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Viewing cable 07WELLINGTON237, NEW ZEALAND PLEASED WITH PIF MEETING OUTCOMES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07WELLINGTON237 2007-03-20 05:33 2011-04-28 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Wellington
VZCZCXRO9763
OO RUEHPB
DE RUEHWL #0237/01 0790533
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 200533Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4047
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 4793
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY IMMEDIATE 0646
RUEHSV/AMEMBASSY SUVA IMMEDIATE 0582
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WELLINGTON 000237 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/FO AND EAP/ANP 
NSC FOR VICTOR CHA 
OSD FOR ISD/JESSICA POWERS 
PHNOM PENH FOR POL/MCKEAN 
PACOM FOR JO1E/J2/J233/J5/SJFHQ 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV NZ FJ
SUBJECT: NEW ZEALAND PLEASED WITH PIF MEETING OUTCOMES 
 
REF: A. PORT MORESBY 99 
     B. WELLINGTON 229 
 
Classified By: Charge David J. Keegan, 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  The GNZ believes the March 16 Pacific Island Forum 
(PIF) Foreign Ministers meeting offered Fiji's interim government clear 
carrots and sticks for a return to democratic elections within 18-24 
months, as recommended by the PIF Eminent Persons Group (EPG).  New 
Zealand was very pleased by the PIF Ministers' unity, which the GNZ say 
was strengthened by the Ministers' negative reaction to FM Nailatikau's 
denial of Fijian military human rights abuses.  Australia and New 
Zealand have offered significant financial and technical assistance to 
Fiji if it agrees to accelerated elections, contingent on continued 
cooperation from the GOF. PIC missions in Suva will work with the 
interim Fiji Government to discuss what is needed to hold elections in 
2008. This information will be fed back to the EPG, which will deliver 
another report in three months. GNZ officials concede the Solomons, PNG 
Tonga, and Somoa especially will need to keep unified pressure on 
Bainimarama and others to convince the interim government to accept thi 
approach. The GNZ also admits that it will be necessary to offer 
Bainimarama an exit strategy, but says it is useless to explore this 
until the GOF shows a willingness to sign onto the PIF's elections 
roadmap.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------ 
Meeting Goes to ANZ Plan 
------------------------ 
 
2.  (C) Alan Williams, the Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs charged 
with Pacific Island issues, told the Charge and PolCouns that the PIF 
meeting was an "Australia-New Zealand diplomatic success story," that 
laid out clear carrots and sticks for Fiji's return to democratic 
elections as early as 2008. The GNZ was very pleased as well by the PIF 
Foreign Ministers' unity in delivering a strong message to Fiji, as 
before the meeting it had seemed that the Solomons and Tonga especially 
would not come on board. 
 
3.  (C) In the end, neither Fiji nor the Solomons participated in the 
drafting of the final communiqui, although they had been invited to do 
so.  New Zealand and Australia convinced the others to accept a number 
of firm recommendations.  When for example Tonga and Kiribati were 
reluctant to "condemn" the coup, New Zealand persuaded them to agree to 
reiterate the December EPG's original statement expressing "profound 
concern" about the coup.  Williams said that FMs Peters and Downer had 
also engaged in crafty negotiating tactics to get the other Ministers t 
support a relatively short time frame for Fiji's return to elections. 
 The FMs argued that because Fiji's constitution requires that any 
changes to electoral districts be approved by elected Ministers, Fiji 
should hold elections immediately.  In reality, Peters and Downer made 
this case so that the other Ministers would not split the difference 
between the EPG's recommended 18-24 month time frame and the GOF's 
claims that it will take 3-5 years before Fiji is ready to return to th 
ballot box.  The final statement affirmed "the EPG's recommendation tha 
the interim government should commit to a firm timetable for national 
elections...within 18 months and 2 years, if not sooner." 
 
4.  (C) As Williams describes it, Fiji's presentation to Ministers was 
both conciliatory and recalcitrant.  Interim FM Nailatikau started out 
with an eloquent and plausible explanation of "Fiji's distinctive 
approach to a return to democracy." Had he left it there, he may have 
carried the day.  But the interim FM soon lost whatever sympathy he'd 
gained by delivering a second presentation message that included a 
diatribe against Australia's alleged plans to invade Fiji and a complet 
denial of any RFDF human rights abuses.  Williams said he could tell 
from the Ministers' body language that they were uncomfortable with thi 
harder message.  He added that Nailatikau's misstep probably increased 
the Ministers' resolve to press the interim government for an early 
return to democracy. 
 
---------- 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
5.  (C) Australia and New Zealand have offered significant financial 
and technical assistance to Fiji if it agrees to accelerated elections. 
Williams said New Zealand might even be willing to help with Fiji's 
anti-corruption investigations.  Any assistance will be staged so that 
 
WELLINGTON 00000237  002 OF 002 
 
 
it is contingent on continued cooperation from the GOF.  The PIF 
Ministers tasked ANZ and PIC missions in Suva to work with the interim 
Fiji Government to discuss what is needed to hold elections in 2008. 
This information will be fed back to the EPG, which will deliver anothe 
report in three months. Williams said the GNZ will monitor the missions 
progress weekly in order to gauge Fiji's response.  NZ officials also 
hope that additional pressure will be placed on the interim government 
through the EU's review of its development assistance to Fiji under the 
EU's Cotonou Agreement with former European colonies.  The EU is set to 
meet later this month with the interim government, and the review could 
result in a permanent removal of European assistance to Fiji's sugar 
producers if the GOF does not accede to return to democracy.  According 
to the GNZ, the EU will reportedly draw heavily on the EPG report in 
making its determination. 
 
6.  (C) Williams said that the GNZ has pointed out to Fiji that the 
timetables the interim government put in its own report to the PIF are 
far longer than necessary, and many actions that the interim government 
say must be sequential can in fact be carried out simultaneously.  The 
Fijian timetables raise the question of how much Bainimarama feels he 
needs to delay elections for his own safety, said Williams, who admitte 
that in the end Bainimarama will likely only agree to elections if he i 
given immunity.  But it's too early to discuss how this would happen. 
Williams said the PIF needs to see which Fiji it is dealing with -- 
contrite or recalcitrant -- before deciding how to handle Bainimarama's 
exit from the scene. While he was justifiably pleased with the results 
of the meeting, Williams also conceded that Tonga, PNG, Samoa, and the 
Solomons especially will need to maintain continued unity of purpose, 
strong advocacy, and the right "tonality" to persuade Bainimarama and 
other senior interim officials that they have many reasons to accept th 
PIF electoral roadmap. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Including Fiji in Regional Discussions 
-------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Williams reminded us that the GNZ sanctions allow bilateral 
discussions with the interim government related to Fiji's return to 
democracy.  He said he and others in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade were pushing for GNZ to allow GOF participation in regional 
meetings covering topics of regional interest, such as fisheries, the 
Pacific Plan, and energy issues.  Australia is undergoing a similar 
debate, said Williams, who added that the GNZ would be interested in 
learning how we intend to handle Fiji's participation in the Pacific 
Island Leaders Conference and other venues.  We agreed to keep in touch 
on this. 
Keegan