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UNCLAS BERLIN 000834 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR ISN, EUR, WHA, CAN, EAP/J 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM MNUC PREL ETTC GM JA RS CA UK FR IT
SUBJECT: SECOND G-8 NONPROLIFERATION DIRECTORS' GROUP 
(NPDG) MEETING IN BERLIN, MARCH 30, 2007 
 
REF: A. BERLIN 791 
 
     ¶B. BERLIN 376 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The second G-8 Nonproliferation Directors 
Group (NPDG) meeting under the German G-8 Presidency was held 
March 30 in Berlin.  The delegates discussed the need for 
Germany to produce soon a draft statement on nonproliferation 
for the June G-8 Summit.  The delegates also agreed that the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee 
(PrepCom) should avoid wrangling over procedural issues. 
Concerning nuclear fuel cycle issues, the delegates agreed on 
the need to convince potential users that proposals on 
enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) are not intended to deprive 
them of nuclear fuel for peaceful uses.  The delegates were 
very interested in the status of U.S.-India talks on the 
proposed 123 Agreement on civil nuclear cooperation.  The 
delegates also discussed making progress in the Nuclear 
Suppliers' Group, Conference on Disarmament, The Hague Code 
of Conduct, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the 
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), UNSCR 1540 
implementation, and the IAEA Additional Protocol.  Lastly, 
Germany appealed to the U.S. and Russia to invite EU 
institutions to participate in Global Initiative to Combat 
Nuclear Terrorism activities.  End summary. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Draft Statement for Heiligendamm G-8 Summit 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) German Chair Ruediger Luedeking, MFA Deputy 
Commissioner for Arms Control and Disarmament, opened the 
meeting by discussing a draft statement on nonproliferation 
to be issued at the June G-8 Summit in Heiligendamm.  He said 
the goal is for a succinct Summit statement that avoids 
repetitions from previous years' statements.  He said the 
German Government will circulate the draft to the other G-8 
partners and solicit input prior to the scheduled April 24 
NPDG meeting (Note: Which was later cancelled.  End note.) 
 
------------------- 
NPT PrepCom Meeting 
------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Luedeking then turned to the agenda items, beginning 
with a discussion of the NPT PrepCom, scheduled for April 
30-May 11 in Vienna.  The delegates agreed a good start is 
important for the current NPT five-year review cycle.  DAS 
Andrew Semmel urged setting the PrepCom agenda right away 
instead of allowing protracted debate on procedural issues, 
such as happened at the 2005 Review Conference (RevCon).  DAS 
Semmel also cautioned that Iran could try to hijack the 
PrepCom and pit the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) members against 
the nuclear supplier states.  Luedeking urged the G-8 
partners to support PrepCom Chairman Yukiya Amano's approach 
used in previous RevCons, including the 2000 meeting, as 
models for conducting work at the next RevCon.  DAS Semmel 
noted the U.S. does not consider some previous RevCons as 
ideal models.  In particular, the U.S. is concerned about the 
use of the 2000 RevCon, since the U.S. no longer supports all 
of the 13 steps toward nuclear disarmament agreed to at that 
time.  DAS Semmel urged the NPT to set a more balanced agenda 
and to produce a more balanced statement, said the U.S. is 
ready for discussion of Article VI concerning disarmament, 
and called for more attention to Article X concerning NPT 
withdrawal.  He said the U.S. shared talking points with 
Amano and will discuss them and other issues at the PrepCom, 
despite Iran's reluctance to consider Article X.  Luedeking, 
summarizing the discussion, said Article X will be important 
at the PrepCom, that a focus on the peaceful use of atomic 
energy should be emphasized, that outreach work should be 
done to convince the NAM signatories that our approach to 
Article IV is not designed to deny them nuclear technology, 
and that Iran should not be allowed to radicalize the NAM 
members. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶4. (SBU) After the NPDG partners discussed this agenda item, 
 
