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Viewing cable 07BAGHDAD1399, KURDISTAN ISLAMIC UNION IN SULAIMANIYAH, IRAQI KURDISTAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BAGHDAD1399 2007-04-24 14:21 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO5169
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1399/01 1141421
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 241421Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0887
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001399 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
E.O. 12958 
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT:  KURDISTAN ISLAMIC UNION IN SULAIMANIYAH, IRAQI KURDISTAN 
 
This is a Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT) Cable. 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: The small Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) party has 
established a platform in favor of reform of the political party 
system in the Kurdistan Region to promote openness, a stronger 
economy, and broader political participation, according to several 
of its members.  As a marginal party that has had difficulty 
obtaining office, it  also seeks greater USG involvement in 
advancing democratic reform of the electoral process in Kurdistan 
and political institutions. The KIU stated it would like to see the 
government separated from the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and 
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the two dominant political 
parties.  The KIU also states it desires to end the influence of the 
KDP and PUK in the economy, the educational system and the labor 
market.   In any event, the KIU is not in a position to challenge 
the dominance of the PUK in Sulaimaniyah Province.  END SUMMARY. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
2.  (SBU) On March 29 and April 22, RRTOff met with members of the 
KIU,Sameer Salim Ameen, KurdoR.S. Seucani, and Poekhal A.B. Hussein 
in Sulaimaniyah.  Sameer Salim Ameen is a member of the Politburo of 
the KIU.  KurdoR.S. Seucani is also member of the Provincial Council 
of Sulaimaniyah Province.  Poekhal A.B. Hussein is a member of the 
Kurdistan Islamic Sisters Union (KISU) which is not a political 
party but an association of women.  The KIU, founded formally in 
1994, is based in Erbil with offices in all three provinces of the 
Iraqi Kurdistan region.  Its predecessor, the Islamic Union, has 
existed since 1951 and started having members in the Kurdistan 
Region in the late 1970s and 1980s.  The current KIU leader is 
Saladdin Muhammad Bahaddin (Secretary General) who was born in 
Halabja in 1950. 
 
3.  (SBU) During the Iraqi legislative elections in December 2005, 
KIU offices were the target of civilian protesters from the KDP. 
The protests were in response to the KIU pulling out from the 
Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan, a coalition which 
included the KDP.  Following the party's withdrawal, KIU leaders 
were assassinated and the KIU headquarters building in Dohuk was 
burned in January 2006, in the presence of the KDP chief of police 
and governor. 
 
4.  (SBU) In the December 2005 elections, the KIU obtained nine 
seats in the Kurdistan National Assembly and five seats in the Iraqi 
Council of Representatives (18 percent of the vote).  The party is 
active among students and in building mosques, clinics and schools 
in rural areas.  KIU interlocutors said they also have a strong 
following among the workers. 
 
5.  (SBU) KIU interlocutors noted that the party receives funding 
from the Islamic Relief Organization located in Saudi Arabia and 
Islamic Unions based in Machnester, U.K. through the influence of 
Dr. Ali Qaradaghi, a Kurd and senior member of the IU. They also 
said they receive no funds from foreign governments. 
 
5.  (SBU) The KIU has used public positions to attempt to present 
itself as an ethical, non-corrupt, non-violent, responsive 
alternative to the KDP and PUK, clearly targeting the perception 
among many in Kurdistan that the KDP and PUK are corrupt and have 
failed to deliver jobs and essential services.  One KIU member told 
RRT Off that they cannot support either the KDP or the PUK because 
of its corrupted ways and internal divisions.  The KIU interlocutors 
claim that their party is now the fastest growing one in Iraqi 
Kurdistan. 
 
GREATER USG INVOLVEMENT 
 
5.  (SBU) According to the KIU members, the KIU was appreciative of 
the USG for having assisted with the downfall of Saddam Hussein. 
They said their expectation remained that the US presence in Iraq 
would result in a fair and just government for the Iraqi people. 
 
6.  (SBU) A small party that has found itself cut out of much of the 
political process by the two larger parties, the KIU does not favor 
the practice in Kurdistan of deciding in advance how many seats will 
be allocated to each party on the electoral list and the rank order 
of candidates within the list.  KIU representatives underscored to 
RRTOff their belief in the important of the role of the USG in 
promoting democratic governance and reform of the electoral 
process. 
 
