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Viewing cable 07DUSHANBE512, HIGH LEVEL OF INTEREST IN U.S. POLICIES AT A TAJIK-RUSSIAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07DUSHANBE512 2007-04-05 03:26 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dushanbe
VZCZCXRO5349
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0512/01 0950326
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 050326Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9991
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2041
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2070
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2033
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1639
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000512 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON KPAO TI RS
SUBJECT: HIGH LEVEL OF INTEREST IN U.S. POLICIES AT A TAJIK-RUSSIAN 
COOPERATION CONFERENCE 
 
 
DUSHANBE 00000512  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (SBU)  Summary: Despite several swipes by Russian Ambassador 
Ramazan Abdulatipov at the United States, participants in a 
conference on Tajik-Russian relations showed sincere interest in 
U.S. policy goals.  While the March 28-29 conference on "Russian 
and Central Asia and the Conditions of Geopolitical 
Transformation" was geared towards examining Russian-Tajik 
cooperation, the moderator was quite pleased to have a 
representative present from the U.S. embassy, and unexpectedly 
asked PolOff to give two separate impromptu presentations 
regarding U.S. foreign policy and investment in Tajikistan. The 
conference brought together Tajik government officials, 
diplomats from most foreign missions in Dushanbe, two 
individuals from the Moscow State Institute for International 
Affairs (MGIMO), local professors and some journalists, and shed 
light of the sometimes tense dynamic between Tajikistan and 
Russia over political and cultural questions.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (U)  As portraits of both President Putin and President 
Rahmonov hung above the podium looking down at speakers at 
Dushanbe's Russian-Tajik Slavonic University, Russian Ambassador 
to Tajikistan Abdulatipov gave the opening address, and 
highlighted areas of cooperation between Russia and Tajikistan, 
including construction of the Sangtuda-I hydropower plant.  He 
further asserted that no other country was currently doing more 
to help the development of Tajikistan, and specifically 
mentioned that Russia was ready to expand cooperation in the new 
"multi-polar world." 
 
3.  (SBU) At times, Tajik and Russian government officials 
exchanged some testy comments, particularly over the role of the 
Russian language in Tajikistan.  Some Tajiks argued that it was 
not necessary for Tajik youth to study Russian, since Tajikistan 
was now an independent country.  Some Russians replied that 
learning Russian would open up additional possibilities for the 
Tajik youths, particularly for the millions of Tajiks who go to 
Russia to work as migrant workers.  A Russian professor also 
referred to local conflicts in Central Asia.  After her remarks, 
one Tajik government official berated her for her "unacceptable 
comments," particularly for using the term "local conflict," 
since all issues in Central Asia also had a direct effect on 
Russia. 
 
4.  (U)  Most of the presentations maintained a neutral stance 
towards U.S. policy in Tajikistan, with the exception of one 
professor, who claimed that  one of the main U.S. goals in 
invading Afghanistan was to apply pressure on Iran.  The 
moderator noticed PolOff's visible disagreement, and offered 
PolOff the opportunity to give an impromptu retort.  Many people 
asked questions about specific U.S. economic programs in the 
region, and asked PolOff to give a lengthier presentation the 
following day, citing figures of U.S. investment in Tajikistan. 
Following the second address, attendees asked more follow-up 
questions than any other presenter received. 
 
5.  (U)  A Tajik professor stated that he understood the U.S.'s 
need to protect itself, but queried when the U.S. government 
would start to think about the needs of other countries.  PolOff 
cited Tajikistan as an excellent example of a country that the 
United States was assisting, noting the U.S. Ambassador would be 
attending a ceremony the following day to give local Tajik 
hospitals $14 million worth of medical supplies.  Others claimed 
that there was a vacuum of information about U.S. policy.  A 
senior Russian diplomat gave the closing address, and 
specifically thanked PolOff for explaining U.S. goals and 
assistance programs to Tajikistan, and highlighting the fact 
that other countries were also actively assisting Tajikistan. 
 
6.  (SBU) Comment: The conference highlighted the mixed 
sentiments towards U.S. policy in Tajikistan from Russians and 
Tajiks and demonstrated the need for more aggressive public 
diplomacy outreach to convey the U.S. message.  It also 
underscored the tension that sometimes exists between the 
Russians and Tajiks over their bilateral cultural and political 
relationship.  Though Abdulatipov only attended the morning 
session of the first day, he treated this meeting as if it were 
a Russian embassy staff meeting.  After a Tajik government 
official made a comment about the threat of Islamic extremism, 
he immediately grabbed the microphone and lectured this 
individual that he needed to be careful when using the phrase 
"Islamic extremism," since all religions were connected to one 
another, and extremism existed in many other religions besides 
Islam.  Abdulatipov is a Tatar Muslim, and appeared to have 
interpreted the comment to mean that Islam was the only religion 
 
DUSHANBE 00000512  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
with which extremists were associated, which appeared to have 
struck a nerve.  End Comment. 
JACOBSON