U.S. universities. 
 
High-level visits 
 
--------------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) It's all about the relationship-building here. 
Offering and accepting hospitality, sharing some toasts, and 
slowly building a personal connection cannot be achieved without 
regular interaction. High-level visits allow visitors and post 
to make personal connections with top decision makers that 
 
DUSHANBE 00000525  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
result in back doors to President Rahmonov and a real 
relationship of mutual understanding.  The August bridge opening 
will be a good opportunity for high-level interaction focusing 
on our mutual goals of regional integration and border security. 
 
Grassroots assistance programs 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Tajikistan desperately needs assistance programs that 
build capacity on the local level.  Existing USAID programs such 
as the Water Users' Associations and the local government 
project have strong track records on teaching local officials 
and communities accountable and responsible governance.  They 
create an organic kind of civil society with an immediate 
impact, and in the current political environment, they 
effectively demonstrate to average Tajiks the tangible benefits 
of democracy.  At the moment, we get more traction and progress 
from of these kinds of democracy programs, than the 
politically-charged projects with political parties that cannot 
operate due to government pressure. Only when there is a base of 
grassroots activism will Tajiks look to political parties to 
represent their interests. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Comment:  Tajikistan may not seem like a front-burner 
priority as long as it remains relatively stable in a region 
with other problems.  But we must work now to counter the 
backward trend towards an authoritarian government and declining 
human capacity if we are to avoid future instability.  End 
Comment. 
JACOBSON