FOR AN IRAQI NATIONAL CITIZENRY 
 
7.  (SBU) The KIU members told RRTOff they want to be on an 
independent list and be a national party (without changing their 
name).  They said they do not support a sectarian classification and 
seek to go beyond an Iraq based on divisions of Shia, Sunnis and 
Kurds.  KIU members did acknowledge the Iraqi constitution 
recognizes the autonomy of the Kurdistan region.  However, they 
stressed their aim is to promote an Iraqi national citizenry with 
 
BAGHDAD 00001399  002 OF 002 
 
 
members having equal rights and duties, thereby differentiating the 
KDP and the PUK, which have promoted the strengthening of the 
Kurdistan region.  The KIU interlocutors said KIU has no members 
outside the Kurdistan region but that they believe in federalism. 
They wish all Kurds will exercise their full civic rights and 
promote the freedom of Kurds in Kirkuk to decide on their political 
future via Article 140 procedures. 
 
FOCUS ON IRAQI YOUTH 
 
8.  (SBU) The KIU representatives expressed particular concern about 
Kurdish youth because they have "accumulated problems from the 
Saddam Hussein era but lack a vision for the future."  The youth 
have lost their feeling of being citizens but instead are focused on 
the economic benefits (fuel, housing) of richer social groups in 
Iraq and in the U.S., the KIU members added.  Focused on economic 
opportunities, the youth have become weak citizens and are attracted 
to the better social services abroad, the KIU members noted. 
 
7.  (SBU) They see two major challenges for the youth: security and 
income/unemployment.  Jobs seem to go to members of the ruling 
parties as well as educational opportunities.  The ruling parties 
(PUK in Sulaimaniyah Province, KDP in Erbil and Dahuk Provinces) 
dominate much of the economy in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and 
membership in these parties is often a condition for a higher 
income.  KIU members expressed their belief that the US should make 
it a priority in Kurdistan to achieve open access to the labor 
market and a university education free from party influence.  For 
instance, selection for the Fulbright Program of the US should be 
free from PUK-KDP political considerations, they said. 
 
8.  (SBU) RRTOff encouraged the KIU members to contact the Public 
Diplomacy section of the RRT for further information on educational 
and cultural exchange programs. 
 
SEPARATE PARTIES FROM GOVERNMENT 
 
9.  (SBU) Members of the KIU told RRTOff it is necessary to free the 
government from the ruling parties.  They support an independent 
administration with separate legislative, executive and judiciary 
institutions.  The US can be of assistance in this objective, they 
added.  The US should give money and assistance funds to the 
government, they continued, not parties.  RRTOff replied that the 
USG does not give money to political parties. 
 
10.  (SBU) KIU members are against offering assistance projects to 
corrupt leaders in the KRG and the government of Iraq.  They 
asserted that the current "corrupt regime" in the Iraqi Kurdistan 
Region does not help citizens prepare for their future life and 
civic responsibilities.  The KIU encouraged USG representatives to 
meet with the students and understand their views.  They noted, 
however, that the US could not replicate a Western political system 
in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
 
COMMENT 
 
11.  (SBU) The KIU's platform for political reform and greater 
openness in the political process and in the economy in the KRG has 
earned the party a strong following among youth and in rural areas 
in Sulaimaniyiah Province.  This is likely due in part to increasing 
public cynicism about KDP-PUK party politics and disillusionment by 
many about the failure of these parties to deliver on promises of 
essential services. 
 
12.  (SBU) The KIU appears to be a well-respected by the working 
classes and intellectuals in Sulaimaniyah Province and is likely to 
attract more members if the youth in Iraqi Kurdistan become 
disenchanted with and lack access to the upper ranks of the dominant 
Kurdish political parties and denied opportunities in the labor 
market and the educational system.  The KIU could also attract more 
women as the party has seven of them in the politburo as compared to 
zero in the other local parties.  Nevertheless, , the KIU is not in 
a position to challenge the dominance of the PUK in Sulaimaniyah 
Province, given the PUK's powerful hold on patronage, the provincial 
budget and the security forces.