Luedeking summarized the discussion as follows: the G-8 
partners have broad consensus for giving assurances for the 
nuclear fuel cycle, but nonproliferation is the driving 
concern.  The G-8 partners have made a number of proposals to 
the IAEA on this issue, but are now waiting for the IAEA to 
advance them to the Board of Governors in June.  Because it 
is an important and sensitive issue for the NAM, the G-8 
partners should engage potential users to convince them the 
proposals are not aimed at depriving them of their right to 
the peaceful use of nuclear fuel.  In addition, the delegates 
agreed Iran would likely try to manipulate discussion of the 
nuclear fuel cycle to its advantage.  DAS Semmel noted the 
overlap among the assured nuclear fuel supply proposals under 
evaluation by the IAEA, but he also said it is not 
contradictory to pursue both nonproliferation and the goals 
of Article IV on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
NSG Issues, U.S.-India Talks on Civil Nuclear Cooperation 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) DAS Semmel updated the NPDG delegates on the status 
of U.S.-India talks on civil nuclear energy cooperation. 
Luedeking said because Germany will chair the NSG in 2008, he 
is interested in the sequence of events for the proposed 123 
Agreement and other steps in the process.  He also asked 
about the conditions and certifications under the Hyde Act, 
whether the conditions are being met, and, specifically, 
about the issue of perpetual safeguards and what would happen 
if India conducted any nuclear tests.  DAS Semmel said the 
U.S. and India have achieved a single bracketed text for the 
123 Agreement at the most recent negotiating session and now 
clearly understand which points still need to be negotiated. 
One reason for delay in the 123 Agreement process is the 
domestic sensitivities in India, DAS Semmel said.  The U.S. 
position is that the agreement should provide for safeguards 
in perpetuity.  If India detonates a nuclear device, U.S. law 
would require an end to civil nuclear cooperation and the 
right to repossess the nuclear technology provided to India. 
This is a point of contention with India, DAS Semmel noted. 
Another point of contention concerns the U.S. ban on 
transferring nuclear fuel enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) 
technology to countries that do not already possess it, 
because India wants advance consent rights on reprocessing 
and access to reprocessing technology.  DAS Semmel also said 
India is committed to the FMCT, even though India and the 
U.S. may differ on FMCT policy.  The President will have to 
certify to Congress that India is fulfilling its FMCT 
commitment as well as make other certifications prior to 
Congressional consideration of the agreement. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Luedeking discussed preparations for the April 16-18 
NSG Consultative Group Meeting in Cape Town.  Germany passed 
out a Point of Contact Note, NSG(07)14, containing a German 
proposal, and asked for comments.  Luedeking said the 
proposal's goal is to create a new status between NSG members 
and non-adherents to ensure that as nuclear technical 
expertise spreads to new recipients that are not NSG members 
they will still follow the NSG Guidelines.  The Canadian and 
Italian delegates supported the proposal.  The French 
delegate cautioned against creating a new category for now 
because of concern that the NSG would be charged with 
applying double standards.  Germany asked G-8 partners to try 
to reach agreement in principle on the concept of their 
proposal in Cape Town while leaving details to be worked out 
later. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Luedeking queried the U.S. on the prospects that it 
will accept within the NSG a criteria-based approach to ENR 
transfers.  DAS Semmel repeated the U.S. stance of opposing 
ENR transfers to countries that do not already possess the 
technology.  After some comments, Luedeking said the issue 
needs to be resolved.  (Note:  None of the partners raised 
dropping the rolling one-year moratorium on ENR transfers 
from this year's G-8 Summit Statement, as happened in 
previous NPDG meetings.  This development may have been due 
to the absence of the normal Canadian representative, who had 
pressed this issues most vigorously in past meetings.  End 
note.) 
 
------------------------- 
Conference on Disarmament 
------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Luedeking noted that at its March 30 meeting the CD 
was unable to agree on the P-6 proposal for organizing work 
in Part II of the 2007 session because several delegations 
had lacked instructions.  The CD members agreed in principle 
on an intersessional meeting in late April, but were unable 
to agree on a date.  The Japanese delegate urged the G-8 to 
demarche CD members jointly, urging support for the P-6 
proposal.  Japan circulated draft talking points and 
solicited input. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Russian Delegate Anatolij Antonov said Russia wants 
the CD to make some progress.  He said Russia has demarched 
China on the FMCT and is still waiting for a response. 
Concerning the proposed G-8 talking points, Antonov said 
Russia considered them as mis-characterizing the P-6 
proposal.  He urged the G-8 to put the priorities in the 
first paragraph.  Russia's priority, he noted, is outer space 
and not the FMCT. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Luedeking suggested the NPDG review the talking 
points, keeping in mind Russia's points about not quibbling 
over priorities.  He said Germany would circulate the draft 
talking points, gather the NPDG input, revise them, and issue 
a G-8 demarche to the CD members.  (Note:  After circulating 
the draft, France could not agree to the text of a joint 
demarche, so eventually Germany, as G-8 President, made it 
unilaterally.  End note.) 
 
