VZCZCXYZ0007
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHEG #0979/01 0951528
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 051528Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4462
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0096
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0163

UNCLAS CAIRO 000979 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL UNSC IAEA KNNP IS IR EG
SUBJECT: NON-PROLIFERATION DISCUSSIONS WITH EGYPT 
 
¶1.  (U) Summary:  Special Representative for Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Christopher Ford visited Cairo on March 21 
for bilateral consultations on Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT) issues.  Egypt has expressed its dissatisfaction 
with what it says is insufficient progress in implementing 
the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT 
Review Conference.  Ford assured his interlocutors that the 
United States continues to support that Resolution,s call 
for a weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD)-free Middle East and 
expects this issue to be fully discussed at the PrepCom.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) On March 21, Special Representative (SR) Ford met 
with Ambassador Naela Gabr, Assistant Minister for 
Multilateral Affairs, and other Egyptian officials to discuss 
procedural and substantive matters related to the NPT, 
particularly the upcoming PrepCom.  Other participating 
Egyptian officials included Ihab Fouzy, Deputy Assistant 
Minister for Multilateral Affairs; Dr. Hossam Aly, Director 
of Disarmament; and Omar A. Youssef, Counsellor, Cabinet of 
the Minister.  Other U.S. participants were DCM Stuart Jones, 
Pol-Mil Officer Lisa Kenna, and Robert Blum and Scott Davis 
(ISN/MNSA). 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The principal -- and virtually the sole -- interest 
expressed by Egypt regarding the PrepCom is to obtain greater 
attention to and action regarding the 1995 NPT Middle East 
Resolution.  Gabr made clear that her instruction from 
Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit is to ensure that the PrepCom 
agenda includes an explicit reference to this Resolution. 
Egypt prefers that the agenda used for the PrepComs held in 
2002, 2003, and 2004 be used to attain this objective, and 
referring to the importance of U.S. leadership on 
nonproliferation issues, urged SR Ford to support this 
approach.  Gabr noted that the President of the 2005 Review 
Conference, Sergio Duarte of Brazil, had taken too long to 
resolve the agenda for that meeting, and suggested that this 
should be a lesson to us now as we prepare for a new review 
cycle.  She also complained about the note on the new cycle 
recently sent by the NPT depositaries (United States, Russia, 
United Kingdom) to all NPT parties, because it omitted a 
reference to the 1995 resolution, a reference that had been 
present in a similar depositaries, note circulated in 2002 
at the start of the last review process. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Ford assured Gabr that the United States seeks a 
full debate at the PrepCom on all NPT issues, including the 
Middle East.  Several of the Egyptians expressed their 
satisfaction with this approach.  SR Ford said that the 
depositaries had simply wanted to ensure that the note in no 
way overstepped the legitimate role the depositaries have had 
since the beginning of the strengthened review process in 
1995, and that the note had been kept scrupulously to 
strictly procedural issues and avoided anything that might 
suggest the depositaries were dictating to States Party about 
what subjects to discuss.  The changes were not intended to 
minimize the importance of the 1995 Middle East Resolution. 
Regarding the agenda, Ford said that that the United States 
prefers a simple and all-encompassing formulation that allows 
for discussion of all issues but does not specify any 
particular ones.  This, he argued, was the best way to avoid 
procedural deadlock and move rapidly into the substantive 
discussions all States Party say they desire. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Aly pointed out that the 1995 Resolution was part 
of a "package" that included indefinite extension of the NPT 
and that little progress had been made to implement the 
Resolution since that time.  Gabr stated that the 1995 
Decisions and Resolution are legally binding.  When pressed 
on Egypt,s legal view on this matter, Aly said that they 
regard the Middle East Resolution as being as legally binding 
as the decision on extension itself.  Ford expressed doubt 
regarding this legal interpretation but said that, regardless 
of legal interpretations, the United States regards the 
Resolution as important and its goal of a WMD-free Middle 
East as deserving of continuing attention. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) In response to continuing Egyptian insistence that 
the United States support adoption of the 2002-2004 version 
of the agenda, Ford suggested that the best model from past 
practice would likely instead be the agenda from the 2005 
Review Conference -- which was the last time all States Party 
had agreed upon an agenda.  Gabr and her colleagues argued 
strenuously against this, contending that the 2005 agenda was 
entirely unacceptable.  (Comment:  The 2005 agenda omitted 
any reference to the 1995 Middle East Resolution.  Egypt also 
obstructed substantive agreement at the 2005 RevCon agenda. 
End Comment)  Ford then said that it would be difficult to 
imagine Washington making the concessions Egypt wished 
without getting something in return.  Did Egypt, he asked, 
have in mind agreeing to some U.S. additions to the 2002 
formula, such as the need to consider other aspects of other 
outcomes of past Review Conferences as well?  He also pointed 
out that references to the 2000 Final Document were awkward 
for the United States because we do not support 
implementation of all of the "Thirteen Practical Steps" in 
the 2000 RevCon,s Final Document.  These steps, for example, 
call for the strengthening of the ABM Treaty, which no longer 
exists. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The Egyptians responded favorably to this idea but 
said they would need to see proposed language.  Gabr assured 
us that Egypt,s view on the agenda did not signal an 
intention to have the Middle East issue monopolize the 
PrepCom debate.  She also expressed Egyptian dissatisfaction 
that the likely product of the PrepCom would only be a 
Chairman,s summary rather than something agreed by all 
States Parties, but indicated that Egypt could accept the 
former.  Gabr said that Egypt,s support for efforts to 
persuade Iran to comply with its NPT and IAEA safeguards 
obligations was shown by its support for the February 2006 
IAEA Board of Governors decision to refer Iran to the UN 
Security Council.  She added that the West has a "double 
standard" in its pressuring Iran but ignoring Israel,s 
nuclear activities.  Ford disagreed about the alleged "double 
standard," but said that U.S. and Egyptian interests 
regarding Iran do not differ and should produce more common 
action. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The meeting concluded with an understanding that 
the two sides would try to work out language for the agenda 
that met each side,s concerns.  All expressed the hope that 
any resolution that met both Egyptian and U.S. concerns would 
be acceptable to Ambassador Yukiya Amano, Chairman-designate 
of the first PrepCom, and other key Parties.  All 
participants in the meeting also agreed to try to achieve an 
agreed agenda before Amano circulates his draft to all 
Parties on or around April 6. 
RICCIARDONE