VZCZCXRO4704
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHFK RUEHHM RUEHKSO RUEHPB
DE RUEHWL #0198/01 0640341
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 050341Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3979
INFO RUEHZU/ASIAN PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION
RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WELLINGTON 000198 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2027 
TAGS: PGOV PINR NZ
SUBJECT: (C) MR. NICE GUY - NEW ZEALAND'S NEW OPPOSITION 
LEADER 
 
Classified By: Consul General John Desrocher for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
). 
 
(U) This message was drafted by ConGen Auckland and approved 
by Embassy Wellington. 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  New Zealand opposition leader John Key's 
persona in private meetings with USG officials has differed 
little from the face he has presented to the New Zealand 
public since taking charge of the National Party last 
November.  Key comes across as modest and moderate, 
determined not to alienate the broad New Zealand political 
middle by promoting policies significantly different from 
those of the ruling Labour government.  Likewise, Key's 
public and private statements to date suggest any foreign 
policy changes under a Key-led government would be changes of 
tone rather than substance.  Key's determination not to 
offend begs the question of how he will persuade voters that 
there is any reason to shift their support away from Labour. 
End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) In recent meetings with USG officials, and in public 
statements, New Zealand's National Party chief and opposition 
leader John Key made clear that his goal, at least for the 
time being, is to give the party a more congenial public face 
rather draw dramatic distinctions between National and the 
ruling Labour Party.  Key met with visiting DAS Glyn Davies 
on January 23, after the latter's visit to New Zealand to 
mark the fiftieth anniversary of U.S.-NZ cooperation in the 
Antarctic and, before becoming opposition leader, with ConGen 
Auckland PO. 
 
¶3.  (C) During these conversations, Key declined to describe 
a distinctive National Party foreign policy.  Asked how New 
Zealand foreign policy would differ under a National 
government, Key said the change would be more in tone than in 
substance.  Indeed, one of Key's first public statements 
after becoming opposition leader affirmed National's support 
for the country's anti-nuclear stance.  Key and his advisors 
recognize that foreign policy is a weak spot.  To strengthen 
Key's foreign affairs credentials, the party announced that 
it will form a think tank of former senior National 
politicians, including former PM Bolger, to advise Key. 
 
¶4.  (C) While we may not see much new foreign policy 
substance, we can expect a far more friendly tone from a 
National government.  Key described Prime Minister Clark as 
"fundamentally anti-American," citing then-Duty Minister 
Anderton's remarks highly critical of the President's Iraq 
policy speech.  While Clark disavowed Anderton's comments, 
Key is convinced that Anderton was only echoing the sort of 
remarks Anderton has heard the Prime Minister make in 
private. 
 
¶5.  (C) The conventional wisdom holds that Key's predecessor, 
Don Brash, was doomed at least in part because he had been 
labeled "conservative" or, even more fatally, 
"neoconservative."  Key takes a different tack.  He told 
Davies that National would not differentiate itself from 
Labour with a conservative economic program because a 
"socialist streak" runs through all New Zealanders - "not 
like Sweden, but it's there."  Key described the New Zealand 
polity as a bell curve, with the bulk of voters occupying the 
center.  A move to the right, Key said, would lose far more 
voters than it would gain.  Key is also reluctant to show his 
hand because he fears Labour will adopt any popular ideas he 
puts forward regarding, for example, tax cuts.  Given that 
the next election is some time away, the ruling Labour Party 
would have plenty of time to make Key's good ideas its own. 
 
¶6.  (C) Hewing to the center is not simply an electoral 
strategy - the center is where Key feels most comfortable. 
When he was National's finance spokesman, Key spoke privately 
in very positive terms about his counterpart, Finance 
Minister Cullen, describing him as an intelligent and skilled 
policymaker.  Asked what National would do to improve the 
business climate in New Zealand, Key had little to say.  He 
declined the opportunity to bash Labour or describe how he 
would do things differently.  He suggested that New Zealand's 
business environment is strong and identified "brain drain" 
to Australia as the only significant problem.  In remarks to 
the press shortly after becoming National leader, Key backed 
away from the previous National position that New Zealand's 
labor laws undermined labor market flexibility. 
 
WELLINGTON 00000198  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Key's private remarks to the Auckland CG reinforced 
the impression that he does not see a big role for Wellington 
in improving New Zealand's economy and is not seeking big new 
ideas for promoting growth and higher incomes.  Key expressed 
support in a pro forma way for tax cuts, but otherwise 
suggested only that New Zealand concentrate on adding value 
to its core strengths - agriculture, tourism, and 
aquaculture.  He avoided the usual platitudes about high tech 
and globalization being the keys to New Zealand's future. 
 
¶8.  (C) Comment.  Key's move to the center makes sound 
political sense.  It was probably inevitable given how 
effectively Labour exploited his predecessor's alleged 
right-wing tendencies in order to frighten New Zealand's 
essentially Social Democratic electorate.  Key is also a more 
natural politician than his predecessor.  Key can join a 
pickup volleyball game with a group of teenagers without 
looking entirely fake, while Don Brash's public events often 
were reminiscent of Governor Dukakis's disastrous 
tank-driving outing.  However, Key's easygoing and 
inoffensive approach has already generated accusations that 
his National Party is no more than "Labour-lite."  What is 
impressive about Key is that he has clearly thought through 
his strategy and is both aware of and comfortable with its 
inherent tradeoffs.  He appears to know it will be a 
challenge for him to distinguish National from Labour in a 
meaningful way without unsettling those voters most 
comfortable on the middle ground.  End comment. 
Keegan