---------------------------- 
Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) 
---------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Luedeking said the HCOC is an instrument with 
modest objectives and diminished effectiveness because of a 
lack of authority and non-participation by countries such as 
China and India.  Antonov voiced Russia's concerns about the 
HCOC, saying 70 percent of the information provided to the 
HCOC comes from Russia and other countries were not committed 
enough to the HCOC.  Luedeking, in turn, noted three issues 
for Germany:  (1) the lack of participation, indicating 
declining interest in the HCOC, (2) the need to convince 
other countries, such as China and India, to participate, and 
(3) the importance of compliance with the HCOC's 
confidence-building measures.  Luedeking also urged the G-8 
to conduct more outreach activities and to consider the 
production of an annual report. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons Convention 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Germany circulated a paper on the 10th anniversary 
of the CWC.  Russian Delegate Antonov and DAS Semmel reported 
on the destruction to date of chemical weapons stocks of 
their respective countries.  Both also noted the difficult 
prospect of destroying all CW stocks by the 2012 deadline. 
All delegates voiced support for the CWC.  Luedeking, noting 
the difficulty of CWC verification, said complacency could 
become a problem.  Concerning the BWC, Luedeking said the EU 
will provide input to the BWC intersessional meeting. 
Germany circulated a report on the G-8 Forensic Epidemiology 
Workshop held March 13-15, 2007, in London.  Antonov said 
Russia's position was that epidemiology should be excluded 
from the G-8 Summit Statement. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Regional Issues: Iran and North Korea 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Luedeking said Iran would be discussed at the April 
3 Political Directors' meeting in Berlin.  Saying the 
situation in Iran is changing, Luedeking noted that G-8 
partners could not agree on Summit Statement language until 
later.  The British delegate said the UK is grateful for G-8 
support over the Iranian seizure of British sailors and 
marines.  He said the UK is not linking the detention to the 
 
UNSCR 1747 sanctions on Iran. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Japanese Delegate Takeshi Nakane said Japan 
regretted that the Six Parties had been unable to enter talks 
yet over freezing the DPRK's nuclear facilities.  Germany 
briefed the partners on a March 6-8 EU Troika visit to 
P'yongyang.  During that visit, the DPRK said it favored 
complete de-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula so long as 
it receives assurances from the U.S.  The DPRK also said it 
would like better relations with the EU.  Luedeking noted 
that the EU should not be expected to contribute funding as 
part of any settlement with the DPRK since the EU was not at 
the table, but that the EU would continue to support the 
Six-Party talks diplomatically.  French Delegate Carre said 
if the agreement progresses, it will be a positive signal to 
Iran to end its nuclear activities outside of IAEA safeguards. 
 
----------------------------------- 
UNSCR 1540, IAEA Safeguards, and GI 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) Luedeking discussed G-8 demarches on UNSCR 1540 
implementation and the IAEA Additional Protocol.  He noted 
that universalization is the goal for both.  Luedeking 
reported Germany had delivered two sets of demarches on 
implementing UNSCR 1540, with some countries responding 
favorably.  Luedeking also said Germany would deliver 
demarches on the Additional Protocol.  DAS Semmel suggested a 
G-8 Foreign Ministers' letter, recalling how effective the 
U.S.-led 2004 Foreign Ministers' letter on IAEA Safeguards 
was.  To Luedeking's objection that too many Foreign 
Ministers' letters would diminish their impact, DAS Semmel 
advised sending a letter only to countries which had not 
signed the Safeguards and/or Additional Protocol.  DAS Semmel 
also observed the work for making demarches on 
universalization does not have to be completed by the G-8 
Summit but could be spread throughout 2007. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Luedeking urged the U.S. and Russia to invite EU 
institutions to participate in Global Initiative activities. 
He said inviting EU institutions would not set a precedent 
for inviting other international organizations.  Luedeking 
also maintained only certain institutions, namely EURATOM, 
had the necessary competencies to oversee nuclear activities 
in the EU member states.  Russian Delegate Antonov observed 
that although every EU member state beyond the original 
invitees had been asked to join individually, only Greece had 
accepted.  French Delegate Carre agreed that although 
individual EU states should be more active the GI would be 
more effective if the appropriate EU institutions could 
participate.  The EU delegate said a paper could be prepared 
on EU competencies relevant to the GI and making the case for 
EU participation in the GI. 
 
¶17. (U) This cable was coordinated with DAS Semmel subsequent 
to the delegation's departure. 
TIMKEN JR